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ABSTRACT
Dissertation concerning design, contents, priorities, and outcomes of development and
disaster risk reduction (DRR) global indicator frameworks. Historical review of United Nations
(UN) multilateral agreements and organizational dynamics precedes analysis of indicator data
reported for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets shared by the 2015 Paris Agreement
and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR). Background on the planning of
UN frameworks is considered along with results of indicator data analysis to identify actors and
processes that steer the focus of frameworks hence influence selection of targets and indicators,
and corresponding framework agendas. Fundamental flaws in resolution frameworks preventing
global goal attainment are revealed, along with issues of indicator validity and data accuracy.
Data evaluations performed for this study imply strongly that UN sustainable development,
climate, and DRR targets will be left unmet, continuing a “business as usual” pattern for UN
resolutions. Projected failures to address factors with hazards increasing potential prompts
consideration and investigation of bottom-up approaches toward sustainable development and
disaster risk reduction. Data resulting from a stakeholder survey concerning knowledge of and
participation toward SDG targets is presented, along with preliminary results of a stakeholder
survey conducted to assess preparedness levels of residents in the Greater New Orleans, LA area.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic climate change has accelerated in recent decades (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014). Climate change-related alterations in air and sea
surface temperatures, atmospheric and ocean circulations, and sea levels are forecast to influence
frequency and intensity of natural hazards, exposing populations worldwide to increased disaster
risk (Abatzogloua & Williams, 2016; IPCC, 2014; Vousdoukas et al., 2018). Global data support
predictions of growing disaster impacts. From 1998 to 2017, countries affected by disaster
experienced economic losses of $2.91 trillion, of which approximately $2.25 trillion, or 77
percent, were attributed to climate-related hazards (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters [CRED], 2018). Overall, a 122 percent increase in economic losses for all disaster
types occurred between the periods of 1978 to 1997 ($1.31 trillion), and 1998 to 2017 ($2.91
trillion) (CRED, 2018). Reported losses from extreme weather events, such as tropical cyclones,
rose by 151 percent between the two 20-year periods (CRED, 2018).
Disasters are known to more severely affect vulnerable populations in less developed
places. Poverty, a main determinant of vulnerability, is viewed as both a driver and a
consequence of disasters (UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UNISDR], 2009).
Poorer populations often live in areas with higher exposure to hazards and less risk reduction
measures. This results in disaster impacts of greater intensity, more likely to be accompanied by
loss of life, livelihood, and temporary or permanent displacement, conditions which in turn
create higher vulnerability and further exposure to events – a cycle known as the disaster riskpoverty nexus (Figure 1.1) (CRED, 2015; UNISDR, 2015a; Wisner, Blakie, Cannon, & Davis,
2004). Therefore, disaster risk can be viewed as tied to development status, and disaster risk
reduction to advances in development. The two conditions reinforce one another, making
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progress in both realms necessary to reduce expected damages from climate change impacts
(Murray, Maini, Clarke, & Eltinay, 2017; UNISDR, 2015a).

Figure 1.1. Risk-Poverty Nexus, based upon the disaster risk-poverty nexus in Chapter 9, “Risk
inequality,” of the 2015 UNISDR Global Assessment Report (GAR). Social processes that drive
the Risk-Poverty Nexus are closely tied to inequality. Inequality increases income poverty
creating social and political exclusion. This can lead to lower social cohesion shown to
exacerbate disaster risk, along with eroded accountability and high corruption (UNISDR, 2015a).
1.1 United Nations resolutions
In response to anticipated increases in climate change-related disasters, plans to curb
climate-driving emissions, advance sustainable development efforts, and implement effective
disaster risk reduction (DRR) measures have been created for varying levels of government in
2

locations across the world (Gall, Nguyen, & Cutter, 2015; Kolk, 2003; Mori, Best, & Cotter,
2014). Overarching, international commitment to these goals was formalized in 2015 with
adoption of three resolutions by United Nations (UN) Member States – The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030
(SFDRR), and the Paris Agreement on climate change (Fowler, 2016; Leiter & Olivier, 2017).
The Agenda, the SFDRR, and the Paris Agreement can be viewed as individual, yet
reinforcing frameworks coalescing toward an interconnected outcome (Figure 1.2) (Murray et
al., 2017; Munene, Swartling, & Thomalla, 2016). Synergies between them reflect the shared
economic, environmental, and social dimensions overlapping across, and occurring within each
phenomenon (Figure 1.3). (IPCC, 2012; Murry et al., 2017; Munene et al., 2016). International
advancement toward these UN resolutions is considered key in preventing largescale, global
destruction caused by climate change, and vulnerabilities exacerbated by low development status
and lack of risk reduction measures. All three resolution dictate that targets contained within be
achieved by 2030 for fortified, long-term results.

Figure 1.2. The Paris Agreement, 2030 Agenda, and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction coalesce toward an interconnected outcome.
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Figure 1.3. Graphic from the IPCC (2012) special report, “Managing the Risks of Extreme
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation.” The report and graphic
representation both consider interactions between disasters and development, the role of
development in exposure and vulnerability, and overall implications for disaster risks.
Countries of varying hazards exposure and development status have pledged to determine
pathways to 2030. The resolutions stipulate that participating countries establish benchmark
measurements and regularly monitor proximity to goals by applying framework indicators to
national-level data (Leiter & Olivier, 2017; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change [UNFCC], 2015; United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2017; UNISDR, 2015b).
To track national progress toward global goals, each resolution provided its own set of guidelines
for creating an indicator framework. With frameworks established, parties to these agreements
are encouraged, but not required, to regularly reapply framework indicators for reporting
purposes, and to reevaluate national progress to adjust approach and policies accordingly.
1.1.1 Resolution frameworks
Frameworks developed from outlines in each resolution are intended to gauge and guide
national progress toward each set of global goals. Shared targets among the frameworks
represent the fundamental connections between climate, DRR, and sustainable development. The
coinciding themes, targets, and timing of the resolutions are meant to enhance potential for
4

frameworks to reinforce one another. The hope is this synergistic support system will push
targets to overarching goals (Leiter & Olivier, 2017; Murray et al., 2017). Similarly, “triple
bottom line” sustainable development, a recurrent theme of the 2030 Agenda, addresses
economic, social, and environmental conditions to strengthen vulnerable populations and assist
in curbing climate drivers that intensify hazards (Hillier & Nightingale, 2013; IPCC, 2012;
Murray et al, 2017; Shepherd et al., 2013).
Table 1.1. Comparison of the monitoring frameworks of the three agreements
SFDRR

2030 Agenda (SDGs)

Paris Agreement

Name of
Resolution;
Framework

Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk
Reduction

Sustainable
Development Goals
(SDGs)

Paris Agreement on climate
change (aka: Paris Climate
Agreement; COP21)

Area of
focus;
Aim of
Resolution

Substantial reduction
of disaster risk and
losses in lives,
livelihoods & health,
and in economic,
physical, social,
cultural and
environmental assets.

Achievement of “triple
bottom line”
sustainable
development
(economic, social,
environmental) in
most/all sectors;
*SDGs intended to
serve as a driver for
implementation and
mainstreaming

Hold increase in global
average temperature to
“well below” 2°C & pursue
efforts to limit it to 1.5°C;
Increase ability to adapt to
adverse impacts of climate
change; Make finance flows
consistent with pathway
towards low GHG
emissions & climateresilient development

Structure;
Measurement Tool(s)

7 Global Targets; 38
“universal” indicators

17 Goals (SDGs); 169
targets; 232 “universal”
indicators

“Nationally-Determined
Contributions” (NDCs)

Indicator
Type

“Universal”
(predetermined,
“one size fits all”)

“Universal”
(predetermined,
“one size fits all”)

May develop countryspecific adaptation
monitoring systems

Framework
shapers /
Influencers

By an ‘open-ended
intergovernmental
expert working group’
comprised of experts
nominated by States &
supported by
UNISDR; adopted by
UN General Assembly

By an ‘Inter-Agency &
Expert Group on SDG
Indicators’; adopted by
UN General Assembly
(*by some accounts
OECD, OWG - First
World countries
disproportionately)

‘Modalities, procedures &
guidelines’ for national
reporting under the
transparency framework
(Art. 13); Details of
Adaptation Communications
(Art. 7) still to be agreed
upon by COP
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Of the three frameworks, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030
Agenda offers the most comprehensive set of assessment tools, featuring 17 overall goals
(SDGs), 169 targets to the goals, and 232 “universal” indicators to track progress at the national
level (UNFCCC, 2015; UNGA, 2017; UNISDR, 2015b). This is considerably more than the
seven global targets and 38 universal indicators offered by the Sendai Framework, it is also a
predetermined and defined framework, unlike “Nationally-Determined Contributions (NDCs)”
of the Paris Agreement which are set at the national level (UNFCCC, 2015; UNISDR, 2015b).
The 169 targets of the SDG framework also feature 5-, 10-, and 15-year milestones to assist
nations seeking to keep pace with the 2030 deadline (UNGA, 2015; UNGA, 2017).
Conducting regular reassessments of data for evaluative purposes is a cornerstone of
incremental target attainment (Sachs, 2012; UNGA, 2017; UNESCAP, 2015). Routine
evaluation of indicators can be used to inform new policy and adjust existing policy accord ing to
national performance. Framework targets can also be expanded to better suit national context
(i.e. First World settings where targets designed for developing countries were previously
reached). Expanding predetermined SDG targets is also encouraged when a target is met prior to
the 2030 resolution deadline and national capacity is deemed capable of supporting further
pursuits of progress (UNISDR, 2008; UNESCAP, 2015).
1.2 Fulfillment of international goals and commitments
National pledges to aspire to and report upon progress toward Paris Agreement NDCs,
and the SDG and SFDRR frameworks hold potential for policy-makers to resolve core conflicts
between the three sustainability dimensions (social, economic, environmental), while advancing
progress through transborder knowledge-sharing (Leiter & Olivier, 2017; Murray et al., 2017;
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP], 2015).
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Developed countries are expected to lead the path toward global goals via international
contributions of technological aid, “North-South” funding mechanisms, and domestic-level
progress toward framework targets (Osborn, Cutter, & Ullah, 2015; UNGA, 2017). Yet, reports
on progress to date indicate few developed countries will reach necessary targets to achieve
global goals (Kroll, 2015; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, & Teksoz, 2016;
Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, & Teksoz, 2017; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll,
Lafortune, & Fuller, 2018).
First World shortfalls toward SDG, DRR, and Paris Agreement climate goals have farreaching effects (IPCC, 2014; Sachs et al., 2018). Domestically, ineffective risk reduction
compounded by uncurbed climate change and growing vulnerability of citizens left behind by
development lags increases and intensifies disaster impacts. The resulting growth of national
disaster costs diminishes First World potential to “lift up” developing countries via international
contributions – leaving the world more vulnerable overall. Additionally, “spillover effects,” such
as high carbon dioxide (CO2) outputs from domestic consumption and production enter the
collective atmosphere and increase global risk. To prevent potentially catastrophic climate
hazards and promote universal well-being, progress toward reinforcing targets of the resolutions
must be achieved by all developed nations.
1.2.1 International role of the United States
The United States, one of the wealthiest nations in the world, has consistently ranked
toward the bottom of SDG indices when compared to similarly developed countries. (Kroll,
2015; Sachs et al., 2016; Sachs et al., 2017; Sachs et al., 2018). In addition to negative outcomes
at the domestic level, this lack of SDG achievement extends beyond U.S. borders as “spillovers,”
such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – atmospheric climate drivers that significantly impact
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global conditions and at-risk populations. Nearly a quarter of the world’s spillover effects can be
attributed to the United States alone (Sachs et al., 2018). The long-time rank of the United States
as the second-highest emitter of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion (Figure 1.4) contributes to that
high spillover assessment, and frames the U.S. exit from the Paris Agreement in 2019 as a matter
of international concern (Boden, Andres, & Marland, 2017; International Energy Agency [IEA],
2019a; IPCC, 2014; Oxfam, 2015; Mulligan; Pompeo, 2019; Saad, 2018; Sachs et al., 2018).
CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion in Metric tons (Mt)

Country

Value (MtCO2)

China
U.S.
India
Russia
Japan
Germany
Korea
Iran
Canada

9.2 thousand
4.8 thousand
2.2 thousand
1.5 thousand
1.1 thousand
718.8
600.0
570.0
553.1

Saudi Arabia

516.6

Figure 1.4. Global CO2 combustion emissions by country with table of top emitters (IEA, 2019a).
Exiting the Paris Agreement and other rollbacks on international participation toward
similar goals is part of a U.S. federal reversal from building policies based in environmental
stewardship to an “Energy First” nonrenewable resource approach initiated shortly after the 2017
inauguration of the Trump Administration (Miller, 2018; Miller & Persons, 2019; Popovich,
Albeck-Ripka, & Pierre-Louis, 2019; U.S. Department of Interior [DOI], 2017). Assessments of
2017 revealed a marked increase in global CO2 emissions following several years of decline
(Figure 1.5) (IEA, 2019a). This increase continued through 2018 revitalizing an upward trend
with levels reminiscent of global emissions peaks in the early 2000s (IEA, 2019a). Although U.S.
emissions cannot solely account for a return to upward emissions trends, the U.S. “Energy First”
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approach and its exit from the Paris Agreement arguably set a global policy trend. (Pickering,
McGee, Stephens, & Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2018; Saad , 2018; Urpelainen & Van de Graaf , 2018).

Figure 1.5. Global CO2 emissions, 2014-2018. An upward trend reemerged in 2017 (IEA , 2019a).
From 2017 through 2019, the United States defaulted on commitments to the SFDRR in
addition to the Paris Agreement. Although the country signed onto the Sendai Framework under
the Obama Administration in 2015, the subsequent federal administration has not implemented
SFDRR risk reduction strategies, contributed national-level indicator data to the UN global
reports, nor has it formed a National Platform to mainstream DRR into relevant policies and
institutions (UNISDR, n.d.-a; UNISDR, 2017). Rising global temperatures and lack of sufficient
DRR will result in rising disaster occurrences and costs (CRED, 2018; IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014).
The United States experienced its highest year of billion-dollar disasters in 2017. A combination
of high-Category hurricanes, wildfire, and severe storms contributed to over $320 billion in
combined disaster costs (NCEI, 2020) (Figure 1.6). U.S. Federal DRR inaction creates cascading
effects that reach the global sphere, however, effects related to disaster occurrence, outcomes,
and overall risk are felt most immediately by increasingly vulnerable U.S. populations.
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Figure 1.6. U.S. billion-dollar disaster costs 1980 to mid-2020, with 2017 disasters (NCEI, 2020).
1.3 Problem Statement
Adoption of the first 2015 framework in Sendai occurred within one week of the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) confirming that 2014 was the warmest year on record to
date – part of the upward global warming trend since the turn of the 21st century (Figure 1.7)
(WMO, 2015; NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies [GISS], 2020). Six months later, the
2030 Agenda was adopted in September during the UN Summit in New York. The Agenda,
which prompted official introduction of the SDG framework, was agreed to one week after the
2015 summer was declared the hottest since records began, an announcement that continued a
succession since the start of the year with six of the first eight months in 2015 also ranked as the
warmest on record (Samenow, 2015). Finally, approximately one year after Member States
committed to the framework for risk reduction in Sendai, the Paris Agreement was finalized
amid reports that 2015 broke the 2014 record for warmest year, and that nearly 350 disasters had
been reported worldwide (UNISDR, 2016). Global disasters in 2015 caused close to 23,000
deaths, and left 100 million people impacted, half of whom (50.5 million) were populations in
Africa undergoing long-term drought conditions (Mead, 2016; UNISDR, 2016).
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Figure 1.7. Global land-ocean temperature index from 1880-2019 shows upward warming trend.
Changes in global surface temperature are depicted relative to 1951-1980 average temperatures
Nineteen of the 20 warmest years on record have occurred since 2001 (NASA/GISS, 2020).
Disasters of all forms are known to more severely affect vulnerable populations in less
advanced locations. Hazards conditions are often exacerbated and perpetuated by lacking or lax
risk reduction measures (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2015;
Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008; UNISDR, 2009; Wisner, Blakie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). As
disaster impacts continue, loss of life, livelihood, and displacement create higher vulnerability
furthering exposure to hazards, thus establishing or perpetuating the disaster risk-poverty nexus
(CRED, 2015; UNISDR, 2009; UNISDR, 2015a; Wisner et al., 2004) The disaster risk-poverty
nexus demonstrates that hazards exposure and development status are inextricably linked, hence
too, disaster risk reduction (DRR) to development advances. The two characteristics reinforce
one another, making improvements to both pivotal toward overall reduction of damages.
Conversely, lags or stops in progress can create near inescapable conditions replete with repeat
disasters and halts to development (Hillier & Nightingale, 2013; IPCC, 2012; Murray et al.,
2017; Shepherd et al., 2013; UNISDR, 2015a). With these concerns at the forefront, the UN
adopted the three 2015 resolutions, establishing top-down frameworks to measure and guide
national progress toward sustainable development and DRR.

11

Of course, adopting and establishing frameworks does not ensure the systems are wellsuited to the task, nor does it guarantee active participation toward reaching targets and global
goals. Performance reports at the seminal 5-year mark suggest that targets outlined by the 2015
resolutions will not be met by the 2030 deadline. Most countries will not fulfill the 5-year SDG
milestones, and achieving the 2015 resolutions will require rapid multilateral action and
coordination, efforts which thus far have not been demonstrated by most countries. (Sachs,
Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, & Teksoz, 2016; CRED, 2018; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub,
Kroll, Lafortune, & Fuller, 2019). Without largescale progress, reinforcing factors of DRR,
climate, and development will act to increase impacts and disruptions. Rather than improving
safety and well-being via resolution targets attained, these factors will instead coalesce as
ongoing, cyclical risk-poverty nexus scenarios that increase the vulnerability of populations
worldwide, while incrementally diminishing vital support systems (CRED, 2015; CRED, 2018;
IEA, 2019a; IPCC, 2012; Shepherd et al., 2013; UNISDR, 2009; UNISDR, 2015a)
1.4 Research Objectives and Research Questions
The objective of this dissertation is to identify possible causes contained within the
construction and approach of the 2030 Agenda that contribute to lack of positive outcomes on
the part of the United States and countries of similar development status. Preliminary review of
the creation process of the Agenda’s 17 SDGs suggests that levels of representation and
influence lead to targets and indicators containing unbalanced expectations and accountability
according to development status. Additionally, initial analysis of UN SDG reports shows this
imbalance carries over in the form of significant data gaps in indicator reporting. The overall
work suggests that a “business as usual” approach on the part of the UN in formation of the
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Agenda, coupled with flawed assumptions upon which SDG progresses rely, will result in low
levels of sustainable development achievement by the resolution’s 2030 deadline.
1.4.1 Research questions
This study begins with review of past UN initiatives to identify conditions or patterns
with potential to influence resolution outcomes. The second section provides evaluation of SDG
indicator data as presented by the UN and United States with attention toward target coverage,
and data quality. Finally, focus is shifted from global and national spheres to local actors with
brief analysis and discussion of a survey study concerning stakeholder knowledge and
perceptions of the 2015 SDGs. The following questions are addressed:
1.) What influences the priorities and progress of UN resolutions?
2.) Regarding importance of data reporting and assessment toward target attainment, what is
the status of UN SDG data related to targets from the Paris Agreement and SFDRR?
3.) Regarding the influence and impact of First World countries on global sustainability,
what is the status of U.S.-reported SDG data related to the Paris Agreement and SFDRR?
Finally, the stakeholder survey study will be used to consider a fourth question – Regarding the
potential need for bottom-up approaches to sustainable development, how familiar are
stakeholders with the SDGs, and at what government level or societal sphere are actions by
stakeholders perceived to hold the most influence on sustainable development?
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
In 2015, amid reports of rising temperatures, growing disaster costs, and public concern
surrounding hazards intensification due to climate change, the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) passed a succession of resolutions starting in Sendai, Japan in March – The Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), then, in September in New York – The 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, and finally, just ahead of year’s end, the Paris Agreement
on climate change (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC],
2015; UNGA, 2015; United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UNISDR],
2015b). Adoption of these three resolutions within one year symbolized international recognition
that climate change, sustainable development, and disaster risk reduction (DRR) are integrated,
thus require an interconnected approach (Kelman, Gaillard, & Mercer, 2015; Leiter & Olivier,
2017; Murray, Clarke, & Eltinay, 2017). However, national performance of UN Member States
who signed onto resolutions, committing to corresponding frameworks has been deficient to date.
As a means of investigation into potential causes for past and present resolution
outcomes, this study will evaluate inputs and outputs of the most extensive framework resulting
from the three 2015 resolutions, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030
Agenda. Inputs and outputs for the purposes of Chapter 2 are the framework components of the
SDGs, built and based upon previous UN conferences, contexts, and outcomes. The following
section reviews select conference proceedings, organizational dynamics of the United Nations,
and planning of frameworks intended to guide progress toward resolution goals to identify
patterns pursuant to performance on targets of the 2015–2030 SDGs and similar UN frameworks.
It begins with description of the first UN megaconference concerning sustainability and the
global, human environment held approximately 40 years prior to adoption of the SDGs.
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2.1 UN Conferences, Contexts, and Outcomes: UNCHE (Stockholm, 1972)
The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), also known as the
Stockholm Conference for its location, is considered a turning point in international
environmental politics. The first conference of its kind, the UNCHE brought together world
leaders and scientists for discussion on international issues of environment, including
transboundary air and waterways, framing them within a global context (Adede, 1995; Handl,
2012; Seyfang, 2003). The main goal of the conference, four years in the making, was to provide
a setting for UN Member States to connect and consider impacts to the human environment, and
depart having formed and forged common pathways toward planetary preservation (Handl, 2012;
UNGA, 1969; UNGA, 1972; United Nations 1973). General Assembly deliberations eventually
arrived at a final outcome document, “The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment,” containing seven proclamations, 26 principles, and a list of 109
recommendations. Each of the 109 recommendation numbers appear once more at the end of the
document, delineated by theme and purpose into an “Action Plan” (United Nations, 1973).
The recommendations are presented in detail and embody the bulk of the Declaration. In
their entirety, they fill 27 pages. On the bottom half of the last page beneath number 109 is a
section titled, “The Action Plan.” Approximately one- and one-half pages in length, the Plan
categorizes the recommendations under three headings - Environmental Assessment (referred to
as “Earthwatch”), “Environmental Management,” and, “Supporting Measures.” Subheads,
sometimes consisting of sentence-long descriptions, refine the categories into specific aims,
“education, training, and public information,” or, “financial and other forms of assistance
(United Nations, 1973, p. 28).” Each subcategory is accompanied by two or more lines of
comma-separated numbers correspondent to the recommendations described in preceding pages.
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While the Plan basically amounts to a numbers index, it does provide structure to the
recommendations, as well as suggested means of implementation (MOI). It is a crude
framework, but the Declaration’s influence on more recent resolutions can be observed in its
format of overarching goals (“Proclamations”), targets (“Principles”), and in a sense,
instructional indicators (recommendations organized as Action Plan subcategories). Its breadth
of recommendations, 109 in all, bears similarity to the extensive set of indicators in the 2015
SDG framework, a portion of which are also MOI “indicators” intended to measure whether a
nation has secured suggested resources to assist target attainment. This is similar to UNCHE
recommendations under Action Plan subcategories (i.e. “financial and other forms of assistance”)
(UNGA, 1972; UNGA, 2015; UNGA, 2017; United Nations, 1973) (Figure 2.1).
Overarching framework for “Action Plan”
(top), and recommendation numbers listed
under “Environmental Assessment” (bottom)

Recommendation number, 18 (1, a-e) from
under “Environmental Assessment” heading,
matched to Recommendation 18 text

3.)
1.)

2.)

4.)

Figure 2.1. Action Plan featured in the UNCHE outcome Declaration (United Nations, 1973).
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Recommendations, proclamations, and principles in the UNCHE were intended as a
guide toward implementing environmental protections and transboundary treaties (Handl, 2012;
UNGA, 1969; United Nations, 1973). It was hoped that provision of a framework to add ress
multilateral preservation challenges would act to also reinforce international commitments to
those ends (Adede, 1995; Handl, 2012; UNGA, 1969). This is in line with the seventh and final
proclamation of the Declaration considered to be the core concept established thus fundamental
takeaway of the 1972 proceedings – that Member States acknowledge and accept responsibility
for environmental impacts stemming from national-level activities (Adede, 1995; Handl, 2012;
Seyfang, 2003; UNGA, 1972; United Nations, 1973). In this way, the UNCHE was the first
international environmental document of its kind. A total of 112 nations represented at the
conference adopted the Declaration, and indeed, several multilateral treaties focused on issues of
transboundary transfers and shared environments followed. (Adede, 1995; Handl, 2012; Seyfang,
2003; UNGA, 1972).
2.1.1 Connected or conflicted: environment and development (UNCHE, Stockholm)
The number of Member States who adopted the conference agreement was more than
expected – not because of disputes concerning the Declaration’s final contents, but rather,
declarations on behalf of Member States that representatives would not be attending the
UNCHE. (Najam, 2005). Leaders from “Third World” countries, or countries considered on the
economic periphery (also referred to as the “Global South”) viewed focus on environment as an
aside, a distraction from larger issues affecting the nations they represented. Beset by the
difficulties of poverty, poor living conditions, civil unrest, and disease, several developing
countries questioned the very need for such a conference to take place (Garth, 1973; Najam,
2005). Member States contesting the UNCHE rightly cited poor development as the source of
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their national share of environmental degradation (Doud, 1972; Najam, 2005). In the early
1970s, several Third World countries were in the process of attempting recovery from colonial
imperialism carried out by the industrialized “First World” (Harvey, 2007; Mindaoudou, 2015;
U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Further, many developing countries had only recently entered
into the UN, not being recognized as sovereign prior to colonial independence (Mindaoudou,
2015; United Nations, n.d.-a). Diplomats from developing countries expressed worry that First
World “environmentalism” might materialize as a means to cement post-colonial poverty via
pushbacks to industrialization in support of the cause (Garth, 1973; Najam, 2005).
Fearing less developed countries might make good on stated intentions to abstain, the
UNCHE Secretary General coordinating the conference commissioned research and
informational sessions to assist his efforts to persuade the leaders to attend (Najam, 2005). A
meeting of experts was convened in Founex, Switzerland to discuss the conference agenda and
potential matters of concern. A report, referred to as “Founex,” is the main outcome document. It
illustrates the larger context from which uncertainties of developing world diplomats stemmed.
An excerpt sheds light on the view from the “Global South”:
The developing countries would clearly wish to avoid, as far as feasible, the mistakes and
distortions that have characterized the patterns of development of the industrialized
societies. However, the major environmental problems of the developing countries are
essentially of a different kind. They are predominantly problems that reflect the poverty
and very lack of development in their societies. . . These are problems, no less than those
of industrial pollution, that clamor for attention in the context of the concern with human
environment. They are problems which affect the greater mass of mankind. . . In
[industrialized] countries, it is appropriate to view development as a cause of
environmental problems. . . In [the Southern] context, development becomes essentially a
cure for their major environmental problems (Founex, 1971, p. 5–6).
This and other contents of the report illustrate a schism between global “North” and global
“South” - with the former viewing environmentalism as a post-industrial imperative, and the
latter viewing it as imperilment to development advances.
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2.2 Millennium Development Goals
In September of 2000, UN Member States gathered in New York for the Millennium
Summit. Leaders in attendance adopted an outcome document, Resolution 55/2, the Millennium
Declaration, which prompted creation of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(UNGA, 2000; UNGA 2002). The Declaration contained a similar set of values and objectives to
those of the final MDG framework, with some key differences. Among the main themes in the
Declaration are: Protecting our common environment; Protecting the vulnerable; Development
and poverty eradication; Meeting the special needs of Africa; and Human rights, democracy, and
good governance (UNGA, 2000; UNGA 2002). While goals and accompanying targets of the
MDG framework do, to some degree, contain calls to care for the vulnerable (mainly children),
they are less particular and less pronounced. Further, specific aims included in the final
framework faded over time.
Critics and creators alike acknowledge that focus during implementation narrowed from
eight goals to one – specifically, MDG 1, Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger (Fehling,
Nelson, & Venkatapuram, 2013 Hulme, 2009; Sachs, 2012). During the MDG pursuit to end
poverty, other goals and targets (i.e. environment, gender equality) were set aside in favor of
producing demonstrable results by the framework’s 2015 deadline (Fehling et al., 2013; Richard
et al., 2011). This shrinking of multidimensional phenomena to a manageable size and scope
extended into narratives surrounding the MDGs (Hulme, 2009). Campaigns for the cause were
packaged in streamlined, oversimplified messaging, often highlighting dysfunctions in less
developed nations rather than international roles pursuant to the problem (Hulme, 2009; Saith,
2006; Saith, 2007). Meanwhile, failures to meet MDG targets (put aside for poverty goals) gave
further rise to the “Third World problem” perspective that developing places were incapable,
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deficient in solving “their problem” despite being signatories to a resolution that pledged
international support (Richard et al., 2011; UNGA, 2002).
David Hulme, professor of development studies at the University of Manchester, and
author of several literary chronicles on the creation and makings of the MDGs describes how
focus of the framework reduced over time in A Short History of the World’s Biggest Promise:
[C]reation of a policy narrative can greatly help to advance a policy or set of ideas. In the
early stages of MDG evolution, the UN arguments were highly specific – if we pursue
this goal we can improve children’s health or improve the social status of women ...
Following creation of the [international development goals] the message became more
powerful …‘if we all pursue these goals then we can reduce poverty by half by 2015’.
This was a simple mantra – critics said it was simplistic, but that is usually the case with
policy narratives – but it worked very effectively with other politicians and with the
public. By late 2000 it was being propagated by the UN Secretary-General, most of the
rich world’s ministers for international development, [heads of state] and vast numbers of
NGOs. By 2001 and 2002 it was being transmitted to new audiences by Bono and other
celebrities and by leading economists, such as Jeffrey Sachs. By 2005 it had become the
narrative behind the ‘Make Poverty History’ and ‘One’ campaigns (Hulme, 2009, p.46).
Centering the MDGs within and upon countries of low development status is a second albeit not
separate, issue. In his 2006 critique, Dr. Ashwani Saith, of The Hague Institute and the London
School of Economics, states, “… even though it professes to be propelled by shared universal
values, the entire MDG scaffolding and accompanying text is insufficiently global in its
approach. It ghettoizes the problem of development and locates it firmly in the third world (p.
1184).” Saith (2006) lists the high rates of poverty among children and the elderly in
“developed” countries during the 1990s, adding that within those groups, minorities are further
marginalized. “Whatever happened to poverty and deprivation in the advanced economies? Are
they to be silenced?” Saith posits:
The issue of social vulnerability and of rights has seldom been as acute in the first world
as in recent times. It is also credibly arguable that this circumstance is driven by the same
forces of globalization that underlie much of the same phenomena in the developing
economies. This is a major lacuna in the MDG frame of reference: it does not provide a
global template, merely ‘our’ agenda for ‘them’ (Saith, 2006, p. 1184).
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Reduction in MDG target scope to a poverty focus, and poverty campaigns often characterized as
omissive, misleading, and misdirected, are manifestations of the overall reductionist approach
shared by the framework and its framers.
2.2.1 MDG framework design: The DAC and the “idgs”
Of the eight Millennium Development Goals, seven called upon developing countries,
alone, to make considerable improvements toward MDG targets that were mostly beyond
domestic capacity (Clemens, Kenny, & Moss, 2007; Fehling et al., 2013; Saith, 2006). The final
goal, MDG 8 – Develop a Global Partnership for Development, outlined “North-South”
commitments to assistance which in concept were meant to fill framework gaps between
aspiration and ability (Fehling et al., 2013; UNGA, 2000; UNGA, 2001; UNGA, 2002). While
the number of donor countries fluctuated over time, approximately 30 First World countries were
expectant contributors during the 15-year duration of the MDGs, most of which were members
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD is an intergovernmental forum of high-income
countries (37 countries at time of writing), the combined economies of which account for more
than 50 percent of global nominal GDP, with some global GDP estimates placing the combined
economic share closer to 75 percent (IMF, 2018; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, n.d.).
Disproportionate participation opportunities and imbalance of influence over MDG
planning is a common critique expressed by a range of stakeholders who contend developed
countries had an upper hand in shaping the final framework (Hulme, 2009; Manning, 2009;
Richard et al., 2011; Saith, 2006; Vandemoortele, 2011). By way of UN structure and economy,
more developed Member States of the OECD typically hold more sway over UN outcomes.
Several scholars and stakeholders involved in MDG planning assert that OECD countries held at
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least half of the collective pull over framework design and MDG contents (Hulme, 2009;
Manning, 2009; Richard et al., 2011). The influence of developed countries over design choices,
such as framework goals and targets is made evident through comparison of the eight United
Nations MDGs to seven “international development goals” (“idgs”) published in a 1996 DAC
report, “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation” (Table 2.1)
(OECD/DAC, 1996).
Table 2.1. International development goals and the MDGs (OECD/DAC, 1996; UNGA, 2000).
International development goals (1996 )

Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015)

1. Reduce the proportion of people living in
extreme poverty by half between 1990 & 2015

MDG 1 - Eradicate extreme poverty & hunger

2. Enroll all children in primary school by 2015

MDG 2 - Achieve universal primary education

3. Make progress towards gender equality and
MDG 3 - Promote gender equality and
empowering women, by eliminating … disparities
empower women
in primary & secondary education by 2005
4. Reduce infant and child mortality rates by twothirds between 1990 and 2015
5. Reduce maternal mortality ratios by threequarters between 1990 and 2015 (*Target 5.A)

MDG 4 - Reduce child mortality
MDG 5 - Improve maternal health
*Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters,
between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality
ratio

6. Provide access for all who need reproductive
health services by 2015 (**Target 5.B)

**Target 5.B: Achieve, by 2015, universal
access to reproductive health
MDG 6 - Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
diseases

–
7. Implement national strategies for sustainable
development by 2005 so as to reverse the loss
of environmental resources by 2015

MDG 7 - Ensure environmental sustainability

MDG (8) Develop a global partnership for development

Ten years after release of the DAC report, the OECD (2006) offered its account of the
“idg” to MDG evolution, beginning with the 1996 “21st Century” report:
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From the early 1990s the volume of official development assistance had begun a decline
… consensus [emerged] that the DAC should disseminate a brief statement on
development strategies … collaboration between the DAC Secretariat and [DAC]
member countries produced a concise text [identifying] poverty reduction as the central
challenge, and endorsed a comprehensive strategy that integrated elements of sound
economic policies; social investment; participation and gender equality; good
governance, human rights and the rule of law; sustainable environmental practices; and
conflict prevention. It expressed a commitment by DAC members to support the
partnership approach (OECD, 2006, p. 49).
In the OECD summary of early “idg” development, the DAC framework included themes and
direct goals which later became precise or indirect goals of the MDGs. The initial, concise “idg”
text was revised and expanded based upon DAC member review of past UN conferences and
resolution recommendations. This resulted in a set of medium-term goals, intended to be pursued
on agreed principles: “people-centred development, local ownership, global integration and
international partnership (OECD, 2006, p. 49).” As the DAC viewed it:
Both the principles of partnership and specific suggested goals met with positive
response throughout the international community … the degree of consensus that it
revealed was impressive … In September 2000, heads of state and government adopted
the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, based largely on
the formulation recommended in [the 1996 report] Shaping the 21st Century and A
Better World for All. The Goals thus evolved from being disparate findings in various
UN conferences to becoming a unified set of DAC recommendations to the international
community, and then to acquiring recognition as a universally-agreed vision to guide
international co-operation [emphasis added] (OECD, 2006, pgs. 49–50).
As the OECD points out, the MDGs were borne of the 1996 “idgs,” confirming the root of
similarities between the two frameworks. The full summary also sheds light on the DAC impetus
for the “idgs,” formed in response to member declines in donated aid, more specifically, “the
relationship between aid volume and perceptions of aid effectiveness in both donor and partner
countries (OECD, 2006, p. 49).” To mend this issue, the DAC designed its own global
framework with a self-described “partnership approach” (OECD, 2006).
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Although assistance via aid and development partnerships are the overarching goal of
MDG 8, as well as the stated inspiration and intent of the “idg” framework, addition of this
eighth and final goal came by way of UN Assembly members - and it was not well-received by
members of the DAC. In fact, Member States in the DAC rejected the Assembly’s suggestion at
first, displeased with calls for committed “North-South” official development assistance (ODA)
(Hulme, 2009; Manning, 2009). Hulme (2009) describes ongoing technical negotiations that took
place surrounding the issue:
At the March 2001 meeting, both World Bank and UN senior managers (Sven Sandstrom
and Mark Malloch Brown) had remarked on the lack of an explicit goal ‘holding the
North accountable to levels of development assistance et cetera…’. The [“idgs”] had
included the issue of what rich countries should contribute to the global poverty reduction
effort in a separate discussion in its document(s). Essential policy changes were
identified, but these were not put forward for the scrutiny of formal monitoring and
reporting. The Millennium Declaration had a discussion of these issues in its
development and poverty eradication section, but again these had not been seen as
something to turn into explicit goals (Hulme, 2009, p. 41).
The technical team responsible for crafting MDG 8 produced a set of seven targets and 17
indicators for the eighth and final goal. The targets and corresponding indicators sought to
increase ODA quantity while improving quality of ODA effects toward better market access for
developing countries, debt relief, access to technology, and essential medicinal drugs. That said:
A caveat must be mentioned for these goals, however. While all of the other goals (1 to
7) were time-specific, there were no concrete dates set for any Goal 8 targets or indicators
and many of the indicators did not include a quantitative target. This reflected the politics
of the situation – the OECD countries were prepared to agree the directions they should
be moving in, but they were not prepared as a group to set specific targets or agree dates
for achievement. They wanted to keep their options open. Subsequently some OECD
countries have unilaterally set themselves targets (for example EU member states have
set dates for achieving the 0.7 percent of GNP as aid target), but others – most obviously
the US – have assiduously kept clear of such commitments (Hulme, 2009, p. 41).
To appease the situation, MDG 8 was adjusted by reducing commitment amounts, fostering
agreement from most Member States also serving on the DAC – with one exception, the United
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States. Richard Manning recounts the view of the U.S. (and other DAC countries) on MDG 8 in
his 2009 report, “Using Indicators to Encourage Development”:
These reservations were, first, that Goal 8, while ostensibly about partnership, focused
only on the donor side, including the 0.7% target for ODA as a proportion of gross
national income (GNI), while failing to include any governance indicators; and secondly
… the US [which] saw the annex to the road-map as a UN Secretariat backroom targetsetting exercise that went well beyond the Millennium Declaration, had serious doubts
the targets were operational enough to be implemented at country level, and felt issues
such as democracy and good governance had not been captured. Reservations were also
expressed by some developing countries, not least on the perceived lack of specificity of
the obligations of developed countries under Goal 8 (Manning, 2009, p. 12).
MDG 8, “global partnerships for development” was the only framework goal to place
performance expectations on developed countries (UNGA, 2002). The development aid target
Manning mentions is an oft-cited figure for MDG 8 - provisions of annual aid equaling 0.7
percent of gross national income (GNI). Of the approximate 30 countries that pledged
commitments to assistance via MDG 8, only five reached the 0.7 percent GNI goal over the 15year period (OECD, 2014). Half of the remaining countries contributed less than 0.4 percent. The
United States, a nation ranked top in global GDP, placed in the bottom 10 donor countries, with a
final offering of ODA below 0.3 percent GNI (Figure 2.2) (OECD, 2014).

Figure 2.2. Percent GNI to ODA, G7 countries, select years from 2001 to 2013 (OECD, 2014).
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Failure to meet the 0.7 percent GNI target raises several concerns. First, regarding
framework design, steep goals set for developing countries by the DAC and later adopted by the
UN were mostly beyond domestic capacities rendering the ODA outlined in MDG 8 a
fundamental necessity upon which framework outcomes depended. (Bourguignon et al., 2008;
Clemens et al., 2007; Fehling et al., 2013; Sachs, 2012; UNGA. 2002). Second, and with the
former in mind, neglecting commitments and poor performance on one relatively reachable,
agreed upon goal foreshadows potentially low First World follow through on the newer 17
SDGs. What’s more, influential world powers such as the United States have demonstrated
increased unwillingness to participate in international initiatives, a trend which may continue
pursuant to U.S. political landscape and leadership. (Baker & Hincks, 2020; Lee & Lederman,
2018; Pompeo, 2019). Finally, failure of wealthy countries to deliver on MDG pledges of ODA
takes on greater significance when considering the 0.7 percent GNI figure was a “throwback”
target, identical to pledges already established by the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in 1968, making its inclusion a symbolic reaffirmation of commitments made more
than 30 years prior to the Millennium Declaration (UNGA, 1968).
2.3 The “Post-2015 Agenda” (2010-2015)
The era referred to as the “Post-2015 Agenda,” took place during the approximate five
years approaching expiry of the Millennium Development Goals (2010–2015). The descriptor,
“post-2015” was meant to convey that UN planners were applying a forward -looking vision of
globalization rather than a typical “business as usual” approach (UN Systems Task Team on the
Post-2015 Agenda, 2012). The official start to the period is marked by publication of the 2012
report “Realizing the Future We Want for All” by the UN Systems Task Team, however,
discourse regarding MDG outcomes and potential future frameworks preceded its release.
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Published works commending or critiquing the MDGs and SDGs often differ in view
according to author context. Such was the case for commentaries submitted for consideration
prior to and during the Post-2015 Agenda. Academics, development stakeholders, and project
implementers familiar with MDG expectations and outcomes called for framework revision and
reframing of the “development” concept. Within the same timeframe, UN affiliates in favor of
expansion rather than revision published works promoting the MDGs as a success upon which to
model its successor (Alkire & Deneulin, 2009; Ban, 2012; Hulme, 2009; Manning, 2009;
Richard et al., 2011; Sachs, 2012; Saith, 2006; Vandemoortele, 2011).
A vocal and influential proponent of MDG expansion without reform was Dr. Jeffrey
Sachs, who held a dual role at the time as Director of the Center for Sustainability at Columbia
University and Special Advisor to the MDGs under former UN Secretary-General, Ban KiMoon. In a 2012 correspondence to The Lancet, Sachs espoused an overall positive view of the
MDGs, presenting the framework as an intuitive pathway to a new set of 15-year global goals.
Sachs describes the MDGs as “effective” and “powerful” yet offers little evidence in support of
his valuation. He does, however, laud one location for development advances, citing progress
made by China toward poverty reduction domestically and abroad - an achievement that several
scholars, including Sachs attribute to China’s independently manufactured economic growth
(Alkire & Deneulin, 2009; Curtis & Poon, 2009; Sachs, 2012).
As for why similar strides seemed out of reach elsewhere, Sachs states that shortfalls in
MDG targets are, “indeed serious, regrettable, and deeply painful for people with low income.”
He describes such shortfalls as demonstrations of “operational failures” attributable to
“stakeholders in both poor and rich countries (Sachs, 2012, p. 2206).” To that end, Sachs makes
brief mention of unfulfilled ODA pledges - Then, a quick transition:
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Nonetheless, there is widespread feeling among policy makers and civil society that
progress against poverty, hunger, and disease is notable; that the MDGs have played an
important part in securing that progress; and that globally agreed goals to fight poverty
should continue beyond 2015. In a world already undergoing dangerous climate change
and other serious environmental ills, there is widespread understanding that worldwide
environmental objectives need a higher profile alongside the poverty-reduction
objectives. For these reasons, the world’s governments seem poised to adopt a new round
of global goals to follow the 15 year MDG period (Sachs, 2012, p. 2206).
These and similar themes repeat through the remainder of the Lancet piece, which along
with several SDG-centric works published by Sachs since, portray global indicator frameworks
as a type of panacea toward Sachs’ dual imperative – to continue the poverty alleviation mission
of the MDGs in tandem with reaching sustainability targets to quell climate change concerns.
2.3.1 The Future We All Want
Toward the end of the 2012 Lancet piece, Sachs cites a report in support of MDG
expansion. Authored by the UN high-level panel, appointed by former Secretary Ban, it
recommends the world adopt a set of “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Sachs, 2012, p.
2206).” The report was issued in preparation for the 2012 Rio+20 Summit scheduled end of June
that year, two weeks after publication of Sachs’ Lancet correspondence. Although he does not
refer to it by name, “Realizing the Future We Want for All,” credited with kicking off the Post2015 Agenda, was released just prior to the conference (UN System Task Team on the Post-2015
UN Development Agenda, 2012). Release of the report was followed by adoption of a resolution
outcome document, “The Future We Want” similar both in name and contents (UNGA, 2012a).
An article published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)
shortly after the conference carried the title, “Rio+20 Adopts ‘The Future We Want’ Outcome
Document, Voluntary Pledges Reported to Reach US$513 Billion (Wagner, 2012)” How much
of the $500 billion materialized is unclear, but similarities between the final 2015 SDG
framework and themes in the 2012 resolution authored by Secretary Ban’s Task Team are quite
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salient (Table 2.2). The SDGs so closely resemble suggestions published by UN planners prior to
officially calling for public input that titles and terms of the time (i.e. “Realizing the Future We
Want for All,” and “Post-2015 Agenda”) can be interpreted as high-level planners signaling an
agenda had already been set (Frank, 2012; UNGA, 2012a; UNGA, 2015; UN System Task Team
on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012).
Table 2.2. List of thematic areas and cross-sectoral issues from the Post-2015 Agenda
“Framework for Action” in the Rio+20 outcome document The Future We Want (left),
alongside SDGs selected from The 2030 Agenda (right) (UNGA, 2012a; UNGA, 2015).
Framework for Action themes & issues from

Framework of Original Working Group on

The Future We Want (2012)

17 SDGs of the 2030 Agenda (2015)

Poverty Eradication

SDG 1: No Poverty

Food Security & Nutrition, and Sustainable
Agriculture

SDG 2: Zero Hunger

Water and sanitation

SDG 6: Clean Water & Sanitation

Energy

SDG 7: Affordable & Clean Energy
–

Sustainable tourism ; Sustainable transport
Sustainable cities & human settlements

SDG 11: Sustainable Cities

Health and population

SDG 3: Good Health & Well-Being

Promoting full & productive employment,
decent work for all and social protection

SDG 8: Decent Work & Economic Growth

Oceans and seas

SDG 14: Life Below Water

Small island developing States; Least
developed countries; Landlocked developing
countries; Africa; Regional efforts

–

Disaster risk reduction*

[*contained in SDGs 1, 11, & 13]

Climate change

SDG 13: Climate Action

Forests

SDG 15: Life on Land

Biodiversity ; Desertification, land
degradation; drought ; Mountains**

[**also contained in SDG 15]

Sustainable consumption & production

SDG 12: Responsible Consumption &
Production

Chemicals and waste***

[***contained in SDGs 6 & 12]

–

Mining
Education

SDG 4: Quality Education

Gender equality & women’s empowerment

SDG 5: Gender Equality
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Goals and targets of the 2015–2030 SDGs are also significantly similar to those of the
2000–2015 MDGs, with SDGs 1–6 (poverty, hunger, health, education, gender, clean water and
sanitation) bearing closest resemblance to MDGs 1–6, and SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals)
viewed as an extension of the original MDG 8 (global partnerships for development). Although
some carryover also exists in SDGs 7–16, these SDGs are mostly considered newer features to
address growing challenges such as climate change, while SDGs 1–6 are viewed as “unfinished
business” of the MDGs (Kumar, Kumar, & Vivekadhish, 2016; UNGA, 2002; UNGA, 2014;
UNGA, 2015). This outcome aligns with the framework expansion approach (rather than reform)
preferred by Sachs and other UN affiliates (Kumar et al., 2016; Sachs, 2012; UN System Task
Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012; UNGA, 2002; UNGA, 2012a).
Building new frameworks based on preceding ones may seem a logical “progression,”
however, arguably this has been an oft-repeated mistake carried through several UN resolutions.
Carryover to the SDGs might be less notable had the MDGs themselves not been the latest
installment in a redundant continuum of unachieved UN targets dating back to the 1960s (Kanie,
Bernstien, Biermann, & Haas, 2017; Seyfang, 2003; United Nations, 1973; United Nations,
1993; UN DESA, 1962; Yiu & Saner, 2014). The very presence of repeat goals and targets over
several decades of “new” resolutions demonstrates that adequate progress toward those ends has
not been achieved, and that deficiencies in framework designs require reform. But, when
framework planners are also “repeats” resulting from persistent exclusionary practices and power
dynamics, these realities are less likely to be recognized, considered, or confronted.
2.4 SDG planners
The path to the final MDG framework began with the DAC’s vision to reinvigorate
development investments via global partnerships and poverty-focused goals. From there, a list of
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seven international development goals (“idgs”) was created through DAC member review of past
UN resolutions (with carryover targets). Finally, a framework of eight goals, seven of which
were aimed at achievements in less developed countries was adopted following agreement to
MDG 8 which outlined First World funding mechanisms to assist in target attainment (Hulme,
2009; Manning, 2009; OECD/DAC, 1996; OECD, 2006; UNGA, 2001; UNGA, 2002).
Similarities between the DAC “idgs” and the final MDG framework, and the positioning
of developing countries at the center of expectations is viewed as a result of power disparities
over design, disparities rooted in development status, economy, and influence afforded by UN
organizational structure (Crossette, 2005; Hulme, 2009; Saith, 2006; Vandemoortele, 2011). The
path toward the global SDGs was not much different. Evidence of these same power dynamics
over design of the subsequent 2015–2030 SDG framework began as early as 2012 at the
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). Item 248 of the conference outcome
document “The Future We Want” outlines the mission and composition of the “Open Working
Group” (OWG), the planning committee for the SDGs:
We resolve to establish an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process on
sustainable development goals that is open to all stakeholders, with a view to developing
global sustainable development goals to be agreed by the General Assembly. An open
working group … shall comprise thirty representatives, nominated by Member States
from the five United Nations regional groups, with the aim of achieving fair, equitable
and balanced geographical representation. [The OWG will develop work] modalities to
ensure the full involvement of relevant stakeholders and expertise from civil society, the
scientific community and the United Nations system in its work, in order to provide a
diversity of perspectives (UNGA, 2012a, p. 47) [emphasis added].
The section later instructs that OWG methods of work ensure “full involvement of relative
stakeholders,” yet here, it proposes a group of 30 Member States, a size that excludes
approximately 85 percent of the 193-member General Assembly - the governing body charged
with negotiating, rejecting or accepting resolution frameworks on behalf of whole nations
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(Mueller, 2016; UNGA, 2012a). Such arrangements place expectations on non-OWG members
to review and possibly ratify a “universal” framework without having input toward its contents
or structure (Mueller, 2016; Kanie et al., 2017; UNGA, 2012a). As Mueller recounts in his 2016
chronology of UN reform, such was the case with “formulation of the MDGs back in 2001, when
the Secretary-General presented proposals to member states for their approval (p. 204).”
Several scholars describe design and approval of the MDGs as driven by the UN
Secretariat (Kanie et al., 2017; Mueller, 2016; Vandemoortele, 2011). It is within this context
that Mueller (2016) recalls reaction to the OWG makeup as it was originally outlined in “The
Future We Want” resolution, “Indeed, member states [were] unhappy at essentially being left out
of consultation for the Post-2015 Development Agenda,” a process which Mueller notes was,
once again, “driven by the UN Secretariat (p. 204).” However, while the outline for the OWG
was shaped by the Secretariat-assigned Task Force who authored “The Future We Want,”
Member States interested in avoiding a second round of exclusion similar to that of the MDGs
pushed for their part in constructing the SDG framework.
Months of deliberations ensued between the 70 Member States seeking participation in a
group which in its initial format allowed for only 30 representatives. Negotiations stretched past
the September 2012 General Assembly session, initially set as the forum to formalize the OWG
thus putting SDG plans into motion. An agreement was not reached until January 2013, seven
months after the original outline was released during the Rio+20 Summit (Kamau, Chasek, &
O'Connor, 2018; Kanie et al., 2017; UNGA, 2012a; UNGA, 2013; UN System Task Team on the
Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012). Following closure of debates and decision-making,
the original OWG outline was mostly adhered to, with two notable exceptions: Division and
distribution of the 30 seats to accommodate all 70 Member States that expressed interest in
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planning, and specified allowances of observer states and “other observers” in SDG planning
sessions. A document titled Working Methods from the first OWG meeting summarizes:
The open working group has been established as an inclusive and transparent
intergovernmental process … open to all Member States and observer states of the
United Nations and other observers that have received a standing invitation from
the General Assembly or ECOSOC … The composition of the open working
group shall at any one time comprise of 30 Member States drawn from each of the
30 countries or groups of [70] countries listed (OWG on Sustainable
Development Goals, 2013a, p. 1).
2.4.1 Inclusion and influence: Observers, NGOs, and intergovernmental coalitions
The stipulation that planning be open to “other observers” pertains to international
institutions, such as the OECD that have been granted observer status by way of adopted
resolutions dating back to 1948 when the Assembly approved its first observer, the Organization
of American States (UNGA, 2019). Since then, the list has grown to 109 such entities, ranging
from development corporations to think tanks for developing countries (UNGA, 2019). These
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) typically do not fulfill the role of grassroots organizing
and outreach performed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to engage directly with civil
society stakeholders. Low stakeholder involvement with IGOs points toward a need for NGO
input to satisfy the original OWG work modalities directive that planning be open to allow for
“diversity of perspectives.” Despite this, suggestions posed during deliberations to involve
NGOs in SDG design were objected to by Members States, the same member states that had
requested deliberations be conducted to widen national representation in the OWG (Kamau et al.,
2018; Kanie et al., 2017; Mueller, 2016; UNGA, 2012a).
Reluctance to include NGOs in UN planning and decision-making is not unique to
formation of the SDGs. It is a long-standing status quo of the UN characterized by delayed or
blocked attempts for NGOs to gain consultative status – a less permanent, more conditional
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status than that of “observer,” with official and unofficial limitations toward UN access (Kamau
et al., 2018; Martens, 2005; UNGA, 2018). Reasons for blocking NGO consultative status vary.
Some Member States principally oppose any expansion of NGO participation in UN proceedings
viewing them as strictly intergovernmental, while others are more concerned with the potential
effects of NGO input on a Member State’s influence within the intergovernmental structure. Of
particular concern to some is the impact of NGO missions and testimonials toward UN decisions
related to domestic interests and international reputations (Kamau et al., 2018; UNGA, 2018).
To gain consultative status, an organization must submit an application to the Committee
on NGOs, a standing committee of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). If
approved, the NGO is assigned one of three distinctions (general, special, or roster) based upon
its mission and geographic reach (ECOSOC, 1996). This distinction dictates the level of access an
NGO has to UN proceedings, as well as whether and to what degree an NGO can provide input
toward UN decisions (ECOSOC, 1996; Martens, 2005). Consultative status is conditional in that
NGOs must submit quadrennial reports detailing the organization’s funds and finances, and also
summarize beneficial contributions it has made to the UN as a result of status approval. NGOs
must also follow UN rules and regulations at all times, such as those contained in the 1945 UN
Charter and procedural standards outlined since (ECOSOC, 1996; Martens, 2005).
The 19 Member States of the NGO Committee in charge of approvals and subsequent
reviews are selected for a term of four years to represent one of five UN regional groups (Africa;
Asia; Eastern Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; Western Europe and Others). Each
region is allotted a certain number of Committee seats as follows (ECOSOC, 2008):
▪

African Group – 5 representatives

▪

Asia-Pacific Group – 4 representatives
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▪ Eastern European Group – 2 representatives
▪

Group of Latin American & Caribbean States (GRULAC) – 4 representatives

▪

Western European and Others Group (WEOG) – 4 representatives

Questions of inclusion begin with the construction and makeup of the NGO Committee.
Although technically each regional seat on the Committee is meant to rotate countries every four
years, there is no official limit on serving consecutive terms. This results in nations retaining
representative seats, one such example being the United States which has kept its seat on the
Committee through every 4-year rotation since adoption of the most recent consultative status
criteria in 1996. Other recurring seat holders include China, Russia, India, Turkey, and Cuba
(ECOSOC, 1996; ECOSOC, 1998; ECOSOC, 2002; ECOSOC, 2003; UN DESA, 2007a;
ECOSOC, 2012; ECOSOC, 2016; ECOSOC, 2020; Martens, 2005). The first four countries
listed, along with the United States demonstrate the ability of robust or growing national
economies to gain and retain representation with little challenge (Agam, 1999; O’Brien, 1999).
The latter on the list, Cuba, is one of several countries that maintains Committee presence to
align NGO selection with domestic policy, using the position to select or reject NGOs according
to national political climate (Agam, 1999; O’Brien, 1999; Vromen, 2017; UNGA, 2018).
While the rules, or lack thereof (i.e. term limits) surrounding Committee representation
open the door for imbalance and potential bias, it is the qualifications and conditions for
awarding consultative status to NGOs which provide the tools for favorable or unfavorable
treatment. In her 2017 law review of the process, Simone Vromen describes how the ECOSOC
resolution guiding the process is limiting to NGOs, but liberal toward Committee considerations:
The criteria …in Resolution 1996/31 [are] strict and vague. Strict, as NGOs need to have
a rather sophisticated and professional organizational structure in order to be considered
for consultative status. And vague, in that it is not clear what is meant by phrases like ‘the
spirit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter’ with which the aims and purposes of an
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NGO have to conform. Furthermore, the criteria for the withdrawal of consultative status
are unclear. When does an NGO clearly abuse its status? What is a politically motivated
act against a UN Member State? What is a positive or effective contribution to the work
of the UN? (Vromen, 2017, p. 89)
It is this combination of qualifications and interpretive grounds for dismissal that offer leeway to
Committee representatives, enabling them to deny applications by entering nondescript judgments
or to remove consultative status via scrutiny of paperwork and procession records to identify
technical slip-ups (i.e. report formatting or Assembly session procedures) (Martens, 2005;
UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017). These methods produce official reasons for denial or removal,
however, such instances are largely perceived as reprisals against NGOs performing or vocalizing
missions antithetical to Member State domestic interests (Martens, 2005; UNGA, 2018).
2.4.1.1 Hierarchies and human rights
As it is the mission of several NGOs serving civil stakeholders is to oppose political
structures or parties, consultative status is viewed by some organizers as more of a hindrance
than a privilege (Charnovitz, 1997; Martens, 2005). The conditional nature of the status means
NGOs must either align politically with Member States (all of which can register complaints for
Committee consideration), or refrain from oppositional behavior – rendering consultative status
ineffective for some NGOs, particularly those focused on human rights (Charnovitz, 1997;
Gibbings, 2011; Martens, 2005; UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017). In her 2011 paper, “No Angry
Women at the United Nations,” Sheri Lynn Gibbings analyzes UN speech norms citing examples
of Iraqi women hosted by consultative NGOs to present on peacekeeping related to the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Gibbings describes fallout and concerns over NGO status following a
speech to the UN Security Council that was critical of the invasion. Of this and other examples
she contends that statements made in support of ideas or in support, “of groups that critique the
UN as imperialist, are not well received. UN speech styles encourage positive visions and
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utopian dreams; little space exists for more critical interventions in public forums (Gibbings,
2011, p. 534).”
A more recent example of NGO Committee members carrying through political views for
domestic interests and the conditions of resolution 1996/31 which allow for this was the 2016
denial of consultative status to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ). Prior to being denied,
the CPJ application for consultative status, initially filed in 2012, was deferred by the Committee
for “procedural reasons” seven times (Astor, 2016; CPJ, 2016). With NGO Committee meetings
to approve consultative status occurring only twice per year, such deferments are viewed as “de
facto” rejections, an additional method of blocking NGOs not aligned with Committee Member
States (CPJ, 2016; UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017).
Indeed, several of the Committee Member States that voted to reject consultative status
for the CPJ - repeat representatives such as China, Cuba, and Russia, were listed on the CPJ site
as not supportive or hostile toward free press (Astor, 2016; Charbonneau, 2016). CPJ Executive
Director at the time, Joel Simon, commented, “A small group of countries with poor press
freedom records are using bureaucratic delaying tactics to undermine any efforts that call [into
question] their own abusive policies (CPJ, 2016).” Similarly, Obama-appointed U.S.
Ambassador and representative on the Committee, Samantha Power (herself a former war
reporter) stated, “It is increasingly clear that the NGO committee acts more and more like an anti
-NGO committee (Astor, 2016).”
Application deferments intended to deter NGOs often include requests for additional
information or answers to continual series of questions. However, once a decision is rendered by
the Committee, NGOs are afforded little say toward the matter - this is particularly true of
smaller, lesser-known NGOs that lack media notoriety or potential to apply external pressures
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(Martens, 2005; UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017). Input toward consideration of consultative status
seldom extends beyond application submission for NGOs. Although the ECOSOC resolution
expressly grants NGOs the right to respond to Committee objections, rulings against consultative
status tend to move forward without affording NGOs proper refute (ECOSOC, 1996; UNGA,
2018; Vromen, 2017). This approach to blocking NGOs is further facilitated aided by boundaries
set on Committee meetings which exclude NGOs not approved but allow non-Committee
Member States to be present and enter grievances toward NGOs seeking status. Meetings are
also attended by “observer states,” notably the Holy See, known for pursuing conservative
agendas seldom in favor of advancing rights of women or LGBTQ individuals (Center for
Reproductive Rights [CRR], 2000; Hulme, 2009; UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017).
Although observer states are granted allowances similar to those of UN observers (i.e.
IGOs such as the OECD), the status of observer states is conceptually based upon that of full
Member States toward input and decision-making, as such, it is an invitation extended far less
often. Palestine was granted permanent observer state status in 2012 to enable its participation in
UN proceedings despite not being recognized as sovereign by the entirety of the General
Assembly (CRR, 2000; UNGA, 2012b; United Nations, n.d.-b). This makes it one of only two
observer states during the MDG and SDG eras. The other, the Holy See, better known as the
Vatican, has held the status since 1964 – a status that has garnered growing public criticism,
however, such disapproval has had little effect on the presence of the Vatican at NGO
Committee meetings and other UN sessions (Abdullah, 1996; Butler, 2000; Buss, 1998;
ECOSOC, 1998; ECOSOC, 2003; ECOSOC, 2012; ECOSOC, 2016; UNGA, 2004; UN Human
Rights Council [UNHRC], 2020).
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The observer state status of the Vatican, a wholly religious body mostly devoid of land or
population, has been met with contention by NGOs and stakeholders for several decades
(Abdullah, 1996; Butler, 2000; CRR, 2000; Lewis, 1999; Manson, 2020; National Secular
Society, 2004; Vik, Stensvold, & Moe, 2013; Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom, 2001). Human rights NGOs, women’s groups, and more recently, the UN Human
Rights Council (UNHRC) all contend the Vatican has slowed progress for several
disenfranchised populations, often highlighting its use of influence to restrict the rights of
women and girls (i.e. access to contraception and other forms of “family planning”). The
presence and sway of the Vatican has been the subject of several published works, including
accounts of both MDG and SDG framework planning and outcomes (Buss, 1998; Crossette,
2005; Hulme, 2009; Sippel, 2004; Vik et al., 2013; UNGA, 2016; UNHRC, 2020). David Hulme
(2009) describes the impact of the Vatican as an observer state during MDG deliberations:
[T]he Vatican, could take the lead in blocking a potential MDG goal that had
considerable support from many member states, NGOs and professionals, by networking
with a small number of concerned G77 states. The G77’s modus operandi, requiring a
consensus, meant that a tiny minority of its members could impose their preference on
the majority. (Hulme, 2009, p. 46).
The “G77” is the Group of 77, an intergovernmental coalition formed during the 1964
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Sauvant, 2014; The Group of 77, n.d.;
UNGA, 1968). Issued and signed at the conclusion of the first session was the “Joint Declaration
of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” in which its signatories declared, “unity has sprung
out of the fact that [in] facing the basic problems of development [we] have a common interest in
a new policy for international trade and development (Ahmia, 2006, p. 20).”
Although problems of development united the initial coalition of 77 and continues to join
the 134 developing countries the G77 has grown to since, the Group is far from homogenous
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(Ahmia, 2006; Sauvant, 2014; The Group of 77, n.d.). Karl P. Sauvant (2014), contributing
author to a multi-volume works on the evolution of the G77 notes, “group cohesiveness is not an
easy matter to maintain.” The large number of countries in the G77 and individual interests plus
negotiating priorities of each nation present a (literally) sizable challenge toward group
consensus. This is further compounded by vast differences in national cultures, politics,
ideology, and economic systems (Sauvant, 2014).
In her 2005 report, “Reproductive Health and the Millennium Development Goals: The
Missing Link” Barbara Crossette recounts how “deeply divided” the Group was on reproductive
rights via an interview with Jacqueline Sharpe, former president of the Family Planning
Association of Trinidad and Tobago (FPATT) who attended G-77 meetings during MDG
negotiations. According to Sharpe:
[O]n one end of the spectrum… were countries such as Libya and Sudan, whose
delegates were able to hold up action "till three o'clock in the morning" to prevent the
forming of a consensus they opposed. There was never a vote. On the other end… were
moderate Islamic nations such as Malaysia, plus a strong subgroup of Caribbean and
Latin American delegations. In most of these meetings involving women's health and
reproductive rights … there were only diplomats or government officials [present] with
no expertise in the issues being discussed (Crossette, 2005, p. 74).
Crossette echoes the assertions of Hulme and Sauvant on consensus difficulties among G77
Member States noting the Group would inevitably, “have to accept a consensus that could be
backed by the most recalcitrant of its members (Crossette, 2005, p. 74).” The author also
provides further insights from FPATT’s Sharpe regarding the role of NGOs:
[O]f nongovernmental organizations that were excluded from the discussion, [Sharpe
said] "We need to get on official delegations”… given that exclusion of NGOs from the
discussion is likely to continue. Even then, Sharpe said, there is no guarantee against
political interference as countries make deals behind the scenes to exchange promises of
support on various issues. Among most governmental priorities in the G-77, she said,
women's rights are not high (Crossette, 2005, p. 74).
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The low priority of women’s rights coupled with the influence of conservative Member States
and that of the Vatican as an observer state has affected the language used and issues addressed
in UN resolutions and frameworks, including the MDGs, and the SDGs that followed (Butler,
2000; Crossette, 2005; Hulme, 2009; UNHRC, 2020; Vik et al., 2013). These same factors
present a type of double jeopardy for human rights considerations since conservative Member
States of the General Assembly also serve on the NGO Committee and can use application
review meetings (which the Vatican regularly attends) to effectively deny or reverse status,
limiting the ability of Sharpe’s FPATT and similar NGOs to gain consultative status, and
consequently lowering the amount of human rights representation in UN decisions (CPJ, 2016;
UNGA, 2018; Vromen, 2017).
2.4.2 Regional Imbalance
2.4.2.1 The NGO Committee
Other factors impeding consultative status for human rights NGOs once again revolve
around “strict and vague” qualifications and conditions outlined in ECOSOC Resolution
1996/31, which was initially intended to afford more access to NGOs from developing countries
(ECOSOC, 1996; Vromen, 2017). Sharpe’s NGO, FPATT, is based in Trinidad and Tobago, a
two-island nation-state in the Caribbean not far from the coast of Venezuela. It is part of the UN
region known as “GRULAC,” short for Group of Latin American and Caribbean states. In 2007,
about midway through MDG implementation, NGOs from the GRULAC region accounted for
only six percent of all NGOs with consultative status, down from seven percent a decade earlier
(UN DESA, 2007b). Figure 2.3 shows the imbalance of NGO status approvals by region.
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Figure 2.3. Percentage of NGOs approved for consultative status from three UN regions (Africa,
Asia-Pacific, and GRULAC), and percentage of approved NGOs based in North America and
Europe (usually divided between the WEOG and Eastern European groups). While regional
ratios have improved, they remain far from equal (UN DESA, 2007b).
Just as perceived political misalignment can serve as impetus for denial or dismissal of an
organization, political alignment with Committee Member States garners approval more easily. It
is also easier for economically advanced, repeat Committee representatives to consider
organizations from wealthier regions since one of the interpretive NGO qualifiers of Resolution
1996/31 is international recognition in a specialized field and significant geographic scope of
populations served – conditions more characteristic of well-established and funded NGOs based
in developed countries (ECOSOC, 1996; Martens, 2005; UNGA, 2018). In this way, the
qualifications both lessen the chances that smaller, local NGOs outside the EU and United States
(and in general) are approved, while increasing the input of First World-based NGOs toward UN
decisions, designs, and implementation plans - much of which focuses upon the lesserrepresented regions and populations within them (Martens, 2005; Vromen, 2017).
Wealthier, long-term occupants of Committee seats have also been known to use national
resources to create “GONGOs,” or Government-Organized NGOs that are passable on paper as
NGOs, thus passed by Committee representatives of the nation-states responsible for their
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creation. Such organizations are indirectly funded by government or government interests, and
often promote conservative ideals, another disadvantage for human rights NGOs such as LGBTQ
organizations, or women’s health NGOs with missions similar to Sharpe’s FPATT (Martens,
2005; UNHRC, 2020; Vik et al., 2013).
As for inclusion of NGOs in SDG planning, Member States in opposition were appeased
by a deal that limited NGO presence to observation only. At the same time, organizers of the
Open Working Group assured NGOs the process would be adjusted to also allow for NGO input.
In some instances, this was arranged successfully. However, NGOs never reached a level of
influence akin to coalitions or the Holy See observer state, nor that of the OECD DAC as
permanent observer over construction and contents of the preceding MDG framework (Hulme,
2009; Kamau et al., 2018; OECD, 2006).
2.4.2.2 Regional imbalance: The OWG
A final format for the SDG Open Working Group (OWG) was established in early 2013
following months of intergovernmental debate over revision of the original OWG outline
designated by the Secretary General’s Post-2015 Task Team. At the center of deliberations was
inclusion of Member States toward design of the Sustainable Development Goal framework
(Kamau et al., 2018; Kanie et al., 2017; Mueller, 2016). The main challenge for diplomatic
mediators working on OWG reform was devising an agreeable approach to accommodate 70
Member States seeking participation in a group which had only 30 representative slots allotted
(Kamau et al., 2018; Kanie et al., 2017).
Although increasing the number of OWG seats may have been permitted, negotiations
settled on an agreement to maintain the number at 30, and satisfy more than double that number
of nations seeking participation through a system of seat-sharing, with up to three countries from
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the same UN region sharing one OWG seat (Kamau et al., 2018; UNGA, 2013). The number of
Member States pursuing OWG participation for each of the regions varied, ranging from nine
nations in the Eastern European Group to 21 in the Asia-Pacific Group - the combined total of
which would fill the 30 seats allotted to the OWG just between the two regions (Table 2.3)
(Kamau et al., 2018; Kanie et al., 2017; UN Department for General Assembly and Conference
Management [UN DGACM], n.d.; United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge
Platform [UN SDKP], n.d.). The difference in the number of nations per region pursuing OWG
participation is somewhat reflective of the amount of countries included in each regional group for example, there are 33 countries in the Eastern European UN regional group versus 54
countries in the Asia-Pacific UN region (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3. Seat allotment and number of OWG countries by regional group, with total countries
and population in each UN region (UN SDKP, n.d.; UN DGACM, n.d.; World Bank, 2018).
REGIONAL GROUP

Allotted

Countries in OWG

Total Countries

Pop

African Group

7 Seats

11 Member States

54 Countries

1.3B

Asia-Pacific Group

7 Seats

21 Member States

54 Countries

4.4B

Eastern European Group

5 Seats

9 Member States

23 Countries

340m

GRULAC (Latin America & Caribbean)

6 Seats

14 Member States

33 Countries

640m

WEOG (Western European & Others)

5 Seats

15 Member States

29 Countries

910m

Once distribution of seats among regional groups was determined it was up to Member
States in each group to decide how their allotted OWG seats would be shared between countries.
Each seat hosted up to three national representatives (Table 2.4) (Kamau et al., 2018; UN SDKP,
n.d.). The Asia-Pacific working group, with 21 OWG Member States and seven seats assigned to
the region serves as a rounded example of countries divided and partnered into sets of three, or
“troikas” as they were called (Kamau et al., 2018; Kanie et al., 2017; UNGA, 2013; UN SDKP,
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n.d.). Although the allotment of seats was purportedly conducted in the spirit of geographic
equity, the amount of representation for each region in the OWG varied.
Table 2.4. Member States in OWG by regional designation (UNGA, 2013; UN SDKP, n.d.).
Member States Represented in Open Working Group (OWG )
African Group

Asia-Pacific

Algeria / Egypt /
Morocco / Tunisia

Nauru / Palau /
Papua New Guinea

Ghana

♦ Bhutan / Thailand /
Viet Nam

Latin American &
Caribbean

Eastern European

Columbia /
Guatemala

▲Hungary 

Western European
& Other
▲ Australia / ▲ United

Kingdom (N. Ireland) /
▲ Netherlands


▲ India /

Pakistan /
Sri Lanka

♦ Benin

▲ China / ▲Indonesia

Kenya

/ Kazakhstan

♦ Tanzania
(United Republic of)

▲Cyprus  / Singapore

/ United Arab Emirates

♦ Congo *

♦ Bangladesh /
▲ Republic of Korea /
▲ Saudi Arabia

♦ Zambia / Zimbabwe

Iran (Islamic Rep. of)
/ ▲ Japan / ♦ Nepal

Bahamas / Barbados
Guyana / ♦ Haiti /
Trinidad and Tobago
▲ Mexico

/ Peru

Belarus / Serbia
▲ Bulgaria / ▲ Croatia




Montenegro /
▲ Slovenia


▲ Brazil

/ Nicaragua

▲ Poland /▲ Romania




▲ Canada / Israel
▲ United States

/

▲ Denmark /▲ Ireland




/ Norway
▲ France / ▲ Germany

/ Switzerland
▲ Italy / ▲Spain
▲ Turkey

/

▲ Argentina /

Bolivia
(Plurinational State
of) / Ecuador
( Note: 13 of 15 WEOG
reps also in OECD DAC )

11* Countries in OWG 21 Countries in OWG 14 Countries in OWG 9 Countries in OWG 15 Countries in OWG
[ 0 G20 countries ]

[ 7 G20 ; 33% of OWG ] [ 3 G20 ; 21% of OWG ] [ 6 G20 ; 67% of OWG ] [12 G20 ; 80% of OWG ]

(4 LDCs ; 36% of OWG) (3 LDCs ; 14% of OWG ) (1 LDC ; 7% of OWG )

( 0 LDCs )

( 0 LDCs )

TOTAL POPULATIONS OF REGIONAL GROUPS
AFRICAN

ASIA-PACIFIC

GRULAC

E. EUROPEAN

WEOG

1.3 Billion

4.4 Billion

640 million

340 million

910 million

POPULATION REPRESENTED BY OWG MEMBER STATES (% total regional pop.)

460 million (36%)

3.9 Billion (90%)

530 million (83%)

98 million (29%)**

850 million (93%)

* Congo is counted as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), population ~84 million in 2018.
G20 Members.
Countries that are G20 members through the European Union (EU).
♦ LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
** Percent of regional countries represented in E. European group would be 72% had Russia joined OWG.

▲ Countries that are

Academics and watchdog groups concerned with equal representation in the UN have
criticized the imbalance of nations contained within each regional group, with some suggesting
reorganization and addition of subregions to help equal the playing field (Agam, 1999; De
Lombaerde, Baert, & Felício, 2012; O’Brien, 1999; Thakur, 2012). The regional groups upon
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which distribution was based illustrate preexisting power dynamics and intergovernmental
coalitions dating as far back as establishment of the United Nations following World War II
(WWII) in 1945. The division of Eastern Europe from Western Europe, reflective of both WWII
and the Cold War, is one example. However, the “Western Europe and Other Group” (WEOG),
the makeup of which more closely reflects economic rather than geographic associations, more
firmly demonstrates preestablished inequity in the regional groups themselves (Figures 2.4 and
2.5) (Agam, 1999; De Lombaerde et al., 2012; O’Brien, 1999; Thakur, 2012).
The Five UN Regional Groups (Africa, Asia-Pacific, E. Europe, GRULAC, WEOG)

Figure 2.4. The five UN regions (“Western and Other Group” in green) (UN DGACM, n.d.).
GDP per Capita, 2018 - High GDP (green) correlates to WEOG Member States

Figure 2.5. World map of countries by GDP per capita (nominal) for 2018 (KREOH, 2019).
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Several institutions formed on the basis of national wealth are represented by Member
States in the WEOG region. Of the 15 WEOG Member States in the OWG, 13 of them are also
members of the OECD DAC, the organization of wealthy nations largely responsible for the
contents and structure of the MDG framework (Hulme, 2009; OECD, 2006; OECD/DAC, n.d.;
UNGA, 2013; UN SDKP, n.d.). Additionally, 12 WEOG countries in the OWG are part of the
G20, another forum for countries with emerging or advanced economies, and six of those 12 also
belong to the G20’s more exclusive counterpart, the G7 (Fratianni, Savona, & Kirton, 2018;
IMF, 2019; UN SDKP, n.d.). Together, the G20 countries account for approximately 80 percent
of global GDP, the majority of the world’s wealth, a condition which assists richer nations in
maintaining a stronghold over international trade and markets, perpetuating the position of
poorer countries on the global periphery. And although coalitions such as the G77 have had some
success in leveling the international playing field, more often realities surrounding aid and trade
agreements apply enough pressure to tip the scales in favor of rich nations during UN Assembly
and working group sessions (Crossette, 2005; Hulme, 2009; McBride & Chatzky, 2019; United
Nations, 2019; United Nations, 2020).
Of the five OWG regional groups, the African Group is the only one without a G7, G20,
or OECD Member State. All eleven countries in the African OWG are members of the G77, as is
the case for all 54 countries on the continent (McBride & Chatzky, 2019; The Group of 77, n.d.;
UN DGACM, n.d.). ] The majority of the African continent, 33 countries, are classified as “Least
Developed Countries” (LDCs) (Figure 2.6). This makes Africa the largest concentration of UNdesignated LDCs in the world (global total is 47) (United Nations Committee for Development
Policy [UNCDP], 2018). This high concentration made Africa a focal point during the 2000–
2015 MDG poverty campaign, however, only four of the 33 LDCs are represented in the OWG
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African Group - Benin, Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia, accounting for less than 15 percent of
African LDC populations (UN CDP, 2018; UNGA, 2013; World Bank, 2018).
Current (red) and Former (orange) Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Figure 2.6. Current and former LDCs. There are 47 LDCs, 33 are in Africa (UNCDP, 2018).
The overall population of Africa is projected to double by the year 2100. It is the only
region in the world not forecast to reach peak population and decline prior to the turn of the 22nd
century (UNCTAD, 2018). By the year 2050, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSAF) is
expected to comprise at least half of the world’s population growth, adding one billion people to
the global tally between 2019 and 2050 (UNISDR, 2017). The SSAF is a high-risk, low
development region typical of the risk-poverty nexus, making inclusion of African Member
States in exchanges concerning DRR and development pivotal toward preventing domestic and
global challenges (CRED, 2018; Hyland & Russ, 2019; UNISDR, 2009; UNISDR, 2017). Yet
Africa was only allocated an additional two seats, seven in all, compared to a region with close
to a quarter of its population (Eastern Europe) (Table 2.4). This is similarly the case with the
WEOG group, also granted five seats which accommodated 93 percent of the total region’s
population compared to representation of only 36 percent for the African continent (UNGA,
2013; UN SDKP, n.d.). As the stated intent of the SDGs is long-term sustainability with targets
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reached by 2030, the current and projected population of Africa, and its attention-grabbing
vulnerabilities, warrant greater representation than the OWG allocation provided .
2.5 Lessons unheard, lessons not learned
Richard et al. (2011) state only 22 percent of national governments were involved in
formal planning of the Millennium Development Goals in their paper, “Sub-Saharan Africa and
the health MDGs: the need to move beyond the ‘quick impact’ model.” The paper critiques
outcomes of the MDG framework and related projects aimed at making gains in the developing
world to meet the 2015 resolution deadline. Its main focus is the Global Health Initiatives
(GHIs), one of several implementation approaches spurred by the Millennium Project (Richard et
al., 2011; Subramanian, Naimoli, Matsubayashi, & Peters, 2011).
The Millennium Project was initiated in 2005, following three years of framing an
“action plan,” a process that began in 2002 around the same time a formal MDG framework was
established (UNGA, 2001; UNGA, 2002; United Nations, n.d.-c; United Nations, 2005).
Planning of the Millennium Project was carried out by an independent committee commissioned
by former Secretary–General Kofi Annan, and led by Special Assistant to the MDGs, Dr. Jeffrey
Sachs. At the end of the three-year period, a condensed version of the “action plan” was
presented to Secretary Annan, and initiatives such as the GHIs which defined the latter portion of
MDG implementation for several low-income locations were launched (McArthur, 2014;
Richard et al., 2011; Subramanian et al., 2011; United Nations, 2005; United Nations, n.d.-c).
The phrase “quick win” initiatives is not one coined by the authors of the paper on GHIs,
but rather the description the Project assigned to its own approach - “simple, proven
interventions with very high potential short-term impacts that can be immediately implemented”
in contrast to more complicated interventions that, “will take a decade of effort or have delayed
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benefits” (Richard et al. 2011; Sachs, 2004; United Nations, 2005). Various primary and
secondary (i.e. support staff absences due to primary) health care failures are described as
stemming from the Project’s “jumpstart” to the GHIs, including impressions that access for
poorer residents may have actually worsened (Fehling et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2011). Richard
et al. (2011) argue that rather than imposing shortcuts to reach health targets by the MDG
deadline, longer-term cross-cutting strategies would have improved overall health and health
care while signaling to stakeholders that the MDGs were more than just “money changing
hands.” They explain:
It was thought that donors would be less interested in complex interventions which would
take ten or more years to produce measurable changes … and that quick wins were more
likely to convince donors to invest. The term “quick wins” was later replaced by the term
“quick impact” interventions but the basic concept was unchanged. This concept became
a buzzword in MDG discourse. However, the list of “quick win” interventions related to
the health MDGs presented in 2005 by the UN Millennium Project, were clearly not all
simple and proven strategies (Richard et al., 2011, p. 43).
Although six years into implementation of the Millennium Project some progress was observed
in sub-Saharan countries, none appeared on track to achieve the health MDGs by the 2015
deadline (Fehling et al., 2013; Richard et al., 2011). As a result, SSAF countries found
themselves, “labeled as ‘lagging behind’ and struggling to implement quick impact initiatives as
the 2015 deadline looms (Richard et al., 2011, p. 45).”
The paper on the Millennium Project GHIs ends by urging planners to work beyond
deadline timelines, to shift donor support from “quick win” approaches aimed at “low hanging
fruits” to longer-term strategies, and suggests a radical overhaul of partnerships between rich and
poor countries (Richard et al., 2011). It was published in November 2011, around the same time
that high-level panels and UN task forces were preparing for the Post-2015 Agenda - organizing
the Rio+20 launch of the SDGs for the following summer and drafting the contents of “The
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Future We Want,” the document that contained the OWG design which left SSAF countries
underrepresented even after adjustments were made by Member States of the General Assembly
(Ban, 2012; Richard et al., 2011; Sachs, 2012; UNGA, 2012a; UN SDKP, n.d.; UN System Task
Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012; UNGA, 2013).
As mentioned, “The Future We Want for All” was referenced by Jeffrey Sachs in his
2012 Lancet correspondence to promote the Post-2015 SDGs. In the piece, Dr. Sachs, who
designed and oversaw Millennium Project implementation in Africa, declares the MDGs mostly
achieved. His announcement of the new 15-year timeline goals proclaims, “The pathways to
sustainable development will not be identified through a top-down approach, but through a
highly energised era of networked problem solving (Sachs, 2012, p. 2211).” A year later, in
another piece to promote transition to the SDGs, Sachs describes the MDGs as, “the most
important global development goals in UN history,” adding that, “setting international
development goals made a huge difference in people’s lives, particularly in the poorest places on
the planet” with sub-Saharan Africa having “benefitted enormously from the MDGs,” a success
to be learned from and applied toward design of the new SDG framework (Sachs, 2013, p. 2).
In the 2013 piece, rather than “networked problem solving” Sachs suggested design of
the framework be guided by the same experts involved in formation of the Millennium Project.
“Stakeholders” are mentioned once, as an implementation component that African governments
have been able to “catalyze.” In the 2012 Lancet piece, ODA shortages are mentioned, whereas
in the 2013 piece, the MDGs are described as a conduit through which donor agencies of highincome countries organized, “their own work in Africa as well.” Both pieces place emphasis on
the SDGs being timebound. The 2012 Lancet correspondence also dedicates portions to the
importance of targets being data-driven (Sachs, 2012; Sachs, 2013).
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2.6 Articulating institutions
A separate 2013 article by Fukuda-Parr & Yamin titled, “The Power of Numbers,” also
addresses targets and data, mainly, the ways in which frameworks based in measurable targets
can act to oversimplify complex issues, in particular those concerning human rights, or in the
authors’ words, “the human principles of participation, equality, democratic voice and
accountability [which] are difficult to measure quantifiably (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013, p.
63).” Arguably, exclusion of these principles during formation of such frameworks (i.e.
participation, equality, democratic voice) acts to further inhibit progress in those realms, or, even
halt progress altogether (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013).
Fukuda-Parr & Yamin echo Richard et al. on the issue of abrupt implementation, noting
the MDGs interrupted progresses being made prior to their adoption, initiatives that were
“emphasized in many of the international agendas [agreed upon] in the 1990s … still being
implemented at the time the MDGs were decided (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013, p. 61).” Other
issues become sidelined altogether, either through exclusion from the framework, or through
further reduction of the framework’s scope - such as the poverty-focus that emerged during the
MDGs (Fehling et al., 2013; Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013; Hulme, 2009).
The poverty-focus of the MDGs calls to the forefront two issues: First, what the
appropriate role of an indicator framework should be toward shaping agendas, and second, how
targets can shape perceptions of concepts through what is assessed and the resulting assessments.
As to the former, and with regard toward the MDGs, Fukuda-Parr & Yamin contend:
Numeric targets and indicators are tools that can monitor implementation by setting
benchmarks. They should not be interpreted as a substitute for a consensus development
agenda, as occurred with the MDGs. Indeed, the MDGs were not developed for this
purpose. They were introduced in the 2001 Road Map to ‘harmonize reporting’.
Nevertheless, they came to be interpreted as hard priorities and an international agenda
(Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013, p. 63).
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As for shaping perceptions, authors, observers, and stakeholders involved with all stages
of the MDGs and SDGs acknowledge placement of the problem in the Third World (Hulme,
2009; Richard et al., 2011; Saith, 2006; Saith, 2007). Fukuda-Parr & Yamin assert the MDGs
framed the concept of development, “as a set of basic needs outcomes, rather than as a process of
transformative change in economic, social, and political structures (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013,
p. 61)” structures which are notably fundamental considerations toward triple bottom line
sustainability central to the subsequent SDGs (Sachs, 2012; UN ESCAP, 2015; UNGA, 2015).
Citing the conceptual model of “indicators as a technology of governance,” Fukuda-Parr
& Yamin state “indicators exert influence in two ways: by setting performance standards against
which progress can be monitored, rewarded or penalized; and by creating a ‘knowledge effect’
where the indicators intended to reflect a concept effectively redefine it (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin,
2013, p. 59).” What’s further, “once these numerical targets were set, they were perceived to be
‘value neutral’. In fact, however, there were assumptions deeply embedded in the MDGs about
the nature and purpose of development (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013, p. 61).”
In his 2010 paper entitled, “Embedded value systems in sustainability assessment tools
and their implications,” Alexandros Gasparatos conceptualizes sustainability evaluation tools as,
“value articulating institutions,” the choice of which should not be deemed trivial. He continues:
In fact their choice can entail various ethical and practical repercussions. However, in
most cases the choice of the evaluation tool is made by the analyst(s) without taking into
consideration the values of the affected stakeholders. By choosing the analytical tool the
analyst essentially “subscribes to” and ultimately “enforces” a particular worldview as the
legitimate yardstick to evaluate the sustainability of a particular project (or policy) ... [this
method of tool selection can distort] sustainability evaluations (Gasparatos, 2010, p. 1).
Similarly, in her 2015 paper regarding the rise and implications of data tracking apps centered on
conditions such as health and fertility, Karen Levy states, “the act of measurement is not neutral.
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Every technology of measurement and classification legitimates certain forms of knowledge and
experience, while rendering others invisible (Levy, 2015, p. 687).”
2.7 “The Analyst”
This might explain why Dr. Sachs, who served as advisor to the MDGs, and later, as
director of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), declares the same
Global Health Initiatives referred to by authors on the frontline as insufficient “quick win”
strategies as, simply – wins (Richard et al., 2011; Sachs, 2012). Very few UN officials,
diplomats, or associated experts - if any at all, have contributed as consistently as Sachs to both
the MDGs and SDGs (UNGA, 2002; Sachs, 2004; Sachs, 2005; Sachs, 2007; Sachs, 2010;
Sachs, 2012; McArthur, 2014; Sachs, 2015; United Nations, n.d.-c). If the two frameworks have
an influential “Analyst” in common, arguably it is Sachs who, in addition to serving as head of
several sustainability and development-focused university programs queried for expert input
toward both sets of goals (i.e. The Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Harvard Center
for International Development), also held the following positions within the UN, and UNaffiliated organizations and governmental institutions:
▪

Special Advisor to Sec. General Kofi Annan on Millennium Development Goals

▪

Director, United Nations Millennium Project

▪

Co-Founder and Director, Millennium Promise

▪

Economic Advisor to governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa & Asia

▪

Director, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network

▪

Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

In his current role as Director of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network
(SDSN), Sachs leads the analytical team responsible for assessing global and regional SDG
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target attainment, appearing as head author on all SDSN annual international SDG index reports.
Sachs and his recurrent team of analysts select the targets to be measured, the target indicators to
be applied, and the methodologies by which scores and rankings are determined (Sachs et al.,
2016; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Durand-Delacre, & Teksoz, 2017; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub,
Kroll, Lafortune, & Fuller, 2018; Sachs et al., 2019; Sachs, Schmidt-Traub, Kroll, Lafortune,
Fuller, & Woelm, 2020). And while in latter annual reports, Sachs has become more outwardly
watchful of environmental markers produced by advanced economies - observed for the first
time as part of the SDG expansion to count developed countries in data reporting - other issues,
such as equality, employment, education, and domestic poverty in developed locations remain
mostly outside of Sachs’ worldview of the First World, from the First World.
This was the case in 2013, as well, when Sachs presented SDSN’s “Action Agenda for
Sustainable Development” to the OWG during the SDG planning committee sessions. The report
contains a blueprint for the SDGs and methods of target measurement, as well as an “FAQ”
section of potential questions should the OWG ask, or be asked, to explain elements of the plan
(SDSN, 2013). Prior to the “FAQs” is a discussion section on potential “costs” to each region
and the world should a “business as usual” (BAU) path continue rather than pursuit of the
Sustainable Development Goals. Table 2.5 shows the report’s interpretation of costs to each area
of the globe. Noticeably, for Sachs and the SDSN authors, North America and other higherincome zones are seemingly without challenges – current or projected, which are otherwise
marked as medium or high cost for other regions.
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Table 2.5. “BAU” paths as presented in SDSN’s report to the OWG (adapted from SDSN, 2013).
Europe

Middle
East &
N. Africa

SubSaharan
Africa

South &
Central
Asia

East Asia
& Pacific

East
Asia

–

–

M

H

H

–

–

–

–

–

M

H

H

M

–

Risk of
Conflict &
Instability

–

M

–

H

H

M/H

M

M

Relative
Poverty &
Inequality

M

H

M

M

H

M

M

M

High
Fertility

–

–

–

H

H

H

M

–

Inadequate
Education

–

M

–

M

H

H

M

–

Gender
Inequality

–

M

–

H

H

H

M

M

Poor
Health

–

M

–

M

H

H

M

–

North
America

America &
Caribbean

Europe

Middle
East &
N. Africa

SubSaharan
Africa

South &
Central
Asia

SouthEast Asia
& Pacific

East
Asia

Water
Stress &
Droughts

M

M

M

H

H

H

–

M

Poor Urban
Housing &
Services

M

M

–

M

H

H

H

M

M

H

M

M

H

H

H

H

Latin

North
America

America &
Caribbean

Extreme
Poverty

–

Food
Insecurity

Latin

South-

Poor Urban
Environment
& Resilience

(table cont’d)
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(table cont’d)
Europe

Middle
East &
N. Africa

SubSaharan
Africa

South &
Central
Asia

SouthEast Asia
& Pacific

East
Asia

M

M

M

H

M

H

H

H

M

H

H

H

H

H

H

Ocean
Acidification

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

Biodiversity
Loss

M

H

M

M

H

M

H

H

Latin

North
America

America &
Caribbean

Extreme
Weather

M

Sea Level
Rise

The “Action Agenda” for the SDGs, as well as the action of presenting this report to the
OWG, exemplify root causes of recurrent issues in the Millennium and Sustainable Development
Goal indicator frameworks. First, the contents of the report omit social and economic inequalities
that present in First World settings. Omission of these realities from portrayal and consideration
of developed countries, combined with the MDG-to-SDG carryover of a “Third World
Problems” credo led to “universal” SDG targets and indicators supposedly meant to incorporate
First World countries yet largely removed from First World contexts (i.e. SDG target 1.1 for the
goal, “End poverty in all its forms everywhere,” with poverty expressed as “people living on less
than $1.25 a day”). This in turn removed developed countries from “counting” in two ways – one
toward compilation and assessment of meaningful data toward global goals, thus, also from
obvious scrutiny or accountability for shortcomings. This helps to reinforce the geopolitical
positions which enable the developed world to task developing countries with achieving
timebound “global” goals that are beyond domestic capacity, and also arguably diminish
development advancements that could produce self-reliant capacity. One thing that is certain: the
“Third World Problem” is not contained, nor confined to, nor largely caused by the Third World.
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CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS
The following section describes data considered and methods applied to evaluate
progress on SDG targets and status of SDG indicator data reported by the United Nations and the
United States leading up to the 2020 milestone. It begins with an explanation of the final SDG
framework contents, structure, and stated applications as outlined in the 2030 Agenda.
3.1 Explanation of the SDG framework
A primary difference between the 2000–2015 MDGs and 2015–2030 SDGs is the
inclusion of First World countries toward target achievement and reporting of data (Table 3.1).
Prior to this expansion, the sole expectation of First World participation under the MDGs was
confined to contributions of “North-South” support in the form of Official Development
Assistance (ODA). This addition is part of the wholistic sustainability approach (i.e. “triple
bottom line”) which considers participation of all societal sectors pivotal to overall, long-term
sustainable development (Fehling et al., 2013; UNGA, 2000; UNGA, 2001; UNGA, 2002).
Table 3.1. Key differences between the MDGs and the SDGs.
Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015)

Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030)

Focus: Development

Focus: (triple bottom line) Sustainability

Main Agenda: Aid & Trade

Main Agenda: Human Rights & Environment

Eco-Approach: Low Level
- Little recognition of planetary boundaries
- Environment is a luxury, development ($$)
is priority

Eco-Approach: Mid-Level
- Living within limited resources of planet
- Healthy environment is fundamental to
overall well-being

# of Goals (MDGs): 8

# of Goals (SDGs): 17

Reporting Countries: Developing Only

Reporting Countries: All

In addition to expanding the scope of nations, the number of global goals more than
doubled. The 2015–2030 framework features 17 SDGs as compared to the eight MDGs of its
predecessor (Table 3.2). This growth is part of an intended shift away from a poverty-focused
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agenda toward one of “triple bottom line” (social, economic, environmental) sustainable
development. The number of targets also grew along with the goals. In all, there are 169 targets
to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (Kumar et al., 2016; UNGA, 2002; UNGA, 2015).
Table 3.2. The eight MDGs and the 17 SDGs.
Eight MDGs

17 SDGs

1. Eradicate extreme poverty & hunger

1. No poverty

8. Decent work
& economic growth

2. Achieve universal primary education

2. Zero hunger

9. Industry, innovation,
& infrastructure

3. Promote gender equality
& empower women

3. Good health
& well-being

10. Reduced inequalities

4. Reduce child mortality

4. Quality education

11. Sustainable cities
& communities

5. Improve maternal health

5. Gender equality

12. Responsible
consumption & production

6. Combat HIV/AIDS

6. Clean water
& sanitation

13. Climate action

7. Ensure environmental sustainability

7. Affordable
& clean energy

14. Life below water
15. Life on land
16. Peace, justice
& strong institutions

8. Develop a global partnership for
development

17. Partnerships
for the goals

SDGs 1 through 16 feature “unfinished business” of the MDGs (MDGs 1-6) incorporated
into the principles of triple bottom line sustainability (Table 3.3). SDG 17 - Partnerships for the
Goals, focuses on transborder capacity-building and Means of Implementation (MOI) as support
for SDG target attainment. This is similar to MDG 8, “Develop a Global Partnership for
Development,” however SDG 17, with 19 targets and 24 indicators, is more expansive than its
predecessor (UNGA, 2000; UNGA, 2001; UNGA, 2002; UNGA, 2017). The complete global
indicator framework for the Sustainable Development Goals containing SDG targets and
indicators is available in Appendix A.
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Table 3.3. SDGs 1-16 organized into columns of “triple bottom line” sustainability realms. SDG
17 for MOI and transborder capacity-building positioned at bottom.

ECONOMIC

SOCIAL

ENVIRONMENT

No Poverty

Quality Education

(SDG 1)

(SDG 4)

Clean Water
& Sanitation

Zero Hunger

Gender Equality

(SDG 2)

(SDG 5)

Good Health & Well-being

Reduced Inequalities

(SDG 3)

(SDG 10)

Decent Work
& Economic Growth

Sustainable Cities
& Communities

(SDG 8)

(SDG 11)

Industry, Innovation
& Infrastructure

Peace, Justice
& Strong Institutions

(SDG 9)

(SDG 16)

(SDG 6)

Affordable
& Clean Energy
(SDG 7)

Responsible Consumption
& Production (SDG 12)
Climate Action
(SDG 13)

Life Below Water
(SDG 14)

Life on Land
(SDG 15)

SDG 17 – Partnerships for the Goals

Each goal in the framework is accompanied by as many as 19 targets (SDG 17) or as few
as five (SDG 13 - Climate Action). Goal targets are intended to guide incremental progress
toward the broader global goals. As SDG targets are achieved, distance to the corresponding goal
shrinks accordingly (Figure 3.1). If a target is reached, a country can choose to move beyond the
“universal” framework and set a new target according to national context and domestic capacity.
For developed countries, a significant number of targets (i.e. poverty as living on less than $1.25
per day) were achieved prior to release of the SDGs (UNESCAP, 2015; UNISDR, 2009).
GOAL: SDG 13

Figure 3.1. Each SDG has a set of correspondent targets to guide incremental progress to the goal.
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The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda instructs participating countries to apply
target indicators toward national-level data for evaluative and annual global reporting purposes.
Nations actively working toward the goals are encouraged to regularly reassess indicator data to
inform policies and practices in support of the Agenda. As a means of measure, 232 indicators
correspondent to the targets are provided. Some indicators are further defined by indicator
metadata, often acting to guide disaggregation of data (Figure 3.2) (UNGA, 2016).

Figure 3.2. Hierarchy of SDG framework. Indicators are applied toward national-level data.
3.1.1 Presentation of SDG data in UN annual reports
Indicator data for SDG targets included in annual UN assessments are arranged according
to the hierarchal order of the SDG framework (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). Each indicator is
numbered according to its correspondent goal and target (i.e. indicator 12.3.1 is the first indicator
belonging to SDG 12, target 3 - or 12.3). The same system applies to indicator metadata. For
targets included in UN reporting, separate tables are presented for each indicator or indicator
metadata. The table shown in Figure 3.3 depicts the first of six metadata (of metadata a–f )
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reported for indicator 1.1.1, “Proportion of population below the international poverty line, by
sex, age, employment status and geographical location (urban/rural).” As is usually the case, the
data are further refined with each successive letter. The table for indicator metadata 1.1.1(a) is
showing data for both sexes by region and subregion. Subsequent tables (1.1.1, b–f ) contain data
disaggregated to show regional populations living below the poverty line by sex, age, and
employment status (ECOSOC, 2019).

Figure 3.3. Table for indicator 1.1.1, metadata (a) (ECOSOC, 2019).
3.2 Data
Although the larger number of goals and targets present new framework application
challenges, the expansion also allows for use of SDGs indicators to review climate and risk
reduction targets. Indicator data reviewed correspond to SDG targets considered cross-applicable
to the Paris Agreement and SFDRR (Leiter & Olivier, 2017; MacFeely, 2019; Murray et al.,
2017; UNFCCC, 2015; UNGA, 2015; UNISDR, 2015b; UNISDR, 2015c).
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3.2.1 Selection of indicators
There are 232 target indicators in the SDG framework. Focus on the cross-cutting targets
between the three 2015 UN resolutions (climate, risk reduction, sustainable development) allows
for time efficiency and more concise data presentations while providing comprehensive
assessment. This approach is also in line with the principles of reinforcing frameworks and
phenomena - whereby progress in one dimension (i.e. climate) strengthens and improves the
other two (sustainable development and disaster risk reduction), and vice versa (Hillier &
Nightingale, 2013; IPCC, 2012; Murray et al., 2017; UNISDR, 2015c).
For the Paris Agreement, SDG targets related to environment and resource principles
contained in the resolution were selected. Both the 2030 Agenda (SDGs) and the Paris
Agreement acknowledge that achieving sustainability requires interconnected progress within
and between social, economic, and environmental realms, or, “People, Prosperity, and Planet
(UNGA, 2015, p. 2).” With specific regard toward “Planet,” the 2030 Agenda states:
We are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through
sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources
and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present
and future generations (UNGA, 2015, p. 2).
Similarly, the preamble to the Paris Agreement states:
Recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and
production … play an important role in addressing climate change. [Also noting] the
importance of ensuring integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans, and protection of
biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth [we have agreed to… ]
(UNFCCC, 2015, p. 2).
The preamble is followed by several articles outlining main objectives of the Agreement.
Article 7, item 9(e) states, “Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems,
including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources
(UNFCCC, 2015, p. 11).” In addition to sharing language with the SFDRR, these statements
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from the Agreement align with six of the goals in the 2030 Agenda –SDGs 6, 7, 14, and 15 for,
“Resources” – Clean Water and Sanitation; Affordable and Clean Energy; Life Below Water;
and Life on Land; respectively; Also, SDG 12, Responsible Production and Consumption; And
finally, SDG 13 – Take Urgent Action on Climate Change. Shared goals between the SFDRR
and SDG frameworks were also included (Figure 3.4). This resulted in a list of eights SDGs
(1, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15), or roughly half of the total 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

Figure 3.4. SDGs 1, 11, and 13 are connected to the Seven Global Targets of the SFDRR.
3.2.2 Selection of UN annual indicator report for analysis
United Nations annual SDG reports published from 2016 to 2019 were considered for use
toward assessment of target coverage and quality of indicator data reported. Evaluation of the
four annual reports determined the most recent report, 2019 at time of writing, was best-suited to
serve as a sample for data contained within the four annual reports. The 2019 report contains the
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most complete set of data tables, or highest target coverage, and the majority of tables contain
equal or greater amounts of indicator data than earlier reports.
3.2.3 Federal SDG reporting site: sdg.data.gov
To assess national-level SDG reporting, the sdg.data.gov site hosted and maintained by
the U.S. federal government was evaluated. The website was launched in January 2017 to serve
several purposes including provision of open information to the public, additional measures of
data and record keeping for federal concerns, and as a means to organize and encourage national
reporting toward the 17 global goals. Ideally, SDG indicator data are uploaded to the site by
agents or employees of federal departments related to the targets measured (i.e. NOAA for
climate data) (Center for Open Data Enterprise, 2017). The site features all 17 SDGs and offers
inspection of data entry information, including federal employee(s) responsible for data entered,
the date of data entry, indicator source data, and expected update of data.
3.3 Methods
The 2019 UN annual SDG report was evaluated at the global and regional levels. Two
conditions were considered for evaluation of global data - First, how many targets were present
for each SDG. For example, SDG 11 has a total of 10 framework targets to measure progress
toward the goal, and 15 indicators to measure target attainment (Figure 3.5). In the UN report,
three tables of indicator data were present – Table 11.1.1 (indicator for target 11.1), and Tables
11.6.1 and 11.6.2 (indicators for target 11.6). This accounts for two of the 10 targets assigned to
SDG 11, or 20 percent target coverage. Because the number of indicators for each target varies,
the second consideration was presence of indicator data. Referring once more to SDG 11, the
three indicators reported (11.1.1 ; 11.6.1 & 11.6.2) represent three out of a total of 15 indicators
or, once again, 20 percent coverage, in this instance for indicator presence.
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SDG 11, “Sustainable Cities” goal with its 10 targets in green and 15 indicators in yellow

Figure 3.5. SDG 11, “Sustainable Cities and Communities” with 10 targets, and 15 indicators.
Data coverage for the Northern America subregion was also assessed in the UN report.
Tables with data disaggregated into subregions were reviewed to determine the potential total
data that could be reported for each target and indicator. For example, the table in Figure 3.6
presents sub-regional data for five separate years, or for the purposes of this evaluation, potential
for data to be entered a total of five times. In this instance, N. America would receive a “score”
of 1 out of 5, or 20 percent, reflecting missing data for the years 2001, 2005, 2015, and 2017.

Figure 3.6. Indicator 2.a.1. Northern America subregion reports
one of five years, or one of five possible data entries resulting in
a score of 20% indicator coverage (ECOSOC, 2019).
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Indicators featuring more metadata (thus corresponding tables of disaggregate data)
logically also have more data entry points. Figure 3.7 features metadata item 1.1.1(a) once more,
this time accompanied by remaining metadata items (b-f) presented in the report for indicator
1.1.1. Metadata items b-f instruct that data be disaggregated to show geographical location, age,
sex, and employment status of populations living under the international poverty line. This
further breakdown results in 40 data entry possibilities for each subregion. “No Data” markers in
Figure 3.7 are placed left of where subregion data for Northern America would typically appear
but are missing. Data for the Northern America subregion are only present for years included in
metadata table “a” which puts indicator coverage at 4 out of 40, or 10 percent.
Metadata for indicator 1.1.1 showing absence of N. America data for items b–f

(figure cont’d)
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(figure cont’d)
Metadata for indicator 1.1.1 showing absence of N. America data for items b–f

Figure 3.7. Metadata items in UN report for indicator 1.1.1 (ECOSOC, 2019).
The online reporting style of the sdg.data.gov site differs significantly from the UN
report. Thus, a different approach toward review of U.S. national data was applied. Rather than
several pages of indicator tables for each target, the online reporting site features one webpage
per target with color-coded text specifying whether data are “Reported Online” or marked absent
as “Exploring data sources” (Figure 3.8). At first inspection, the need to evaluate multiple data to
determine target coverage appears to be eliminated via this format. However, using the site’s
option to view details for each indicator revealed several issues. Among them, outdated data.
Several entries listed 2017 as the most recent annual update. Data which have undergone more
recent entries or adjustments demonstrated other issues. For some, data entered are entirely
incongruent with indicator descriptions. These conditions call into question data accuracy on the
sdg.data.gov site, hence too, the site’s reported target coverage.
Reported target coverage was compiled. SDGs showing more than 40 percent target
coverage on the website were isolated. Those with targets shared by the SFDRR and Paris
Agreement were selected for indicator evaluation. Indicator data that were wholly misaligned
with indicator definitions were given a mark of “0” (or, “no data”). A partial value of 0.5 was
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assigned to indicator data which were misaligned but conveyed information pursuant to the
target. Finally, data congruent with indicator definitions and presenting without further issue
were assigned a value of “1” signifying the indicator was considered reported and complete.
New totals for target coverage were tallied based upon these findings then compared with the
coverage reported for each target by the sdg.data.gov site.

Figure 3.8. Bottom of indicators reported page for SDG 5 targets (sdg.data.gov)
3.3.1 SDG Stakeholder Survey
Finally, in addition to evaluating inputs and outputs of the SDG framework at
international, regional, sub-regional, and national levels, a survey concerning stakeholder SDG
knowledge and actions was conducted. Main distribution of the survey, or “Phase I” was
conducted via social media sharing from November 2019 through February 2020, however,
sharing of survey posts and receipt of survey returns is ongoing. The target survey pool are
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members of civil society, or “citizen stakeholders” in all geographic locations. The final “Phase
I” survey contains 36 questions centered on sustainability and the SDGs, and 8 “About You”
demographic questions (i.e. gender, location, age). Predominate question formats include
multiple choice, Likert scale, and qualitative text entries. A full version of the online
“Stakeholder” survey is provided in Appendix C.
To create the questions, research was performed to locate similar survey projects
concerning stakeholder roles and involvement toward sustainable development. The search
returned published surveys distributed by academics, well-established nonprofit organizations,
and one UN-affiliated institution. These were reviewed and considered while creating questions
for the first draft survey. Survey content, questions, and format were reviewed and revised
during a two-part pilot study. First, the survey was distributed to sustainable development
professionals for content review, namely, one nonprofit organizer, one social worker, one forest
conservationist, and one faculty member of a sustainability-focused university department.
The main objective of the professional panel review was to have members of the public
who work with the public in a sustainable development role establish face validity. Face validity
affirms the degree to which an instrument, for the purposes of this study – a survey evaluating
stakeholder perceptions of the SDGs, measures what it is intended to measure (Holden, 2010).
Professional panel reviewers were provided with a PDF of the survey for close review and also
participated in the online version of the “Stakeholder” survey. Reflections and suggestions were
submitted either via email or using a long format text entry provided at the end of the online
survey. Reviews were mostly positive and established face validity, editing suggestions made by
the professional panel were applied during the first survey revision.
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Following an initial round of editing, a second phase of pilot testing was performed via
survey posting in an equality-focused (SDGs 5 and 10) Facebook group. An open text review
box was featured at the end of the survey prompting input on style, length, and content. This
garnered two text entries, one containing an edit suggestion which was applied during the final
survey revisions. The revision process in its entirety resulted in a reduction from 41 to 36
questions. Data analysis was performed on survey returns resulting from “Phase I” distribution to
show reported familiarity (knowledge) of the SDGs, level of participation in SDG planning, and
perceptions of stakeholder influence toward sustainable development progresses. Questions
included in the Phase 1 SDG Stakeholder Survey are available in Appendix B.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Two SDG data sources, the 2019 UN Sustainable Development Goals Report and the
U.S. federal government reporting site, sdg.data.gov were assessed to determine overall quality
and quantity of data, and coverage of SDG targets and indicators. Data contained in the UN
report were evaluated at the global and sub-regional levels. National-level data for the United
States were assessed via the sdg.data.gov site with emphasis placed on data accuracy. Results for
both sets of data are described separately below. The third and final section, 4.3 is dedicated to
results of the SDG Stakeholder Survey.
4.1 UN 2019 SDG data report
As data in the UN report were presented in greater detail, the section concerning its
evaluation begins with a general overview of indicator presence and presentation of tables.
4.1.1 UN 2019 SDG data report: Overview
Looking back briefly to metadata presented for indicator 1.1.1 in Figure 3.7, “No Data”
markers appear beside five of the six metadata items (b-f) signaling missing data for the “Europe
and Northern America” region. Low data reporting from richer regions toward targets covered by
developing countries is recurrent throughout the report. It is most apparent when tables pertain to
carryover targets from the MDGs - goals which for the most part did not apply to wealthy
nations. Of the richest regions in the world, the Northern America subregion presents the least
indicator data, including for ODA pledges built into the newer SDG framework (ECOSOC,
2019; UNGA, 2002; UNGA, 2015).
Absence of data for the Northern America subregion brings to light a separate issue “sum” totals for the Europe and Northern America region appear despite these gaps in data
(Figure 4.1). This is arguably a misrepresentation that data exist where there are none. Further,

72

totals reported for the region are likely skewed inaccurately toward or away from the target. And
finally, in some tables regional data are not disaggregated to the subregion level (indicator 3.a.1),
rendering it impossible to determine presence of sub-regional data or detect potential inaccuracy
of regional totals (ECOSOC, 2019).
Indicator 2.a.1

Indicator 3.a.1

Total presented for Europe & Northern America
region regardless of absent N. America data

Total presented for Europe & Northern America,
data is not divided into subregions

Figure 4.1. Indicators showing region totals despite absence of subregion data (ECOSOC, 2019).
Data presented for indicator 2.a.1 in Figure 4.1 is more complete than most tables in the
UN annual report. More often, tables display gaps in data (Figure 4.2). Another frequent
occurrence is long footnotes appearing beneath tables which stipulate limitations on data
accuracy (i.e. small percentage of region or country surveyed). Limitations vary, and may apply
to all locations considered, or a specific country or region, or in some cases accompanying
footnotes list multiple limitations on data accuracy covering multiple locations (Figure 4.2).
Disaggregation of data, or lack thereof, is a recurrent issue that appears in various
formats. Regarding “Regions,” aggregate data appear from regional level to “World,” and in
some instances, cover whole ecosystems (i.e. waterway) without reference to location (Figure
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4.3). While this may suffice to convey partial, global measures, it does not assist in country-level
assessments of data. The table for indicator 5.1.1 (Figure 4.3) demonstrates additional issues.
Among those raised are subjectivity of “the analyst” (i.e. determining “non-discrimination” of
national frameworks). Footnotes beneath 5.1.1 explain that in this example of survey data as
indicator data, the survey was not distributed to members of the public, but rather, to National
Statistics Offices, where respondents may feel pressured to report positive national policies. A
more general framework and target concern is the meaningfulness of the indicator toward
measuring progress attainment of target 5.1, “End all forms of discrimination against all women
and girls everywhere,” and further, whether the target 5.1 is itself a reasonable expectation that
can guide meaningful progress toward equality.

Indicator 2.5.2

Indicators 16.2.1 & 16.2.3

Data only present for Europe

Table footnotes on data coverage & accuracy

Figure 4.2. Indicator 2.5.2 showing large gaps in data, and indicators 16.2.1 and 16.2.3 with
accompanying footnotes stipulating data have limited country coverage (ECOSOC, 2019).
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Indicator 6.5.2 showing (global) “transboundary basin grouping” & low data coverage

Indicator 5.1.1 showing “World” as geographic disaggregation & potential subjective “analyst”

Figure 4.3. Indicator 6.5.2 (top) shows nondescript disaggregation, and 5.1.1 (bottom) shows
issues of disaggregation, potential subjective analysis, and data coverage (ECOSOC, 2019).
4.1.2 UN 2019 SDG data report - presence of targets for SDGs 1, 6, 7, and 11 through 15
The 2019 UN annual SDG report was evaluated for target and indicator coverage of
SDGs 1 and 11 for the SFDRR, SDGs 6, 7, 12, and 14 for the Paris Agreement as it relates to
resources, and SDGs 13 and 15 for the Paris Agreement as it relates to environment (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. SDGs described and categorized according to related resolution (UNFCCC, 2015).
SDG 1
SFDRR

SDG 11
SFDRR

SDG 6
Paris–R

SDG 7
Paris–R

SDG 12
Paris–R

SDG 14
Paris–R

SDG 13
Paris–E

SDG 15
Paris–E

No
Poverty

Sustainable
Cities &
Communities

Clean
Water &
Sanitation

Af f ordable
& Clean
Energy

Responsible
Consumption
& Production

Lif e
Below
Water

Climate
Action

Life
On
Land
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The two environment SDGs in the Paris Agreement, SDGs 13 and 15, had a combined target
coverage of 41% between them, this was solely based upon data presence for SDG 15 targets,
however. Target coverage for SDG 15 was 58 percent, with 64 percent indicator coverage in the
report (Table 4.2). Comparatively, there were no tables with regionally disaggregated data
present for SDG 13, “Take Urgent Action on Climate Change” (Figure 4.4). For example,
indicator 13.1.1, “Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and
natural disasters in all countries” (“all countries” being a common phrase used in targets with
national-level indicators) rather than regional data pertaining to number of deaths and missing
persons attributed to disaster events, a table with deaths categorized by hazard type (i.e.
earthquake) was presented with global data. Further, the data are presented for an aggregate
period of 28 years (1990 to 2017) rendering it impossible to distinguish whether hazards events
have increased or decreased. Adaptation measures are also undetectable in the data.
For indicator 13.1.2, “Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies,
and planning” two tables featuring global data for “Aggregate GHG levels,” and one table
showing total number of signatories to UN climate change agreements were presented. There
were no data for the remaining three SDG 13 indicators. As little to no meaningful assessment of
climate change action is made possible by these data, the percent target and indicator coverage
were both marked as 0 for SDG 13.
Table 4.2. Target and indicator coverage for environment SDGs in the Paris Agreement.
Paris Agreement: ENVIRONMENT
SDG 13 – Climate Action

SDG 13 –
Climate
Action

TOTAL TARGETS: 5

TARGETS IN REPORT: 0*

% Target Inclusion: 0%

Total Indicators: 8

Indicators in Report: 0*

% Indicator Inclusion: 0%
SDG 15 – Life on Land

SDG 15 –
Life On
Land

TOTAL TARGETS: 12

TARGETS IN REPORT: 7

% Target Inclusion: 58%

Total Indicators: 14

Indicators in Report: 9

% Indicator Inclusion: 64%
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Figure 4.4. Data tables included for SDG 13 in UN annual report (ECOSOC, 2019).
A total of four risk reduction targets are presented in the report for SDGs 1 and 11, with
two targets presented for each of the SFDRR goals (Table 4.3). In the case of SDG 1, “No
Poverty,” that amounted to 29 percent of targets. For SDG 11, “Sustainable Cities and
Communities,” this amounted to 20 percent of target representation, the second-lowest target
coverage next to SDG 13.
Table 4.3. Target and indicator coverage for risk reduction SDGs related to the SFDRR.
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR)
SDG 2 – No Poverty

SDG 1 –
No Poverty

TOTAL TARGETS: 7

TARGETS IN REPORT: 2

% Target Inclusion: 29%

Target Indicators: 14

Indicators in Report: 2

% Indicator Inclusion: 14%
SDG 11 – Sustainable Cities

SDG 11 –
TOTAL TARGETS: 10
Sustainable
Cities &
Communities Total Indicators: 15

TARGETS IN REPORT: 2

% Target Inclusion: 20%

Indicators in Report: 3

% Indicator Inclusion: 20%
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Overall, resource SDGs had the highest target and indicator coverage, with SDG 6,
“Clean Water and Sanitation” being the most well-represented (Figure 4.5). Data were present
for 6 of 8 targets, or 75 percent target coverage. While that is the highest percent target coverage,
indicator coverage for SDG 6 (64%) is equal to indicator coverage for SDG 15, “Life On Land.”
Indicators for SDG 6 and SDG 15 are among the most well-rounded and well-defined. SDG 7,
“Affordable and Clean Energy,” has only 5 targets compared with 8 targets for SDG 6 and 12
targets for SDG 15. Less targets that are less defined is reflective of SDG 7 being a partially new
target to UN indicator frameworks. SDG 12, “Responsible Consumption and Production” is also
a fairly new goal containing new targets which may partly explain why it received the third
lowest target coverage score. Further details concerning the significance of these factors are
presented in Chapter 5 (ECOSOC, 2019; UNGA, 2015).
Table 4.4. Target and indicator coverage for Paris Agreement resource SDGs (ECOSOC, 2019).
Paris Agreement: RESOURCES
SDG 6 – Clean Water + Sanitation

SDG 6 –
Clean Water
& Sanitation

TOTAL TARGETS: 8

TARGETS IN REPORT: 6

% Target Inclusion: 75%

Total Indicators: 11

Indicators in Report: 7

% Indicator Inclusion: 64%
SDG 7 – Affordable + Clean Energy

SDG 7 –
Affordable &
Clean Energy

TOTAL TARGETS: 5

TARGETS IN REPORT: 3

Total Indicators: 6

Indicators in Report: 4

% Target Inclusion: 60%
% Indicator Inclusion: 67%
SDG 12 – Consumption + Production

SDG 12 –
Responsible
Consumption
& Production

TOTAL TARGETS: 11 TARGETS IN REPORT: 4

% Target Inclusion: 36%

Total Indicators: 13

% Indicator Inclusion: 38%

Indicators in Report: 5

SDG 14 – Life Below Water

SDG 14 –
Life Below
Water

TOTAL TARGETS: 10 TARGETS IN REPORT: 4

% Target Inclusion: 40%

Total Indicators: 10

% Indicator Inclusion: 40%

Indicators in Report: 4

Data tables for both risk reduction targets, SDGs 1 and 11, and for environment, SDG 13
were most absent from the report. SDG 1, “No poverty,” the attention-grabber of the MDGs was
ranked third lowest with 29 percent target coverage (Figure 4.5). Of the three lowest-scoring
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SDGs, “No Poverty,” is a carryover from the MDGs. It was also the focal point of the MDGs by
many accounts (Fehling, Nelson, & Venkatapuram, 2013 Hulme, 2009; Sachs, 2012).
TARGETS
SDG-1
1.1 ; 1.3

% SDG Targets in UN Report
100%
90%

75%

80%

70%

60%

58%

60%
50%

40%
30%

36%

29%
20%

20%

10%

SDG-11
11.1 ; 11.6
(2 / 10)
SDG-6
6.1;6.2;6.5;
6.6;6.a;6.b
(6 / 8)
SDG-7
7.1 ; 7.2 ; 7.3 (3 / 5)
SDG-12
12.1 ; 12.2
12.4 ; 12.c
SDG-14
14.4 ; 14.5
14.6 ; 14.b

40%

0%

(2 / 7)

SDG-13

(4 / 11)

(0 / 5)

0%
SDG-1 SDG-11

SDG-6 SDG-7 SDG-12 SDG-14

SDG-13 SDG-15

SDG-15
(7 /12)
15.1 ; 15.2 ; 15.3
15.4 ; 15.5 ; 15.6

SFDRR
RESOURCES
ENVIRON
Figure 4.5. Target coverage of SFDRR and Paris Agreement SDGs in UN report (ECOSOC, 2019).

4.1.3 Coverage of Northern America subregion metadata in UN report
Data in the 2019 UN SDG report was also inspected to establish indicator coverage for
the Northern America subregion. While at first glance, results for this section may appear to be
in line with the percent coverage of targets and indicators, an important distinction is that
indicator and indicator metadata percentages are calculated from data that are present in the
report, whereas the previous section depicted the coverage of targets and indicators based upon
what is included in the SDG framework in its entirety. For example, SDG 1, “No Poverty,” has
an indicator coverage of 23 percent for the Northern America subregion (Table 4.5) – this is not
reflective of the low overall coverage of indicators in the report, but rather, the low coverage of
data for the Northern America subregion. The other SDG under consid eration for the SFDRR is
SDG 11, “Sustainable Cities and Communities.” SDG 11 has a total of three indicators in the
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report, however, calculating percent coverage of the Northern America subregion was not
possible due to data not being disaggregated at the sub-regional level for all three indicators.
Table 4.5. Indicator metadata coverage of risk reduction SDGs for N. American Subregion.
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR)
Targets in Report: 2

Indicators in Report: 2

SDG 1 – No Poverty

Metadata in Report: 47

N. America Metadata: 11

% N. America metadata: 23%

SDG 11 –

Targets in report: 2

Indicators in Report: 3

SDG 11 – Sustainable Cities

Sustainable
Cities &
Communities

Metadata in Report: N/A

N. America Metadata: N/A

% N. America metadata: N/A

SDG 1 –
No Poverty

SDG 13, a resource SDG for the Paris Agreement demonstrates a similar issue, as there
were no data disaggregated below a global level making determination of sub-regional coverage
not possible. However, SDG 15 of the environment SDGs featured disaggregate data, as well as
relatively high indicator coverage (89%) for Northern America (Table 4.6). Two factors to be
expanded upon in the subsequent chapter are the aforementioned presence of data for targets
previously covered under UN frameworks, as well as, which notable indicators were missing for
the Northern America subregion (i.e. 15.a.1 for official development assistance) (Table 4.7).
Table 4.6. Indicator metadata coverage of environment SDGs for N. American Subregion.
Paris Agreement: ENVIRONMENT
SDG 13 –
Climate
Action

Targets in Report: 0*

Indicators in Report: 0*

SDG 13 – Climate Action

Metadata in Report: N/A

N. America Metadata: N/A

% N. America metadata: N/A

SDG 15 –
Life On
Land

Targets in Report: 7

Indicators in Report: 9

SDG 15 – Life On Land

Metadata in Report: 62

N. America Metadata: 55

% N. America metadata: 89%

ODA data for the Northern America subregion is also absent for indicator 6.a.1 of the
resource SDGs (Table 4.7). Overall, however, indicator and indicator metadata coverage of
resource SDGs for the subregion was higher than its coverage for the other two SDG categories.
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Once again, preexisting frameworks play a role that will be elaborated upon in the next chapter,
along with notably missing indicator data. Data were not disaggregated to the sub-regional level
for several indicators, including indicator 12.2.1 meant to measure domestic material footprint an important climate and environmental factor. Additionally, SG 14, “Life Below Water” had
only seven metadata broken down to the sub-regional level. A full list of indicators without data
for the three classifications (resource, environment, SFDRR) for the Northern America subregion
is contained in Table 4.7, along with percent metadata coverage for resource SDGs flagged for
missing metadata. Overall, the resource SDGs had a metadata coverage of 73 percent.
Table 4.7. Targets with associated indicators missing metadata for the N. American subregion.
Targets / Indicators Without Metadata Present for Northern America Subregion
Target

Indicator

1.1 By 2030, eradicate extreme
poverty f or all people
everywhere, currently
measured as people living on
less than $1.25 a day

1.1.1 Proportion of pop.
below int’l poverty line
by sex, age,
employment status &
geographical location
(urban/rural)

N/A

N/A

Target

Indicator

SDG 6
[Resource]

6.1 By 2030, achieve universal
and equitable access to saf e &
af f ordable drinking water f or all

6.1.1 Proportion of
population using saf ely
managed drinking
water services

4 md items / 11
(64% coverage)

SDG 6
[Resource]

6.2 By 2030, achieve access to
adequate & equitable sanitation
and hygiene f or all and end
open def ecation, w/special attn
to needs of women & girls and
those in vulnerable situations

6.2.1 Proportion of pop.
using (a) saf ely
managed sanitation
services and (b) a
hand-washing f acility
with soap and water

9 md items / 14
(36% coverage)

SDG 6
[Resource]

6.a By 2030, expand int’l
cooperation & capacity-building
support to developing countries
in water- and sanitation-related
activities / programmes including
water harvesting, desalination,
water ef f iciency, wastewater
treatment, recycling / reuse tech.

6.a.1 Amount of water &
sanitation-related
of f icial dev. assistance
that is part of gov.coordinated spending…

SDG 1
[SFDRR]

SDG 11
[SFDRR]

(table cont’d)
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# of metadata missing

36 md items / 40

N/A (“regional”)
# of metadata missing

5 md items / 5
(0% coverage)

(table cont’d)
Targets / Indicators Without Metadata Present for Northern America Subregion

SDG 6
[Resource]

SDG 7
[Resource]

SDG 12
[Resource]

SDG 14
[Resource]

Target

Indicator

6.b Support and strengthen the
participation of local
communities in improving water
and sanitation management

6.b.1 Proportion of
local administrative
units with established
and operational policies
and procedures f or
participation of local
communities in water &
sanitation management

SDG 15
[Environment]

5 md items / 5
(0% coverage)
(Note: Two of four
md items marked
N/A “regional”)

Reported

Reported

Reported

12.4 By 2020, achieve the
environmentally sound
management of chemicals and
all wastes throughout their lif e
cycle, in accordance with
agreed international
f rameworks, and signif icantly
reduce their release to air,
water and soil in order to
minimize their adverse impacts
on human health and the
environment

12.4.1 Number of
parties to international
multilateral
environmental
agreements on
hazardous waste, and
other chemicals that
meet their
commitments and
obligations in
transmitting inf ormation
as required by each
relevant agreement

Reported

Reported

(Note: Two “regional”)

Target

Indicator

#of metadata missing

SDG 13
N/A
[Environment]

SDG 15
[Environment]

# of metadata missing

N/A

15.3 combat desertif ication,
restore degraded land and soil,
including land af f ected by
desertif ication, drought and
f loods, and strive to achieve a
land degradation-neutral world

15.3.1 Proportion of
land that is degraded
over total land area

15.a Mobilize and signif icantly
increase f inancial resources
f rom all sources to conserve
and sustainably use biodiversity
and ecosystems

15.a.1 Of f icial
development
assistance and public
expenditure on
conservation and
sustainable use of
biodiversity &
ecosystem
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3 md items / 4

(25% coverage)

Reported

N/A (“regional” +)

3 md items / 3

4 md items / 4

4.2 U.S. federal SDG data reporting: sdg.data.gov website
The same SDG classifications (resource, environment, SFDRR) were also considered for
this portion of the study on data contained on the U.S. federal government sdg.data.gov website.
The number of SDGs, however, was narrowed by the qualifier that SDGs evaluated for U.S.
national-level data will have more than 40 percent target coverage reported on the sdg.data.gov
site. This resulted in one SDG from each of the three classifications. As the purpose of this
portion of research is to inspect the accuracy of data entered for indicators on the sdg.data.gov
site, and adjust coverage percentages accordingly, it should be noted that of the 17 SDGs, seven
were reported as having approximately 25 percent or less target coverage (Figure 4.6).

Figure 4.6. Coverage of SDG targets as reported on sdg.data.gov. SDGs 1, 7, and 13 were
selected to inspect accuracy of indicator data entered thus reported toward target coverage.
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Results of data evaluation for SDGs related to the SFDRR are presented in Table 4.8 with
accompanying indicator definitions. The white rows at the top of the table contain recorded
results, the rows in gray below the main table contain associated data descriptions and
explanation of scores. Indicator 1.3.1 is bold and underlined to signify it is also in the UN report.
Table 4.8. Data accuracy scores with accompanying explanations for SFDRR-related SDG 1.
SFDRR – SDG 1 [14 Total Indicators; 6 U.S. “Reported” Indicators]
`

SDG-1

Ind. #

Indicator

1.2.1

Proportion of population living below
the national poverty line, by sex and age

2000 - 2016

Proportion of pop. covered by social
protection floors/systems, by sex,
distinguishing children, the unemployed,
older persons, persons with disabilities,
pregnant women, newborns, work-injury
victims, and the poor & vulnerable

2000 - 2016

Number of deaths, missing persons and
directly affected persons attributed to
disasters per 100,000 population

N/A

Direct economic loss attributed to
disasters in relation to global gross
domestic product (GDP)

2000 - 2016

Number of countries that adopt and
implement national disaster risk
reduction strategies in line with the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030

2000 - 2017

1.3.1

1.5.1

1.5.2

1.5.3

1.5.4

1.3.1

1.5.1

1.5.2

Proportion of local governments that
adopt and implement local disaster risk
reduction strategies in line with national
disaster risk reduction strategies

Years
https://sdg.data.gov/1 -2-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/1 -3-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/1 -5-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/1 -5-2/

https://sdg.data.gov/1 -5-3/

2000 - 2017
https://sdg.data.gov/1 -5-4/

Source
Periodicity

Source
Update

Data
Update

Congruent?
Correct?

Annual

9/2018

10/2017

1

Annual

4/2018

10/2017

0 (*A)

Stated as
“Annual”

N/A

11/2017

0 (*B)

“Annual”

(source
unclear)

10/2017

0 (*C)

“Annual”

(Policy
Directive)

2/2018

1 (**)

“Annual”

(Policy
Directive)

7/2018

0.5 (**)

*A: “Actual indicator available [used]” – The “percentage insured” is the relationship of individuals who have earned
Social Security retirement, survivors and disability insurance coverage based on their covered earnings histories.
[Not Congruent w/UN Metadata Description]

0 (*A)

*B: “U.S. method of computation” – US Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, including the
National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness System; “Unit of measurement” – Yes/No; NOTE:
Accompanying chart is data representation addressing title question, “Has the US established national and local
disaster risk reduction strategies?” (bar graph, “Yes/No” measurement) [ Not Congruent w/UN Metadata Description]

0 (*B)

*C: Multiple issues – Conflicting U.S.-adjusted indicator descriptions, and corresponding definitions of terms, both
of which do not appear to serve the UN metadata description and associated definitions for SDG indicator 1.5.2;
Data source unclear, however, when working upon assumption that stated source is intended to reflect U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis, “Saving and Investment” reports, data presented in associated graph comes into question.

0 (*C)

**NOTE: Indicator data in need of refinement (consideration toward implementation at local scale)
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The difference between reported (congruent, complete) indicator status on sdg.data.gov
and what was found to be congruent and complete data via evaluation was 25 percent (lower than
reported). In some cases, for example indicator 1.3.1, indicator data were simply not complete
enough to convey total coverage. In others, indicator data entered on sdg.data.gov were not
congruent with the UN indicator definition. For example, data entered for indicator 1.5.1,
“Number of deaths and missing persons attributed to disaster,” described a policy directive rather
than an amount. Data were presented as “Yes” in a Y/N measurement to convey the policy is in
place. This was also given a score of zero, as it did not align with the indicator description.
Table 4.9. Data accuracy scores with accompanying explanations for resource-related SDG 7.
RESOURCES – SDG 7 [6 Total Indicators; 3 U.S. “Reported” Indicators]
Ind. #

Indicator

Years

Source
Periodicity

Source
Update

Data
Update

Congruent?
Correct?

7.1.1

Proportion of population with access to
electricity

2001 - 2015

Biannual

2/2019

11/2017

0.5 (*A)

Renewable energy consumption as a
percentage of total final energy
consumption

2000 - 2016

Annual (&
monthly:
)

3/2018

9/2017

1 (** )

3/2018

9/2017

1 (*** )

SDG-7

7.2.1

https://sdg.data.gov/7 -1-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/7 -2-1/

h ttp s://www.e i a.gov/to tal ene rgy/d ata/mo nthl y/

7.3.1

Energy intensity measured in terms of
primary energy and GDP

2000 - 2016
https://sdg.data.gov/7 -3-1/

Annual (&
monthly:
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy
/data/browser/index.php?tbl=T0
1.07#/?f=M&start=200001

)

7.1.1

*A: NOTE: Missing rural-level data (Partial)

0.5 (*A)

7.2.1

**Slight incongruence between UN indicator & U.S. indicator. data OK

1(**)

7.3.1

***U.S. indicator congruent with UN indicator metadata – however, indicator (“Total Primary Energy
Consumption per Real Dollar GDP”) more closely related to GDP / development status than “Clean Energy”
(TRADEOFF-SDG 7) – https://www.nap.edu/read/9736/chapter/4 also:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/162011517329890816/pdf/WPS8322.pdf

1(***)

For SDG 7, the UN-assigned indicator definitions are vague. For instance, although it
was not considered for this study (as no data were reported on sdg.data.gov for inspection) there
is no clear definition for “primary reliance,” and “clean fuels and technology” appearing in UN
indicator 7.1.2, “Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology.”
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This is discussed further in Chapter 4. More pertinent to these study results, the lack of data
reported for indicator 7.1.2 by sdg.data.gov leaves potential judgments of national progress
toward target 7.1 reliant upon only 7.1.1, “Proportion of population with access to electricity,” an
MDG carryover indicator. Application of indicators intended for developing countries toward
national-level data for developed countries (i.e. 7.1.1 “access to electricity”) leads to distorted
measurements on target attainment in “First World” settings. Further, this indicator, by UN
definition, does not account for whether electricity is affordable. However, as the study was only
concerned with evaluating data for congruency and completeness, these issues were not
considered toward scoring. Only a 0.5-point deduction was applied to SDG 7 regarding
incomplete data for indicator 7.1.1 (Table 4.9).
Table 4.10. Data accuracy scores with accompanying explanations for environmental SDG 13.
ENVIRON – SDG 13 [8 Total Indicators; 7 U.S. “Reported” Indicators]
SDG-13

Ind. #

Indicator

Years

13.1.1

Number of deaths, missing persons and
directly affected persons attributed to
disasters per 100,000 population
(Repeated in SDG-1)

“2000–2017”

Number of countries that adopt and
implement national disaster risk
reduction strategies (Repeat)

2000 - 2017

Proportion of local governments that
adopt and implement local disaster
risk reduction strategies in line with
national disaster risk reduction
strategies (Repeat)

2000 - 2017

13.1.2

13.1.3

13.2.1

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -1-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -1-2/

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -1-3/

Number of countries that have
communicated establishment or
operationalization of an integrated
policy/strategy/plan which increases
their ability to adapt to adverse climate
change impacts, and foster climate
“2000-2017”
resilience & low greenhouse gas
emissions development in a manner
that does not threaten food production
(including a national adaptation plan,
nationally determined contribution,
national communication, biennial
update report or other) [my emphasis]
https://sdg.data.gov/13 -2-1/

(table cont’d)
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Source
Periodicity

Source
Update

Data
Update

Congruent?
Correct?

Stated as
“Annual”

“Fall,
2018”

10/2017

0 (*A)

Stated as
“Annual”

N/A

2/2018

1

Stated as
“Annual”

N/A

2/2018

0.5(**)

“Annual”

2 of 3
Sources
Revoked
by EOs
13783 & ,
13834 :
https://sftool.gov/learn/anno
tation/427/executive-order13653-revoked-preparingunited-states-impactsclimate-change

&
https://sftool.gov/learn/anno
tation/447/executive-order13693-revoked-planningfederal-sustainability-decade

0 (*B)

7/2018

– at time of
writing, 2 of 3
EOs offered
as “method of
comp” were
revoked (in
March 2017
& May 2018)

(table cont’d)
ENVIRON – SDG 13 [8 Total Indicators; 7 U.S. “Reported” Indicators]
Ind. #

Indicator

Years

Source
Periodicity

Source
Update

Data
Update

Congruent?
Correct?

13.3.1

Number of countries that have
integrated mitigation, adaptation,
impact reduction & early warning into
primary, secondary & tertiary curricula

2000 - 2017

“Annual”

N/A

1/2017

1

Number of countries that have
communicated the strengthening of
institutional, systemic and individual
capacity-building to implement
adaptation, mitigation and technology
transfer, and development actions

2000 - 2017

“Annual”

N/A

7/2018

1 (*C)

Number of least developed countries
and small island developing States
that are receiving specialized support,
and amount of support, including
finance, technology and capacitybuilding, for mechanisms for raising
capacities for effective climate
change-related planning and
management, including focusing on
women, youth and local and
marginalized communities

7/2018

N/A

N/A

7/2018

0 (*D)

SDG-13

13.3.2

13.b.1

13.1.1

13.2.1

13.3.2

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -3-1/

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -3-2/

https://sdg.data.gov/13 -b-1/

*A: “U.S. method of computation” – US Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, including the
National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness System; “Unit of measurement” – Yes/No; NOTE:
Accompanying chart is data representation addressing title question, “Has the US established national and local
disaster risk reduction strategies?” (bar graph, “Yes/No” measurement) [Not Congruent w/UN Metadata Description]
*B: “U.S. method of computation” – US President’s Climate Action Plan E.O. 13653: Preparing the U.S. for the
Impacts of Climate Change (agencies adaptation plans) – REVOKED, 3/28/17 :
federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/31/2017-06576/promoting-energy-independence-and-economic-growth …
E.O.13693: Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade – REVOKED, 5/17/2018 :
federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/22/2018-11101/efficient-federal-operations ; Further, the indicator calls for
more than one qualifier (metadata) related to SDG 13 “climate actions” such as “Nationally-Determined
Contributions (NDCs)” to the Paris Agreement, however, data reported for 13.2.1 on SDG.data.gov addressed only
one question: “Has the US established a plan to improve the nation’s ability to adapt to climate change in a manner
that does not adversely affect food production?” Data reported for the indicator item was presented as a Yes / No
bar graph on the government site, with “Yes” displayed for more recent years. The aforementioned related and
revoked Executive Orders entered in conjunction with the Yes / No U.S. reporting method (in support of “Yes”)
confirms doubts about accuracy of data, however, larger questions of indicator applicability toward “First World”
contexts & outputs, and whether framework indicators accurately work to measure progress toward targets and
global goals are later discussed along with oversimplification and other limitations posed by indicator frameworks .
. . [Data not properly updated; MAJORITY OF DATA OUTDATED / INCORRECT… stated update: 7/2018]
*C: Source is archived Obama White House Page for Americorps (Note: Trump has proposed defunding the
program) … Source Link: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/19/resilience-americorpsannounces-ten-cities-its-pilot-program-support

0 (*A)

0 (*B)
– at time of
writing, 2 of
3 EOs
offered as
“method of
comp” were
revoked (in
March 2017
& May
2018)

1 (*C)

NOTE: 13.a.1 (no data on U.S. site / not under analysis) is a financial pledge ( “ODA”) indicator –

“Mobilized amount of U.S. dollars per year between 2020 & 2025 accountable toward the $100 billion commitment
[re: UNFCCC commitment & more recent Paris Agreement] (UNGA, 2017)” – no data, indicator 13.a.1

13.b.1

*D: “U.S. method of computation” – Does this indicator (LDC or small island developing states receiving support)
apply to the US?; “Unit of measurement” – Yes/No; NOTE: Accompanying chart is unclear data; Chart title, “Does
this indicator (LDC or small island developing states receiving support) apply to the US?” (bar graph, “Yes/No” –
displaying as both) [Not Congruent w/UN Metadata Description]

** 13.1.3: UN indicator (and U.S. application) need refinement (and alignment, with target)
Consideration of/to local scale ; implementation also important / relevant re: 13.1 & 13.1.3
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0 (*D)

Results for SDG 13 were significantly lower than target coverage reported on the
website, by a difference of half - down to 44 percent from 88 percent reported on sdg.data.gov
(Figure 4.7). Inspection of indicator 13.2.1 revealed particularly problematic data. The indicator
calls for several forms of data associated with climate drivers (i.e. CO2) and climate adaptation
measures. The information entered is outdated, as was the case with most indicators, however, in
this instance, two climate policies that had been revoked prior to the date of the latest entry were
cited. This goes beyond the recurrent issue of outdated data, and instead was deemed inaccurate.
The indicator was given a score of 0, as two out of three of the policies cited were no longer in
effect. Implications of these and other findings are further discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Figure 4.7. SDG target coverage as reported on sdg.data.gov presented alongside percent
coverage of targets calculated according to results of accuracy of data indicator evaluation
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4.3 SDG Stakeholder Survey
The “SDG Stakeholder Survey” concerning knowledge and perceptions of the SDGs was
conducted via social media posting and sharing from November 2019 to February 2020. Results
presented in this section concern five questions (Table 4.11). The “Stakeholder” survey garnered
approximately 90 survey returns. This amount was lowered slightly when queried to eliminate
survey previews. A second query was performed to isolate surveys with reported respondent
locations. This placed the number at approximately 50 subjects (N=51) for the first three
questions considered. The latter two, which appeared toward the end of the survey, received 11
less responses, or a total of 40 subjects. Incomplete surveys are discussed in the next chapter.
Table 4.11. “Stakeholder” survey questions considered, with corresponding answer options.
Questions

Answer Options

Survey Part : I

How familiar are you with the
17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs)?

(a) Very ; (b) Somewhat ; (c) I've heard of them, but
don't know specif ics ; (d) I've never heard of them ;
(e) Other: [text entry option]

Survey Part : I

How involved do you feel
you were in creating the
SDGs? ... for example, in
choosing the 17 Goals, or
creating the framework to
guide goal achievement

(a) I was directly involved ; (b) I was involved thru
an organization that represents me ; (c) I was
somewhat involved ; (d) I was not at all involved ;
(e) Other: [text entry option]

Survey Part: I

Would you have preferred to
be more involved in
Sustainable Development
Goal planning?

(a) Yes, but I didn't know about it ; (b) Maybe, but I
didn't know about it ; (c) I knew about it, but didn't
know how to participate ; (d) I knew about it, but
didn't f eel participation was open to me ; (e) I knew
about it, but I was not interested ; (f ) I participated,
but I wish I had more input ; (g) Other: [text option]

Survey Part : II Regarding government

LEVELS once more
(national, state, city/town) ...
What amount of influence do
you feel YOU hold over
sustainable development at
each level?
Survey Part : II And - what amount of action

/ participation toward
achieving sustainable
development might You
perform at each level?

[Likert Scale slider]
None(1) → [2]→Some(3)→[4]→High(5)

[Likert Scale slider]
None(1) → [2]→Some(3)→[4]→High(5)
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Two outreach methods were applied toward survey distribution. The first method,
contacting U.S.-based nonprofits with missions reflective of sustainable development, spurred
upticks in survey returns listing U.S. locations when direct contact resulted in survey sharing.
The most effective survey share produced by this method occurred after contact with a U.S.based nonprofit organizer who reported posting the survey on their personal Facebook page, and
sending the online survey link to friends and colleagues. Returns listing locations near the
organizer’s nonprofit noticeably increased during the week that followed. Overall, however,
returns generated by email outreach with U.S. sustainability nonprofits were not high. Further,
this approach required more time and attention than the second, social media circulation method
performed mainly through Facebook groups focused on sustainable development and the SDGs.
Returns resulting from posts in sustainability-oriented groups were mainly submitted by
respondents reporting residence outside of the United States. Posts to SDG Facebook groups
were well-liked and commented upon, and garnered shares to both personal and NGO-affiliated
pages which, once more, mainly listed non-U.S. locations. Shares on Twitter, including sharing
of posts made by U.S.-based organizations, were also mainly performed by non-U.S. user
profiles. Higher levels of engagement from social media users and pages outside of the United
States, combined with the Third World focus of the previous MDG framework, prompted
separation of data to evaluate SDG knowledge levels based upon reported respondent locations.
Following a summary introduction concerning triple-bottom-line sustainability and main
stated aims of the SDGs, the first survey question asked, “How familiar are you with the 17
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?” Of respondents in the survey pool isolated for listing
a location (n=51), 33 percent and 29 percent reported being “Very” or “Somewhat” familiar
(respectively), 24 percent reported having “only heard of” the SDGs (no specific knowledge),

90

and 14 percent reported having “never heard of them” (Figure 4.8). Response data were then
disaggregated according to reported (U.S. or non-U.S.) location. This breakdown revealed that
non-U.S. participants (n=25) felt significantly more familiar with the SDGs (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.8. Reported familiarity with the SDGs for all respondents that listed location (N=51).

Figure 4.9. Data disaggregated to show reported SDG familiarity by non-U.S. and U.S. location.
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Non-U.S. participants makeup more than two-thirds of those reporting they are “very”
familiar with the SDGs (23.5%), they also account for almost three-quarters of the “somewhat”
familiar group (21.5%). Conversely, U.S. respondents comprise the entirety of the “never heard
of them” group (24%), and more than two-thirds reported having only heard of the SDGs with no
specific knowledge of them (10%). These and other survey data demonstrate a marked difference
between exposure of the two location groups to SDG information and related actions during the
eight-year framework timeframe thus far, beginning in 2012 with the Post-2015 Agenda
promotional period and approaching the first five-year milestone during Phase I of survey
distribution in late 2019 and early 2020. These representations of data also demonstrate the
importance of disaggregating data, a recurrent shortcoming in SDG reports published to date.
That said, stakeholder responses to questions two and three (Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11) show
low levels of overall engagement in SDG contents and outcomes, with approximately 70 percent
of respondents in all locations reporting they were “not at all involved” in SDG planning.
“How involved do you feel you were in creating the SDGs?”
“Directly” ; “Somewhat” ; or “Through Org”

All Answers ; All Locations

Figure 4.10. Reported participation in SDG planning, all respondents (left), and disaggregated
data showing reported direct or indirect involvement for comparison of results by location.
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Data for the roughly 30 percent of respondents reporting direct or indirect participation in
SDG creation were isolated then separated to compare levels of involvement according to the
two location types (non-U.S. and U.S.). Within this subgroup (N=15), two U.S.-based
respondents (13%) reported having participated in planning, with one U.S. participant stating
they participated directly, and another reporting representation through a stakeholder
organization (Figure 4.10). However, for the subsequent question, “Would you have preferred
more involvement in SDG planning?” the latter of the two U.S. respondents chose the option, “I
knew about [planning], but participation did not feel open to me,” potentially a sign that
expectations of input toward the SDGs via NGO or other organization were not met.
The U.S. respondent citing participatory challenges was one of four from both locations
(8%) to report that access to planning felt closed to them (Figure 4.11). The same number of
respondents reported knowing about SDG planning, but not knowing how to participate (8%).
Other respondents who reported direct or indirect participation in SDG creation also reported
wanting more input (14%). Altogether, 30 percent of respondents knew that SDG planning was
taking place but felt unable to participate or achieve a satisfactory level of input in the process.
“Would you have preferred to be more involved in SDG planning?”
“Yes” or “Maybe” …

All Answers …

but didn’t know about SDG planning

Both Location Types Combined (N=51)

U.S. & Non-U.S. Locations (N=51)

Figure 4.11. Preferred involvement in SDG planning, all (left), and by two location types (right ).
93

In the combined group of all respondents in all locations, 66 percent reported they were
unaware that creation and design of the SDG contents and corresponding framework were taking
place at the time, however, they expressed interest toward participating had they been aware of it
(“Yes” or “Maybe”…“but didn’t know about it”). In fact, 81 percent of respondents who
reported residing in a U.S. location answered either “Yes” or “Maybe” toward being involved
had known about the planning process. Finally, for the participation in SDG creation question,
none of the respondents in any location chose the “not interested” answer option.
The start to the second portion of the SDG Stakeholder Survey (“Part II”) presented
participants with a series of Likert scales to use toward perception questions concerning triplebottom-line sustainability (referred to as “the 3 P’s” for “people, planet, and profit”). This was
followed by two Likert scale questions intended to assess potential for stakeholder involvement
in advancements toward sustainability targets. Rather than “the 3 P’s” these final questions
considered sustainable development as it relates to the three typical levels of government (i.e.
city, state / province, federal). Participants were asked, “What amount of influence do you feel
you hold over sustainable development at each level of government?” and, “What amount of
participation / action toward sustainable development might you perform at each level?”
Responses to both questions were similar, and suggested that “local” (city / town) is the
government level that survey pool stakeholders felt they held the most influence over sustainable
development, as well as the level of government which participants felt most likely to perform
sustainability actions. Simple bar graphs depicting the mean of responses to the 5-point Likert
scale questions are presented in Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13, however, these results along with
the response data to the previous three questions revealing generally low stakeholder knowledge
of the contents and workings of global frameworks will be further discussed in the subsequent

94

chapter, along with the plausible need for bottom-up approaches to risk reduction and sustainable
development to protect against likely climate change impacts.

Figure 4.12. Perceptions of influence over sustainable development at each government level.

Figure 4.13. Reported likelihood felt by respondents to perform sustainability acts at each level.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
This study began with description of three international resolutions that address the
inherently interconnected phenomena of climate, sustainable development, and DRR, and share
an urgency toward global safety. UN resolutions adopted in 2015 place emphasis on this
connectivity, often conveying potential for a beneficial feedback loop fostered by target
attainment in the three resolution frameworks (UNFCCC, 2015; UNGA, 2015; UNISDR,
2015b). These reinforcing properties, however, are a proverbial double-edged sword. Whereas
progressing, forward motion on climate, sustainability, and DRR targets can maintain or enhance
safe conditions, to fall backward in one realm risks a plunge for all considered. What’s more,
lagging behind or steady declines in all three realms poses elevated threat of entering or
perpetuating a cyclical risk-poverty nexus from which reemergence grows increasingly difficult
as integral processes coalesce toward worsening conditions (CRED, 2015; Murray et al., 2017;
UNISDR, 2015a; Wisner et al., 2004).
Understanding geopolitical mechanisms and domestic contexts that contribute to the
makings of international agreements, indicator frameworks, and associated performance
outcomes, the quality of which will influence the direction of these phenomena, is key to
anticipating results and preparing for potential, related effects. The following chapter presents
summary and central points that emerged from review of past UN resolutions and creation of
corresponding frameworks, along with outputs of the SDG framework observed through
evaluation of data one year prior to the 5-year milestone of the resolution’s 15-year deadline. It
concludes with presentation of response data from a survey concerning stakeholder knowledge
and perceptions of the SDGs, and description of current and future research related to these
findings.
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5.1 Inputs: What influences the priorities and progress of UN resolutions?
Review of almost 50 years of UN proceedings reveal persistent patterns of
disproportionate power and influence within the UN organizational culture and structure (Garth,
1973; Hulme, 2009; Najam, 2005). Preservations of authority present in several forms including
imbalanced representation of geographic regions and underrepresentation of stakeholder NGOs.
Disparities in control over decision-making held by Member States is also prevalent.
Characteristics of control among countries in the General Assembly reflect global economic
conditions and long-established geopolitical hierarchies. Similar to these real-world dynamics,
operating outside of or in opposition to established world powers can result in a range of
retaliations. At the UN scale, pushback against reordering or redistribution of powers is
demonstrated through acts such as denying or cancelling NGO consultative status, or threats
(posed or realized) to deny “North-South” development aid. Often, such strategies are deployed
in the interest of directing deliberations concerned with international trade and finance flows.
This includes inputs to resolution frameworks known to shape global agendas, thus nationallevel policies and profits.
Resolutions that define the structures and work modalities of committee oversight for UN
procedures or planning (i.e. the OWG for the SDGs) can also act as pathways to limit
participation of nations with less pull. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, which guides the granting
and approval and rejection of NGO consultative status is one of several procedural UN
resolutions that enables exclusion and preferential treatment at the hands of presiding Member
States. The NGO Committee in charge of granting consultative status is a recurrent, rarely
rotated group of national representatives. Typically, countries reappearing in the NGO
committee queue aim to serve domestic interests by maintaining their authority to accept or
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reject consultative status, a conditional status that assigns levels of input and access for NGOs.
Benefits to this include less obstructed, thus more effective promotion of national agendas made
possible through disempowering perceived oppositional parties (while including those in favor),
and resulting, related protections toward domestic actions, national reputation, and international
standing. These and similar methods to retain influence have allowed dominant Member States
to steer multilateral measures in favor of preserving global systems (i.e. markets, industry, trade),
in turn preserving global positioning (which in turn further affirms UN stature). With power
structures upheld, these wealthier countries are able to pursue additional tactics, such as driving
UN deliberations through consensus with coalitions of developing countries pressured by
leverages of “North-South” aid.
Delivery of ODA from developed to developing countries and corresponding d ata
reporting was the only expectation placed upon “First World” countries by the 2000–2015
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Conditions surrounding country commitments to
assistance were roughly outlined in MDG 8 (with some specifics, such as pledges of 0.7 percent
GNI). The remaining seven goals of the MDG framework focused solely on target achievement
in the “Third World.” The placement of global problems and associated target expectations
within the Third World alone by the MDGs and other UN is largely the result of reductionist
views held by First World “analysts” and coalitions of wealthy countries with significant sway
over contents and construction of formative and final framework designs.
In the case of the MDGs, its archetype, the “idgs” (International Development Goals)
were designed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) using past UN
resolutions as source material for framework targets. The stated aim was to reinvigorate faltering
development aid flows with an emphasis on forming supportive North-South partnerships.
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However, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) outlined in MDG 8 (a goal pushed by the
Assembly and initially rejected by DAC Member States) was a goal largely not delivered on.
This left developing countries short on targets dependent upon outside aid to fill the gap between
insufficient domestic capacity and the remaining seven global goals of the MDG framework.
Unfulfilled ODA pledges and resultant shortcomings in MDG attainment are evidential
outcomes of fundamental framework flaws. Reliance upon aid that lacks guarantee of payment or
accountability as a critical component of target achievement has been proven to fail, yet the
SDGs are also largely built upon expectations and needed provisions of North-South assistance.
Another carryover to the SDGs was the “unfinished business” of the MDGs, mainly contained
within SDGs 1 through 6. This carryover is part of a long-enduring practice of “reaffirming” or
simply repeating unmet targets from resolution to resolution, with examples of carryover
occurring as far back as the 1960s, more than 50 years prior to the 2015 SDGs. Rather than
reform the frameworks or framework contents, a frequent request of stakeholders directly
affected by resolution aims and outcomes, planners hailing predominately from developed
countries, some of whom are also “repeats,” opted instead to expand the MDG framework.
Along with long-standing issues of unbalanced power and influence in UN culture and structure,
framework defects were largely left unresolved during the planning phases of the next iteration
of the MDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These issues continue to be explored
in subsequent discussion surrounding evaluation of SDG data, followed by closer examination of
the SDG framework.
5.2 Framework Outputs, 2019 UN Report: What Do the SDG Indicator Data Indicate?
General overview of SDG indicator data for targets included in the 2019 UN report
revealed recurrent gaps in data. Absence of data was most closely associated with two
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conditions. First, lower presence of indicator data for richer regions and subregions was observed
in relation to repeat, pre-existing targets (i.e. carryovers from the MDGs and other frameworks),
targets for which measures of progress were typically not applied toward wealthier, developed
nations. Second, regional and sub-regional data in the report were missing regardless of
development status for targets specific to the SDG framework expansion. These relatively newer
targets correspond to indicators not widely applied therefore seldom reported upon prior to
inclusion in the expanded set of Sustainable Development Goals.
Both conditions were also characterized by limited disaggregated data. In the case of
richer regions with less data reported for established, carryover targets, subregion to regional
data were absent (i.e. N. America absent from “Europe and N. America” region), and in some
cases, whole regions were missing from reporting tables (i.e. “Europe and N. America”).
However, limitations were greater in the latter case concerning newer targets. In these instances,
data were sometimes not aggregated to the regional level at all, instead presented for larger
geographic spheres such as, “World,” or global “Waterways,” rendering evaluation of nationallevel progress not possible. Temporal considerations were also limited for newer targets, with
data presented for a range of years combined or for one year only, making measurement of
changes in target attainment not feasible.
Ambiguity and absence of data from the 2019 UN report means a core directive of the
three 2015 resolutions is thus far unfulfilled. The Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework for
Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), and the 2030 Agenda (SDGs) each emphasize the importance
of national-level data reporting (based on benchmarks), regular indicator reassessments, and
corresponding policy adjustments to improve national performance toward the goals. Low
presence of SDG indicator data in the four annual UN reports considered for this study, and
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missing data throughout the 2019 report selected for closer evaluation of SFDRR and Paris
Agreement indicators implies these progressive steps, considered cornerstones toward
completion of the 2015–2030 global goals have not yet been occurring almost five years into the
15-year timeframe.
5.2.1 UN report: Status of SDG indicator data related to the SFDRR and Paris Agreement
Lack of data for newer targets associated with the expansion approach toward the SDG
framework was demonstrated by evaluation of SDG 13 – Climate Action, and SDG 15 – Life on
Land, two environment indicators related to the Paris Agreement. Tables for targets in the UN
report contained little to no data for indicators of progress toward SDG 13, a newer global goal
with regard toward development. Data for two of the five total SDG 13 targets were present,
however, these data were only loosely related to SDG 13 targets and bore little resemblance to
indicator definitions. SDG 13 data also lacked temporal and geographic disaggregation to
properly track progress toward the goal. Conversely, SDG 15, a goal with several targets also
contained in decades-old UN Forest Forum pledges (ECOSOC, 2000; United Nations, 2007) was
represented by data for nine of 14 indicators, or 64 percent indicator coverage for SDG 15 in the
report. The majority of these data were present for several years and disaggregated to regional
levels allowing for measurements of progress. The report contained indicator data for seven of
the 12 targets for SDG 15, or 58 percent target coverage, the third -highest target coverage of the
eight SDGs considered.
Ranked first for target coverage was SDG 6 – Clean Water and Sanitation, a resource
SDG containing both MDG carryover targets and indicators long-established and reported upon
in developing locations by UN-affiliated institutions. This first place rank for SDG 6, which had
75 percent target coverage in the report further demonstrates higher presence of data for non-
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expansion, preexisting targets already measured over time. As with SDG 15, several years of
regionally disaggregated data were presented for SDG 6 allowing for progress assessments.
However, in some instances, indicator data for SDG 6 were absent for richer regions signaling a
continued deficit in First World data reporting despite nearing the five-year milestone of the
SDGs. In this instance, the lack of data is likely due to First World conditions not previously
measured under the MDGs. However, these gaps present for SDG expansion targets, as well,
meaning less data are included in the UN report for richer regions under both target types (old
and new). Fewer data for richer regions carries several issues, it also goes against a frequent
assumption in the SDG framework - that developed countries possess greater statistical gathering
capacities thus require less data reporting oversight and assistance (Sachs, 2012; SDSN, 2015;
UNGA, 2017).
Of the eight SDGs evaluated for this study, SDGs 7, 11, 12, 13, and portions of 14 are
newer, while SDGs 1, 6, and 15 are based upon older frameworks such as the MDGs (Table 5.1
and Table 5.2). For the evaluation of UN target presence, SDGs 11, 12, 13, and 14 scored 20%,
36%, 0%, and 40%, respectively. SDGs 6 and 15, the former based on the MDGs and decadeslong water initiatives by the World Health Organization and similar institutions, and the latter
containing several targets associated with the decades-long Forest Forum pledges, scored 75%
and 58%, respectively. Two anomalies to this pattern of established indicators having higher
presence of data and vice versa are SDG 1, “No Poverty,” the focus of the MDGs which scored a
relatively low score of 29% target coverage, and SDG 7, a semi-new goal which garnered the
second-highest score. Low coverage of SDG 1 targets speaks to “unfinished business” of the
MDGs, while the relatively high target coverage for SDG 7, “Affordable and Clean Energy,” is
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representative of several recurrent framework flaws, including low target count for SDGs and
low-impact indicators for targets of high global importance.
Issues presented by SDG 7 are discussed in greater detail in a later section concerning
reported data on the sdg.data.gov site, however, a low number of targets to measure progress
toward the overarching goal is a characteristic shared by SDG 13 – Climate Action. With a total
of five targets, SDG 13 is tied with SDG 7 for lowest number of targets among the 17
Sustainable Development Goals. SDG 7 and SDG 13 also rank lowest and second lowest for
number of indicators, with six and eight indicators, respectively.
Table 5.1. Targets carried over from MDGs to SDGs have higher percent target coverage, the
exception being SDG 1 - No Poverty (ECOSOC, 2019).
MDG “Carryover” Targets to SDGs (Pre-existing / Established)

SDG-6

SDG-15

SDG-1

(Water & Sanitation)

(Life On Land)

(No Poverty)

75%

58%

29%

Highest % target coverage

Third highest % target coverage

Low % coverage “anomaly”
(Third lowest target coverage)

*Note: SDG 14 contains mix of MDG carryover & SDG expansion targets. SDG 14 target coverage = 40%

Table 5.2. Targets included as part of SDG framework expansion approach have lower percent
target coverage, the exception being SDG 7 - Affordable and Clean Energy (ECOSOC, 2019).
SDG Framework Expansion Targets (Newer / Less Established)

SDG-7

SDG-12

SDG-11

SDG-13

(Affordable & Clean Energy)

(Production & Consumption)

(Sustainable Cities)

(Climate Action)

60%

36%

20%

0%

High % coverage “anomaly”
(Second highest target coverage)

Fourth lowest % target coverage

Second lowest % target coverage

Lowest % target coverage

*Note: SDG 14 contains mix of MDG carryover & SDG expansion targets. SDG 14 target coverage = 40 % (Fourth highest % coverage)

5.2.1.1 Low target count and lack of data for SDGs of high global importance: SDG 13
As its title implies, SDG 13 is a goal that shares principles with the Paris Agreement on
climate change. Reduction of atmospheric carbon is described as central to the Paris
Agreement’s main goal to strengthen international response to climate change as part of a shared
effort to prevent global temperature rise from exceeding 2°C (UNFCCC, 2015). This makes
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SDG 13, “Climate Action” the most closely aligned with the resolution’s overarching goal. In
addition to being the primary focus of the Paris Agreement, climate change was also frequently
referenced in reports, articles, and correspondence during the Post-2015 Agenda, conveyed as
impetus, more directly, as a matter of urgency requiring expansion of the MDGs to include
“triple bottom line” sustainable development (Ban, 2012; Sachs, 2012; SDSN, 2013). Climate
also appears in the SFDRR with regard to reducing and adapting to climate change hazards
(UNISDR, 2015b).
Altogether, the three resolutions contain substantial portions dedicated to consideration of
climate change as an international crisis and safety threat. Yet, SDG 13 is the most meager of the
eight SDGs evaluated in the 2019 annual SDG report. So few were the data that the goal was
given a score of 0, the only such score assigned to an SDG evaluated for this study. Only two of
the five targets for SDG 13 contained data (targets 13.1 and 13.2), with two indicators out of
eight reported upon (one for each target). For target 13.1, data for one of three indicators was
included, indicator 13.1.1, “Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster
per 100,000 people,” however, data were not disaggregated by year nor region (Table 5.3).
Rather than one table for one of three indicators, three tables appear for the single
indicator assigned to target 13.2, indicator 13.2.1, “Number of countries that have communicated
establishment or operationalization of an integrated policy / strategy / plan which increases
ability to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change, and foster climate resilience & low GHG
emissions…” (Table 5.3). The first two tables for indicator 13.2.1 are titled, “Aggregate GHG
emissions” and contain just that - greenhouse gas emissions divided into two global “regions” one table with data for developing countries, and the other with data for developed countries.
Both tables are accompanied by footnotes beneath communicating several stipulations toward
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data reliability. The third table titled, “Number of Parties to the Paris Agreement … and Number
of nationally determined contributions (NDCs),” considered along with the other two does not
help to enable clear distinctions of progress toward “climate action” (certainly not at the national
level). However, the final table does contain the most telling information of the three. The
bottom row, “Parties that communicated their second NDCs,” with the number “1” listed as a
full count. Divided by the total parties to the Paris Agreement (183 in 2019), this equals
approximately 0.5% of potential follow-up NDCs.
Although not all 183 signatories signaled submission of a second set of climate
commitments by 2020, a total of 107 countries did enter stated intent to do so. As of August
2020, 4 of the 107 countries have submitted a second set of NDCs: Norway, Suriname, The
Marshall Islands, and Moldova, which account for 0.1%, 0.01%, 0.00001%, and 0.03% of global
GHG emissions, respectively. For comparison, the United States which announced formal
departure from the Agreement, accounts for approximately 15 percent of global GHG emissions
(IEA, 2019a; Leprince-Ringuet, 2020; Pompeo, 2019). The miscellaneous tables in the 2019 UN
report for SDG 13, and the aggregate data within them offer little assistance toward gauging
national, or even international progresses toward the goal or its targets. Meanwhile, exit of big
GHG contributors from commitments to curb climate drivers, including pledges of “NorthSouth” funding mechanisms to support implementation of climate measures in less developed
locations may cause Agreement outcomes to become as dismal as the data inclusion for SDG 13.
Of course, the smaller four locations following up with more progressive NDCs deserve
recognition for national follow through, however, potential global reductions in GHG outputs
associated with these countries are minimal. Further, implementing these intentions may not be
possible for these and other countries without delivery of pledged funding assistance. As Noah
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Sachs describes it in his 2019 paper, “The Paris Agreement in the 2020s: Breakdown or
Breakup?”
… some states explicitly made their NDCs contingent on the availability of climate
change finance from the developed world. According to one analysis, NDCs from 111
developing nations mentioned the need for outside financial support to achieve their
targets … India, for example, stated that $2.5 trillion in new international climate finance
would be needed to implement its NDC by 2030 (Sachs, 2019, p. 899).
Given these conditions, the final table, which by indicator definition is meant to address
integration of climate measures into national policies and planning, should go beyond the Paris
Agreement to include additional multilateral agreements, or more realistically, implemented
national climate policies either in conjunction with or independent of the resolutions. As it
stands, the most plain and poignant inference offered by the final SDG 13 table is an apparent
lack of climate action. Continued lack of action to curb CO2 threatens to increase hazard s risks.
Table 5.3. SDG 13 framework targets and indicators, and data appearing in 2019 UN report.

SDG 13: Take Urgent Action to Combat Climate Change and Its Impacts
SDG Target
Target 13.1
Strengthen
resilience and
adaptive capacity
to climate-related
hazards and
natural disasters in
all countries

Target Indicator(s)

Data Appearing in 2019 UN Report

13.1.1 Number of
deaths, missing persons
and persons af f ected by
disaster per 100,000
people

13.1.2 Number of
countries with national
and local disaster risk
reduction strategies

13.1.3 Proportion of
local governments that
adopt and implement
local disaster risk
reduction strategies in
line with national
disaster risk reduction
strategies

(table cont’d)
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(table cont’d)
SDG Target
Target 13.2
Integrate climate
change measures
into national
policies, strategies
and planning

SDG Target

Target Indicator(s)

Data Appearing in 2019 UN Report

13.2.1 Number of
countries that have
communicated the
establishment or
operationalization of an
integrated policy /
strategy / plan which
increases ability to
adapt to adverse
impacts of climate
change, and f oster
climate resilience & low
GHG emissions
development in a
manner that does not
threaten f ood
production (including a
national adaptation plan,
nationally determined
contribution, national
communication, biennial
update report or other)

Target Indicator(s)

Target 13.3

13.3.1 Number of

Improve
education,
awareness-raising
and human and
institutional
capacity on
climate change
mitigation,
adaptation, impact
reduction and
early warning

countries that have
integrated mitigation,
adaptation, impact
reduction and early
warning into primary,
secondary and tertiary
curricula

Data Appearing in 2019 UN Report

NO DATA
13.3.2 Number of
countries that have
communicated the
strengthening of
institutional, systemic
and individual capacitybuilding to implement
adaptation, mitigation
and technology
transf er, and
development actions

(table cont’d)
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(table cont’d)
SDG Target
Target 13.a

Target Indicator(s)
13.a.1 Mobilized

Implement the
commitment
undertaken by
developed-country
parties to the
UNFCCC toward
jointly mobilizing
$100 billion
annually by 2020
from all sources to
address needs of
developing
countries in the
context of
meaningful
mitigation actions
and transparency
on implementation,
and fully
operationalize
Green Climate
Fund through its
capitalization as
soon as possible

amount of United
States dollars per year
starting in 2020
accountable towards
the $100 billion
commitment

SDG Target
Target 13.b

Target Indicator(s)

Promote
mechanisms for
raising capacity for
effective climate
change-related
planning and
management in
LDCs and small
island developing
States, including
focus on women,
youth and local &
marginalized
communities.
Acknowledging that
the UNFCCC is the
primary int’l,
intergovernmental
forum for
negotiating the
global response to
climate change

Data Appearing in UN Report

NO DATA

Data Appearing in UN Report

13.b.1 Number of
least developed
countries and small
island developing
States that are
receiving specialized
support, and amount
of support, including
f inance, technology
and capacity-building,
f or mechanisms f or
raising capacities f or
ef f ective climate
change-related
planning and
management,
including f ocusing on
women, youth and
local and marginalized
communities

NO DATA
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Much like the SDGs, the Paris Agreement has several financial assistance commitments
that are heavily factored into achievement of global targets. Shortly after the United States
announced its exit, hence ending relatively large amounts of assistance to various funding
mechanisms of the Agreement, Australia followed suit, also ending delivery on financial
commitments. It is estimated that full implementation of the Paris Agreement will cost upwards
of $2.5 trillion (a modest estimate). Meeting that monetary target in support of the goals was
doubtful when the United States and Australia were still contributors, without wealthy nations
making contributions it will likely not be realized (Mattar, Kansuk, & Jafry, 2019; Pompeo,
2019; Sachs, 2019; Urpelainen & Van de Graaf , 2018; Williams, 2019).
Reliance upon aid is an inherent flaw of almost all UN international resolutions and
corresponding frameworks containing portions dedicated to “development” agendas. As
demonstrated during the MDGs these funding mechanisms are not guaranteed to be delivered
and cannot be relied upon heavily to lift vulnerable places, such as small island nations mentioned specifically in the underreported ODA targets for SDG 13, up and out of harm’s way.
For more than 50 years UN frameworks have relied, reaffirmed, and re-failed on aiddependent targets (UNGA, 1968). With addition of developed countries toward SDG
performance counts, presumptions upon which this continued approach is based become clearer.
For example, following the credo of decades of UN and UN-affiliated publications on data
reporting, deficits in data for richer regions should not be prevalent in the UN annual reports, nor
should these gaps exceed those observed for developing countries. With exception of recent,
emerging attention toward delivery of SDG data from developed regions, calls for improvements
in statistical reporting have been primarily focused upon developing countries (Sachs, 2012;
SDSN, 2013; SDSN, 2015). Even directly prior to initiation of expanded SDG reporting, familiar

109

passages unconcerned with newly included developed countries were still appearing in guides for
gathering SDG data successfully, such as this 2015 Sustainable Development Solutions Network
(SDSN) “needs assessment” for SDG monitoring:
The discussion of the post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) has renewed interest in the quality and availability of statistics for
management, program design, and monitoring performance. Most of the necessary
statistics are produced by national statistical systems in developing countries, and this
data is a crucial component for good governance … Therefore, improving statistics
requires investment in national statistical capacity (SDSN, 2015, p. 8).
Even though the reporting expanded, this view did not grow beyond perceptions of poor data
reporting only occurring in poorer locations. This notion is observed in the SDG framework, as
well, with all targets and indicators concerning advancement of statistical capacities calling for
North-South technological and funding assistance to developing countries, depicted as struggling
with compilation of data. What’s more, SDG targets and indicators regarding “good
governance,” mentioned in the above SDSN passage as correspondent to data reporting
capabilities focus almost solely upon the Third World, as well.
The idea that good governance resides in the “North” might be the most crucial
displacement of “the problem” carried through decades of UN development resolutions and
global initiatives. It is an assumption which, in addition to First World power maneuvers, has left
developed countries to their own “good governance” without questions of ability, nor
accountability. It has also fostered the belief that with good governance at the national level
comes fulfillment of global goods. In reality, economically driven domestic policies of
developed countries have caused the greatest global long-term harms, while simultaneously
acting to perpetuate geopolitical positions (and perceptions) that enable unchecked behavior. At
the same time, developing locations are kept in check, held in position by vulnerabilities
exacerbated by activities in the industrialized world, as well as incomplete “North-South”
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commitments set then unfulfilled by the First World, and the widespread idea that developed is
“right” (the solution) and developing is “wrong” (the problem).
In reality, these perceived behaviors and global roles are more blurred, and require better
understanding both from outside and within if progress is to be made. The United States, for
example, one of the world’s richest “superpowers” negates every one of the assumptions posed
and imposed over the past 50 years of UN “agreements” and resolutions. For the majority of the
SDG era thus far, the United States has been noncompliant with multiple multilateral
agreements, while also denying various forms of formerly committed aid, and demonstrating
poor performance on SDG targets and data reporting (Sachs et al., 2017; Sachs et al., 2018;
Pompeo, 2019). With this in mind, and with regard toward investigation of “Northern” nationallevel SDG reporting (context), the next section concerns data coverage of the Northern American
subregion in the UN SDG report, followed by discussion of data reported on the U.S. federal
SDG online repository, sdg.data.gov.
5.2.2 UN report: Status of SDG indicator data related to Northern American subregion
The second analysis performed on the UN annual report focused on presence of data for
the Northern American subregion. Three main takeaways emerged from this evaluation. The first
is a lower presence of data for the richer subregions. For example, despite SDG 6, “Clean Water
and Sanitation,” having the most target coverage of all SDG targets considered, several indicator
tables were missing data for the Northern American subregion. The second is an absence of data
in tables detailing ODA contributions, tables which had presence of data for similarly advanced,
wealthy nations. Finally, and related somewhat to absent ODA data, the amount of missing
indicator data for the Northern American subregion overall throughout the report is troublesome,
as are the specific targets missing the data. One example is low data reported for 6.b.1,
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“Proportion of local administrative units with established and operational policies and
procedures for participation of local communities in water & sanitation management,” an
indicator that carries current and possibly increased importance with time with regard to
stakeholder involvement toward several climate change and resource concerned issues. Tables
for 6.b.1 also highlight misrepresentations associated with missing subregion data. Northern
American subregion data are absent for all four metadata associated with 6.b.1, with only Europe
representing the “Northern American and Europe” region in most cases (Figure 5.1).
Indicator 6.b.1 Proportion of local administrative units with established & operational policies
and procedures for participation of local communities in water and sanitation management

Figure 5.1. Sample metadata 6.b.1 (b) and (d) showing gaps in Northern American subregion
data, as well as reported regional totals based on incomplete data (ECOSOC, 2019).
Australia and New Zealand, categorized under “Oceania” in the UN reports, are also
missing from the table. However, all other regions and subregions, many of them classified as
developing, present full data, and further, several have high scores of 80 percent or more
recorded. Australia and New Zealand considered within “Oceania” also calls attention to the
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geographic regions in the UN SDG report, which are also used in the SDSN 2013 report, and
additional SDG publications and differ from those used to determine representation on
committees such as the NGO approval committee and the Open Working Group (OWG) on SDG
planning (ECOSOC, 1996; ECOSOC, 2019; UNGA, 2013). This seems to favor the outlook that,
at the very least, changes need to be made to the makeup of the regional groups, with perhaps
further subdivision in addition to rearrangement. Another issue to consider, specifically toward
evaluation of data reported for the Northern American subregion once more, is absence of data
for target 6.a which concerns water- and sanitation-related ODA. Target 6.a is one of several
ODA targets, including targets contained in SDGs 7, 12, and 13 that were missing data for the
Northern American subregion.
Contributions of ODA from wealthy nations, such as Canada and the United States within
the Northern American subregion are vital to international frameworks constructed to depend
upon “development” aid to achieve targets. U.S. participation is particularly significant toward
ODA, as is its progress toward SDG targets to deter global spillovers. Working toward the global
goals can also help avoid “geopolitical spillovers,” such as other nations following suit with U.S.
noncompliance on UN resolutions, Australia also backing out of Paris Agreement pledges
following U.S. departure being one example. In this way, lack of U.S. participation is also felt as
a loss of a potential leadership toward SDG achievements (rather than resolution withdrawals).
5.3 Framework Outputs: What Do the U.S. Indicators Indicate? (sdg.data.gov)
To inspect data accuracy on the sdg.data.gov site, SDGs 1, 7, and 13 were chosen based
upon two qualifiers - classification as SDGs containing resource, environment, or SFDRR
targets, and for having 40 percent or more target coverage reported online. SDG 1 – No Poverty,
had the second largest percent decrease in target coverage after adjusting for findings from
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evaluation of indicator data accuracy. Target coverage for SDG 1 – No Poverty dropped from 43
percent reported on sdg.data.gov, to an actual 18 percent coverage of targets. Only 2.5 of the six
targets listed as “Reported online” had adequate, congruent indicator data entered. Three of the
six indicators listed as reported online for SDG 1 were found to have data incongruent with UN
indicator definitions, while a fourth indicator was decreased by half (0.5) for reporting at the
national rather than local levels as called for by the indicator. All in all, the SDG.data.gov site
provided accurate data for 2.5 of a total 14 indicators for SDG 1.
SDG 13 also had significantly lower target representation after adjusting for data
accuracy, by a difference of half, down from 88 percent reported to 44 percent accurate data.
Particularly problematic was entry of two previously revoked U.S. climate policies for indicator
13.2.1 on climate drivers and adaptation measures. Indicator 13.2.1 received a score of “0” due
to inaccuracy of these data, this indicator also received a score of “0” in the UN report. Target
coverage established for SDG 7 decreased the least after adjusting for accuracy. These results are
similar to the high percentage target coverage represented in the UN report. However, in this
instance, these seemingly favorable findings for SDG 7 are actually reflective of deeper
framework issues.
5.3.1 Versatility of “universal indicators and low-caliber indicator definitions: SDG 7
SDG 7 – Affordable and Clean Energy received the second highest target coverage
percentage for data included in the 2019 UN report (60%). Similarly, it only received a 0.5-point
reduction in coverage after adjustment for accuracy of data reported on the sdg.dat a.gov site.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, positive marks for SDG 7 are more reflective of
framework inadequacies than compliant reporting of data. Along with relatively high rankings, is
a relatively high occurrence of common SDG indicator issues.
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SDG 7 has both the lowest number of targets and lowest number of correspondent
indicators - five and six, respectively (Table 5.4). This means a low number of assessment
variables must adequately capture and convey national-level progress toward “Affordable and
Clean Energy,” or to use the full Goal 7 description (rather than oft-published shorthand),
national efforts to “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.”
The longer-format version is similar to target 7.1, “By 2030, ensure universal access to
affordable, reliable and modern energy service,” two differences being inclusion of the deadline
year in the target, and loss of the descriptor, “sustainable.”
Table 5.4. Total targets and indicators assigned to each of the 17 SDGs.
(Poverty)

SDG 1

(Hunger )
SDG 2

(Health)
SDG 3

(Education)
SDG 4

(Gender Equality )
SDG 5

7

8

13

10

9

14

13

27

11

14

(Water)

(Energy)

SDG 6

SDG 7

(Work & Economy )
SDG 8

(Infrastructure)
SDG 9

(Inequalities )
SDG 10

8

5

12

8

10

11

6

17

12

11

Total

Targets
Total

Indicators

Total

Targets
Total

Indicators

(Sustainable Cities & Communities)

(Consumption & Production )

(Climate Action )

SDG 11

SDG 12

SDG 13

10

11

5

15

13

8

Total

Targets
Total

Indicators

(Life Below Water)

(Life On Land)

SDG 14

SDG 15

(Peace & Justice)
SDG 16

(Partnerships )
SDG 17

10

12

12

19

10

14

23

25

Total

Targets
Total

Indicators

A relatively straightforward indicator follows for target 7.1, indicator 7.1.1, “Proportion
of population with access to electricity,” for which data coverage and accuracy were relatively
high. Target attainment in First World countries was also high when compared to electricity
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access in developing countries (Figure 5.2). Indicator 7.2.1 is less straightforward, “Proportion of
population with primary reliance on clean fuels and technology,” a description that features
vague qualifiers such as “primary reliance” and “clean fuels.” The indicator definition refines the
description somewhat as, “access to clean fuels and technologies for (indoor) cooking,”
specifically, “share of total population with access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking.”
GOAL 7

Ensure access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable and modern energy for all

Target 7.1:
By 2030, ensure universal access
to affordable, reliable and modern
energy services

7.1.1 Indicator
Proportion of population with
access to electricity

7.1.1 indicator definition
Access to electricity –
measured as the share of people
with electricity access at the
household level.

Figure 5.2. Indicator 7.1.1 definition with map of access to electricity (SDG Tracker, 2018a).
The predominate form of cooking fuel identified in available metadata for 7.1.2 is gas.
Which means that indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 are aimed at increasing use of electricity (most
likely traditional grid) and gas, a finite fossil fuel the production of which is proven to exacerbate
climate change (Boden et al., 2017; UNFCCC, 2015). While this may not be the best solution for
the planet, it does meet the stated aim of the indicator definition, to create healthier air conditions
within the home (this added aim in the indicator definition is discussed in a subsequent section).
A question is raised, however, as to whether these indicators adequately measure progress
toward target 7.1 as it is stated, “universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy,” or
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to a larger extent, Goal 7, “Affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.” There is
no measure of energy affordability to stakeholders, and while cooking fuels that ensure clean
indoor air are needed in less developed locations, this variable is not as robust as suggested to
transitions to solar and similar large-scale changes appearing in aspirational SDG outlines and
implementation guides (Sachs, 2008; Sachs, 2012; UN HLPF, 2019). Also, given long-term and
widespread access, energy sources described in indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 are not typically
regarded as “modern” in First World settings.
Ensure access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable and modern energy for all

GOAL 7

Target 7.1:
By 2030, ensure universal
access to affordable, reliable
and modern energy services

7.1.2 Indicator
Proportion of population with
primary reliance on clean fuels
and technology

7.1.2 indicator definition
Access to clean fuels for
cooking – measured as the
share of total population with
access to clean fuels and
technologies for cooking.

Figure 5.3. Indicator 7.1.2 definition with map of access to clean fuels (SDG Tracker, 2018b).
The predominate form of cooking fuel identified in available metadata for 7.1.2 is gas.
Which means that indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 are aimed at increasing use of electricity (most
likely traditional grid) and gas, a finite fossil fuel the production of which is proven to exacerbate
climate change (Boden et al., 2017; UNFCCC, 2015). While this may not be the best solution for
the planet, it does meet the stated aim of the indicator definition, to create healthier air conditions
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within the home (this added aim in the indicator definition is discussed in a subsequent section).
A question is raised, however, as to whether these indicators adequately measure progress
toward target 7.1 as it is stated, “universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy,” or
to a larger extent, Goal 7, “Affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.” There is
no measure of energy affordability to stakeholders, and while cooking fuels that ensure clean
indoor air are needed in less developed locations, this variable is not as robust as suggested to
transitions to solar and similar large-scale changes appearing in aspirational SDG outlines and
implementation guides (Sachs, 2008; Sachs, 2012; UN HLPF, 2019). Also, given long-term and
widespread access, energy sources described in indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 are not typically
regarded as “modern” in First World settings.
Divergence from what goals and targets imply is being measured and what is actually
being measured - often with targets conveying outcomes affecting larger scales and scopes than
indicators capture, is a recurrent among the SDGs. “Low caliber” indicators producing less
effectual results is also an issue of national context, for instance, the ind icator “access to
electricity” leaves developed countries unchallenged and unchanged. Although these conditions
have little chance of creating meaningful resource and climate progress, they do provide
improvements in the form of better health, and improved safety and services associated with
energy access in developing countries. These benefits are already recognized through inclusion
of these targets in the preceding MDGs.
Indicators 7.2.1 measures renewable energy share in national consumption, and 7.3.1
energy intensity by primary energy and GDP. Although seemingly nuanced when compared with
indicators 7.1.1 and 7.1.2, these indicators also originated in the MDGs. However, whereas other
examples of MDG carryover targets and indicators tend to have lower data coverage for
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previously unmeasured developed countries, this isn’t an issue with SDG 7, as the International
Energy Agency has reported on the latter two indicators for decades at all levels of development.
For this reason, all regions and subregions present with disaggregated data for indicators 7.2.1
and 7.3.1, spread over approximately 15 years. Both indicators (thus the two associated targets)
have wholly full sets of data. This is not the case, however, for the last two SDG 7 indicators,
7.a.1 and 7.b.1, both of which concern North-South delivery of aid. Clearly, underreporting or
actual low provisions of assistance to developed nations is reminiscent of a main framework
hindrance of the MDGs. Development aid-dependent frameworks are further explored in a latter
section however, it can be noted here that uncertain funding mechanisms rarely make for easy
progress.
Framework indicators for SDG 7 are few in number, and foreign to First World contexts
resulting in less meaningful measurements and progress. Only two of the six total indicators for
SDG 7 can be considered “universal” and relevant to global energy concerns yet neither
encapsulate the depth or reach needed. There are very few guidelines contained within the SDG
7 indicators or targets to guide further sustainable development gains, a service the framework
claimers to offer. This is the case for most goals, targets, and indicators in the Sustainable
Development Goal framework. As such, methods of calculating and reporting (and adhering to)
ODA pledges for indicators 7.a.1 and 7.b.1 are not fully clear, and the same is true for most aid
indicators evaluated. What is also not fully clear is if this lack of clarity is why the SDG 7 ODA
targets are not covered in the UN report or, if the lack of data is a first look at what to expect
from ODA delivery over the remaining 10 years of the SDGs, which would be another “repeat”
of the MDG framework.
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The expand rather than reform approach toward building another 15-year global set of
goals, an effort led by many of the same influencers of the MDGs, meant restructuring was
minimal. A major outcome of this was retainment of the development aid-dependent design
which designates delivery of North-South ODA as vital toward achievement of the goals. Strong
reliance upon ODA in both frameworks as means to create development advances is indicative of
the reductionist influence of First World planners who simultaneously view poverty as the root
of multiple, multifaceted problems, yet view poverty itself as a one-dimensional problem that
can successfully be solved via “money changing hands,” as Richard et al. (2011) phrased it when
describing MDG “quick win” initiatives. The “quick win” initiatives themselves and poverty
focus of the MDGs speaks to this narrowed, oversimplified approach, as does the SDG
framework structure which like the MDGs relies heavily upon ODA as the main fuel for
framework achievement.
Further, lack of review, recognition, regard, and application of critiques entered from the
frontlines of MDG implementation toward design of the newer SDGs illustrates a continued
culture of exclusion toward stakeholders. Stakeholders are positioned as the focus of framework
targets, however, stakeholder concerns about the framework components and approach submitted
via a variety of formats during the Post-2015 era seem to have been set aside (Crossette, 2005;
Curtis & Poon, 2009; Fehling et al., 2013; Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013; Hulme, 2009; Richard et
al., 2011; Saith, 2006; Saith, 2007). And, although the method of expansion rather than reform
officially widened the scope of consideration to include First World reporting and target
attainment, the targets themselves are still largely based in the “Third World Problem”
perspective from the First World. They are also largely unaccomplished in a meaningful manner

120

with one-third of the allotted 2015–2030 timeline coming to a close. Expansion rather than
reform of the framework will likely only produce a greater number of (added) targets unreached.
5.4 Stakeholder Knowledge of the SDGs, and Potential for Bottom-Up Improvements
If goals and targets of the three 2015 resolutions are left largely unachieved, then global
hazards risk and vulnerability of populations will almost certainly increase (CRED, 2018; IPCC,
2012; IPCC, 2014; UNISDR, 2015b). Given a presumed widespread lack of good governance as
both a cause and perhaps also effect of increased risk and vulnerability, a need for “safe-fail,”
bottom-up hazard mitigation, preparedness, and sustainability measures is needed (Begg, 2018;
Fox-Rogers, Devitt, O’Neill, Brereton, & Clinch, 2016; Kundzewicz & Takeuchi, 1999).
Developing a stakeholder-centric approach to safety in uncertain, future conditions is a complex,
multi-hazard exercise which must also take into account societal unknowns. Direct input from
stakeholders across the world is necessary to ensure a better chance at working frameworks
which truly consider diverse perspectives and form local capacity as opposed to dependence on
foreign aid (Begg, 2018; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). A preliminary step toward establishing
global sustainability knowledge exchange is to determine how effective outreach for the existing
SDGs was, and what levels of effectiveness were achieved where. This approach not only
acknowledges and makes use of existing pathways, but also informs new ones (Fox-Rogers et
al., 2016; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016).
To begin this process, a survey concerning stakeholder knowledge of the SDGs was
conducted primarily via social media platforms Facebook and Twitter. Accounts and groups
centered on sustainability and Sustainable Development Goals were followed and joined to
facilitate survey sharing. This approach garnered high levels of attention from outside the United
States, whereas more direct contact (i.e. intentional emails to SDG-oriented U.S.-based NGOs)
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was needed to engage U.S. respondents. The higher level of non-U.S. engagement with the
survey was an early indication that SDG knowledge and awareness of the SDGs would be
greater among respondents listing locations outside the United States. Survey results supported
the preliminary hypothesis with non-U.S. respondents demonstrating stronger familiarity with
the SDGs. Greater SDG knowledge was paired with higher participation levels reported and
greater willingness to perform actions in support of sustainability. However, it should be noted
that as the MDGs took a direct poverty-focus in the Third World, programs associated with the
SDGs are more likely to be or have been established in non-US locations. And with this
considered, participation fosters knowledge, as well (Begg, 2018; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016).
Across the board, survey respondents felt that stakeholder influence and actions have the
most effect when demonstrated or performed at the local level. This is the opposite of the topdown, global to national approach of UN resolutions. Further, belief that stakeholder
effectiveness is strongest at the local level holds potential to render larger geopolitical powers
less relevant. While global dynamics will continue to have local effects, building personal and
community capacity also creates a shift in stakeholder potential toward better control of
outcomes (Begg, 2018; Kundzewicz & Takeuchi, 1999; Offerdahl, Renckens, Wagner, &
Chasek, 2013; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). This is yet another angle at which to deconstruct
old frameworks dependent upon foreign assistance hence foreign influence.
5.5 Current and Future Research
Although phenomena discussed throughout this study are closely related to risk, the
position of stakeholders actually exposed to increased intensity and frequency of hazards – the
stated central concern of UN global goals and similar initiatives, has yet to be widely illustrated
or addressed. Evaluations performed for this study imply strongly that UN sustainable
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development, DRR, and climate change targets will be left unmet and that worsening conditions
associated with development and DRR shortcomings will contribute to greater physical
vulnerability of stakeholders, and greater numbers of stakeholders facing multidimensional
vulnerability. Lack of critical contributions, participation, and progress toward DRR-oriented
goals has been linked to poor national governance and related policy weaknesses, as well as
limitations on stakeholder inclusion toward design, direction, and focus of frameworks such as
the SDGs. These conditions combined may require stakeholders to grow individual and local
preparedness levels to avoid entrenchment in cycles of ongoing harm (i.e. the risk-poverty
nexus). To that end, and in the interest of furthering investigation of social media pathways, an
online survey concerning stakeholder preparedness was conducted in the Greater New Orleans
area during the 2019 Atlantic hurricane season. A selection of data produced by the survey is
presented below.
5.5.1 Survey site
Survey circulation took place during the 2019 Atlantic hurricane season, mainly via postsharing on social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook, the latter serving as the main social
media distribution pathway. The intended survey pool was residents of the Greater New Orleans
area and surrounding portions of south Louisiana. South Louisiana and the New Orleans metro
area comprise a region of the United States known for low human development markers and high
hazards risk. The southernmost coastal portions of the state are exposed to hydrometeorological
risks intensified by a land loss crisis ongoing since the start of the 20th century. In more
northern, central Louisiana locations, away from the coast, populated regions such as Baton
Rouge and nearby parishes are becoming increasingly vulnerable to flooding from extreme
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rainfall events and high river levels in recent years. The 2016 Louisiana Floods, for example, tied
with Hurricane Matthew for most expensive billion-dollar disaster event that year (NCEI, 2020).

Figure 5.4. Projected flood depths (circa 2060) from 100-year flood event in a moderate sea level
rise scenario, and without implementation of coastal land restoration measures (CPRA, 2017).
5.5.2 Radar charts
Radar charts are used as data representations for responses to the stakeholder
preparedness survey. A radar chart is typically used to track performance outputs of individuals
or organizations (Mosley & Mayer, 1999). The charts feature four or more axes which meet and
extend from the center of one radial figure (Figure 5.5). Each axis represents a realm of
performance, and performance level is expressed by points plotted along the axes from the center
(low performance) toward the outer radii (higher performance).

Figure 5.5. Radar chart showing SDG familiarity reported by respondents to the SDG survey.
Lines connecting data points extend from axis to axis in radar charts, creating a visual
representation of deficits and strengths or progresses occurring along each axial realm. Several
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phenomena can be plotted and graphed within one radar chart, allowing for comparison of
multiple dimensions. The visual format is considered one of the more comprehensible data
representations for researchers and research subjects, both concerned with potential outcomes
and implications of evaluative projects (Mosley & Mayer, 1999).
5.5.3 Greater New Orleans stakeholder preparedness survey: Preliminary results
The following section features profiles of preparedness levels for survey pool
demographic subgroups. These profiles are based upon performance reported by respondents in
four preparedness realms. Multiple dimensions are presented using radar charts providing the
ability to assess overall strengths and weaknesses, as well as those occurring in each prep realm
within each demographic population.
For the purpose of demonstrating current and future research, responses to a sample set of
survey questions were used to represent the four prep realms – preparedness level, preparedness
capacity, willingness to perform preparedness actions, and presence of preparedness motivators.
A rating system using a 5-point scale (0-4) to reflect the five stages of preparedness was used to
recode responses (0-No Prep; 1-Not meeting; 2-Approaching; 3-Meeting; 4-Good Prep).
Responses to multiple choice, multiple answer questions concerning preparedness level (“What
prep steps do you take?”) and willingness to perform preparedness actions (“Which actions
would you consider?”) were rated based upon the number of options the respondent chose from
the list – in other words, total preparedness steps the respondent performs, and preparedness
actions the respondent is willing to perform (Table 5.5). For questions concerning prep capacity
(“hurricane fund”) and motivators to preparedness (“Are preparedness plans talked about?”),
scores were assigned according to response content. For example, a response of, “I have a
hurricane fund, but I wish I could afford to put more aside” to the prep capacity question was
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given a rating of 3 out of 4, indicating the respondent has a hurricane fund (“3-Meeting”), but
does not have the capacity to meet the highest stage of preparedness (“4-Prep Good”).
Table 5.5. Sample set of questions for each prep realm with question format and rating system.
Prep Realm

Prep Question

Question Form / Rating System

Preparedness
Level

What preparedness steps do you
typically take before / during hurricane
season? [Check All That Apply]

Format – Multiple Choice / Multiple
Answers Allowed ; Rating – Based upon
the number of options chosen f rom list

Preparedness
Action
Willingness

Which, if any, of the following actions
would you consider?
[Check All That Apply]

Format – Multiple Choice / Multiple
Answers Allowed ; Rating – Based upon
the number of options chosen f rom list

Preparedness
Capacity

Regarding a “hurricane fund,” which
of the following statements do you
relate to most?

Format – Multiple Choice / Single
Answer ; Rating – Based on response
content

Preparedness
Motivators

Are preparedness plans talked about
at your place of work? In your
neighborhood? In other places you
often are? (i.e. a club, a bar, athletic
program, place of worship, etc.)

Format – Multiple Choice / Single
Answer ; Rating – Based on response
content

(presence of )

Figures 5.6 through 5.9 represent participant responses for the set of sample prep
questions gauging performance in each realm according to income and age demographics. Figure
5.6 and Figure 5.7 consider results according to income, first for all four realms, then with each
individual realm depicted separately. The same combined then separate format is used to present
results according to age range in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9.

Figure 5.6. Levels of preparedness in all realms according to household income.
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Prep Levels According to Household Income – individual preparedness realms

Figure 5.7. Individual realms of respondent preparedness according to household income.

Figure 5.8. Levels of preparedness in all realms according to age range.
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Prep Levels According to Age Range – individual preparedness realms

Figure 5.9. Individual realms of respondent preparedness according to age range.
Age subgroups on the left side of the “Action Willingness” radar chart highlighted in
Figure 5.9 reported low willingness to carry out preparedness acts. To investigate ways to
improve performance in this realm, a radar chart was created based upon responses from these
age groups to the prep motivator question, “What would help you to perform an action?” (Figure
5.10). The response, “Instructions on how to perform (prep actions)” was a prevalent return
among all “low willingness” age groups. This “instructions” response combined with provision
of materials and time to learn or complete an act were the strongest motivators reported by the 18
to 24 age demographic. For the 49 to 54 age group, “instructions” again had high returns, along
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with information on organizational assistance and funding toward prep projects - the latter being
a response more frequently entered by all age groups 49 and above.

Age Groups Less Willing to Perform Prep Acts:
What would help you to perform an action?
18-24

49-54

55-60

61andUp

Info on Org. Assistance
4
3
2
Funding Toward Project

Provision of Materials (rain
barrel)

1
0

Time to Learn or Perform

Instructions on How to Perform

Figure 5.10. Motivators - Age Ranges 18-24, 49-54, 55-60, 61 and Up.
These data provide the ability to target municipal and nonprofit programs toward specific
subgroups (i.e. rain barrel installation demonstrations that offer take-home materials targeted
toward people ages 24 and under, or allocation of organizational assistance or nonprofit funding
to people ages 49 and up). Response data and radar chart representations of these data also help
to identify which programs, organizations, and tools can combine for beneficial results, such as
concert and college campus promotions for rain barrel demos, or concentrating volunteer prep
assistance toward aid or outreach groups working with older populations – in either and all of
these cases, targeted marketing and communications (i.e. social media posting and ad targeting)
can also be applied. Such efforts return additional data which in combination with regular
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reassessments via surveys or similar stakeholder inquiries can reveal and refine direct pathways enhancing precision and speed of progress toward greater stakeholder preparedness.
5.5.4 Potential improvements to and future use of stakeholder preparedness surveys
The stakeholder preparedness survey conducted in 2019 was more comprehensive than
most previous surveys conducted in the Greater New Orleans area. In addition to thorough
assessment of stakeholder preparedness and capacities, the survey also investigated risk
perceptions and risk communication. While this provided valuable data, incomplete survey
returns and respondent input to the online survey “comments” box convey the length of the
survey exceeded participant preferences or time availability. Ideally, future surveys intended for
residents of south Louisiana or other areas exposed to growing hazards risks can be made briefer.
One approach underway is a two-phase survey beginning with a “Phase I” set of questions
focused on prep steps taken, prep capacity, and risk perceptions at the start of the hurricane
season, then a Phase II, “Exit Survey” conducted at the end of the season to assess stakeholder
risk communication methods, experiences, outcomes, and takeaways toward future preparedness.
An “Exit Survey” reflecting these aims was conducted from November through
December 2019, and analysis of those results is underway. Although a “Phase I” survey for the
start of the 2020 hurricane season was developed, emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and
associated quarantine measures and shutdowns in the Greater New Orleans area required survey
contents to be altered with consideration toward the virus, changes in personal vulnerability due
to work losses, and other effects of the global pandemic felt locally. This, combined with a
highly active Atlantic hurricane season featuring several storms and storm tracks affecting
Louisiana and the Gulf Coast prompted creation of an “Exit Survey” containing abridged Phase I

130

components with late-season Phase II considerations. Distribution of the 2020 Exit Survey is
planned to begin in November, the generally accepted end to “peak” Atlantic hurricane season.
5.6 Limitations of Study
The main limitation upon reliable data analysis results, were the very data under
consideration. Both the validity and accuracy of reported SDG indicator data and associated
representations should be approached with caution. With regard toward validity, targets and
indicators assigned to SDG 7 – Clean and Affordable Energy provide one demonstration of SDG
measures of progress not matching the stated goal. Indicators and indicator metadata definitions
are provided for target 7.1, “by 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern
energy services” in Table 5.6. Issues raised concerning the validity of these indicators and
metadata definitions to measure target 7.1 include the absence of data on energy affordability
and reliability, and consideration toward whether provisions of clean cooking fuels (defined as
gas) can be considered “clean” and “modern.”
Table 5.6. Indicators and indicator metadata definitions for SDG target 7.1.
Goal
Target
Indicator
Indicator Metadata Definition
SDG 7 –
Ensure access
to affordable,
reliable,
sustainable
and modern
energy for all
(“Clean and
Affordable
Energy”)

7.1 – By 2030,
ensure
universal
access to
affordable,
reliable and
modern energy
services

7.1.1 –
Proportion of
population with
access to
electricity

7.1.1 MD – measured as the
share of people with electricity
access at the household level

7.1.2 –
Proportion of
population with
primary
reliance on
clean fuels and
technology

7.1.2 MD – measured as the
share of the total population with
access to clean fuels and
technologies for cooking (with
gas as predominate definition of
clean cooking “fuels”).

Target 7.1 is one of only five targets assigned to SDG 7 to measure progress toward
ensuring, “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all,” the full
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definition of the goal. Only two SDGs have a low target count of five assigned – SDG 7, and
SDG 13 – Climate Action, this is half the average number of targets (10) assigned to the 17
SDGs. Targets for SDG 13 remain largely undefined almost five years into the 2015–2030 SDG
timeframe. Two of the three non-MOI (means of implementation, generally funding) indicators
do not have metadata definitions and are instead categorized as “proxy” indicators (still awaiting
official definitions and open to national interpretation). This is largely why SDG 13 received a
zero rating for target coverage for analysis of data contained in the UN annual SDG report.
Further discussion and critique concerning SDGs 7 and SDGs 13 are available in sections 5.2.1.1
and 5.3.1 of the dissertation.
With regard toward accuracy of data and related representations of data, in several
instances, progress toward targets is distorted by incongruency of data entered with metadata
definitions, by the metadata definitions themselves, as well as, representations of regional
progress which are lacking sub-regional data. Incongruency of data is discussed in sections 4.2
and 5.3 concerning data entries on the U.S. federal sdg.data.gov site. Distortions due to metadata
definitions are related to lack of validity of measuring the intend ed target, as well as lack of
applicability of metadata targets toward First World national contexts, as demonstrated by
metadata for indicator 7.1.2 described above, and further described in section 5.3.1. Potential for
data representation distortions of regional data due to absence of sub-regional data were most
prevalent with the “Europe and Northern America” region in the UN annual SDG report. This is
further discussed in section 5.2 of this study.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
Toward the conclusion of the fifth meeting of the Open Working Group (OWG) on the
SDGs in November 2013, a familiar scene concerning perceptions of and limitations upon
“development” occurred:
… discussion on energy brought a dynamic exchange, with many recognizing that energy
access should figure prominently in the post-2015 development agenda. Calling energy a
“key enabler” of development—a term that some noted had also been applied to the
subjects of health, education, [industry] water, and food security—the nexus between
sustainable energy access and all other issues was repeatedly underscored. Kandeh
Yumkella, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sustainable Energy for All
gave an impassioned plea for an SDG on energy access for all (Offerdahl et al., 2013, p. 9).
This roundup of the fifth session followed two days of discussion between OWG Member States,
Committee Co-Chairs, and presenters such as Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, discussions which repeatedly
returned to issues of energy, the eventual focus of SDG 7.
Guest presenters at the OWG meeting pushed a renewable energy agenda assuring those
waiting for access that more affordable sources were on their way. Delegates of developing
countries facing challenges in health, safety, gender equality, and industrial advancement linked
such limitations to lack of energy access, and stressed the need for a transitional period of fossil
fuel use until renewables become accessible. Issues of ODA and other mechanisms of assistance
were also raised. Repeatedly, OWG regional representatives asked for energy access to be a main
SDG focus, and repeatedly “energy” for developing countries was converted to “renewable
energy” with a wait period for what is better for the world. When pressed by the inquiry again,
one presenter suggested use of the smart mini-grid model for rural locations while awaiting
arrival of major grids suppling access to clean energy.
Following his own presentation on SDSN’s guide to SDG creation, a report presented to
the OWG during its preceding session as well, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs fielded questions from his
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audience. When Member State Kenya pointed out, “industrialization requires energy,” and asked
how a sustainable energy goal might affect “developing countries’ ability to industrialize,” Sachs
fielded a few other observer questions before assuring the representative from Kenya that,
“renewable energy options for Africa are positive,” and further, that internal combustion engines
and coal “have no role in the future.” This response offers no actionable guidelines toward
achieving quick access to renewable energy in developing countries, yet it is also, in a sense,
instructing low energy-access countries which action to take (or, not take, as in “wait”). This is
typical for the top-down, developed-to-developing approach of the United Nations. It is also
characteristic of most UN-affiliated influencers and “Analysts” whose views of the world and its
workings tend to be at least slightly removed from reality, and further, the reality of the majority.
The exchange between the representative of Kenya and Dr. Sachs at the OWG planning
meeting presents a double disconnect in this respect, as the United States began pursuit of an
“Energy First” agenda partly focused on revitalizing the coal industry three years after Sachs
declared coal a thing of the past, and more than five years later the 2019 IEA energy outlook for
Africa featured a prominent section titled, “Full energy access remains elusive under current and
planned policies.” The section states 600 million people on the African continent still lack access
to electricity (with 900 million still without clean cooking), and describes the lack of access to
regular, reliable electricity as “brakes on the continent’s development (IEA, 2019b).”
Development and environmental sustainability as “dichotomies” were the topic of
multiple submissions to a public consultation hosted by SDSN upon release of its 100-indicator
SDG draft in 2014. Whether unlimited economy or development as presented in the framework
can coexist with environment was a question raised by several contributors. However, much like
a range of more complex entries to the consultation, this point garnered little attention toward
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framework and indicator adjustments. Smaller, less impactful suggestions for indicator
definitions were the most considered in that, quite a few of them were simply added to the
framework which eventually grew to 232 indicators by the following year. These stakeholder
indicators are less of a nod toward practically meeting or measuring needs as expressed and more
of a disorganized afterthought. So far, this form of expansion has produced steep gaps in data for
high-priority global goals that fell outside the original 100-indicator coverage thus were never
fully developed (see “Proxy Indicators,” Figure 5.3, target 13.2).
This is somewhat visible in SDG 7 – Affordable and Clean Energy. Rather than tackle the
larger issues of accessibility to renewables, SDG 7 became a goal with only five targets, two of
which concern ODA and still lack data five years into the resolution timeframe. The remaining
four - barring placement of energy access at the top of the target list (target 7.1), are identical or
similar targets moved “forward” from the 2000–2015 MDGs. Meanwhile, the smart mini-grid
model suggested by a presenter at the fifth OWG meeting has become a form of energy upon
which rural areas of developing countries depend, but not one often found in developed settings.
If all of this sounds familiar to concerns voiced by delegates of newly “sovereign”
formerly colonized countries just prior to the first megaconference on human environment in
1972, it’s because, those concerns are being realized. The Small Island Developing State (SIDS)
representative at the OWG meeting who voiced concern over needing energy access, but
simultaneously experiencing growing climate change impacts likely requires ODA to assist in
establishing large-scale renewable energy on the island (for which the representative spoke in
favor toward). But if the ODA does not arrive either via the Paris Agreement or commitments to
the SDGs or other pledges made via UN resolutions, then the developing small island is left in
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the dark, left with assurances that affordable clean energy and ODA are on their way, but in
reality there is no power exchange occurring.
And, arguably, that’s the point. As Hulme recounts of proceedings leading up to the final
MDG framework:
At a deeper level, the structures of global capitalism can be seen as shaping the MDGs …
At no time did the debates around the UN conferences of the 1990s, the [“idgs”], the
Millennium Declaration or the MDGs attempt to challenge the market economy in a
significant way. They could discuss trade reform and debt relief in terms of changes and
improvements, but not in terms of any fundamental changes to the overarching system.
Such matters were for other fora – WTO, G7/G8 the OECD – in which the US, and other
powerful entities, the EU, China and India would flex their muscles. All of these could be
ambivalent about Goals 1 to 6 of the MDGs, but would keep a careful eye on issues such
as trade, global environmental change and redesigning the international financial
architecture (Hulme, 2009, p. 46).
The ODA component fundamental to the SDG framework works to limit development in
poorer places. While some countries have been faithful deliverers over the years (Norway and
France, as examples) the largest economies have continued to hold back on aid. This stifles
advancements as basic as energy access while imposing rules upon how those goals can be
achieved in less advanced nations. Rather than Third World locations progressing, this instead
ensures the type of sustainable development (stagnant and non-carbon contributing) which the
developed world has defined through frameworks and poverty campaigns and correspondences
(Hulme, 2009; Sachs, 2012; UNGA 2017). This is why frameworks matter. It is also why many
if not all of the SDGs will fail to be realized (much like the MDGs).
Delegates of Founex in 1972 predicted precisely this - that First World
“environmentalism” would materialize as a means to cement underdevelopment via pushbacks to
industrialization in developing places in support of a “global” cause (meanwhile the North keeps
producing). This and other definitions of “development” delivered from the developed to
developing world have sparked decades’ worth of unanswered stakeholder calls for framework
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reform. But the “Analyst” is part of the developed domain which views itself as aptly governing
and providing correct solutions. The blind spots created by the “Analyst’s” position may be
partly responsible for the most oft-cited framework omission entered by stakeholders for
consideration during the 2014 SDSN consultation - Human Rights. It is another critical miss, in
this instance, missing one of the three fundamental dimensions (social) of the triple bottom line.
This is why stakeholder input toward any project affecting the public is crucial. Without it, riskpoverty nexus cycles will be created and perpetuated, fueled mostly by the redundancy of
geopolitical positioning and related frameworks of influence. The subsequent section takes a last
look at the MDG and SDG frameworks before a final section concerning related current and
future research.
6.1 UN MDG and SDG frameworks: A failed approach repeated
The idea of an indicator framework for the MDGs was initially introduced as a tool to
“harmonize reporting” using a set of numeric, “universal” indicators to monitor implementation
of global targets (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013). Several authors contend, however, that the
MDGs instead became an agenda that shaped the concept of development through choice, and
eventually prioritization of targets, and later, associated implementation measures (Fehling et al.,
2013; Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013; Hulme, 2009; Richard et al., 2011; Sachs, 2012). Regardless
of whether the framework is viewed as one or the other or both (tool and implementation
agenda), the MDGs and subsequent SDGs fail to properly function as either.
The start to the 2015 SDSN report, “Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the
Sustainable Development Goals: Launching a data revolution for the SDGs” establishes that:
Indicators will be the backbone of monitoring progress towards the SDGs at the local,
national, regional, and global levels. A sound indicator framework will turn the SDGs
and their targets into a management tool to help countries develop implementation
strategies and allocate resources accordingly, as well as a report card to measure
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progress towards sustainable development and help ensure the accountability of all
stakeholders for achieving the SDGs (SDSN, 2015, p. 2) [author emphasis].
Several aims and processes of the framework and its indicators are proposed. Among them, that
indicators will serve as monitors of progress at most geographic levels (global to local), and that
design of a sound indicator set will enable the framework to act as a management tool assisting
in implementation and allocation of resources (SDSN, 2015).
This is a lot to task a single framework with, a framework which at the time the “data
revolution” report was written contained comparatively less indicators – still around 100 total, or
~130 less than the final framework. None-the-less, treating the framework as both a method of
measuring progress (“report card”) and a method of shaping progress (“management tool”) is the
approach that took form. To achieve this, either duel functions need to be clearly assigned to
each indicator, or separate indicators must be designed for each purpose. The latter, two
designated sets, is not observed in definitions of indicators for the 17 SDGs, and attempts to
locate successful examples of indicators functioning as both a means of production and
measurement only highlight indicator weaknesses toward achieving either end.
Lack of guidance toward target achievement via “sound indicators” supposedly chosen
for the task was and is repeatedly highlighted in both UN and non-UN affiliated critiques
beginning with those concerning the MDG framework, which over time purported to serve
similar management purposes (Curtis & Poon, 2009; Fehling et al., 2013; Fukuda-Parr & Yamin,
2013; MacFeely, 2019; Richard et al., 2011; Saith, 2006; Saith 2007). Absence of instructional
pathways became further evident while performing target and target indicator data inspections
for the latter portion of the study. Data evaluation also revealed indicator weaknesses toward
measuring what indicators state is intended to be measured.
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6.1.1 Classification of the SDG indicators and framework
An indicator for the purposes of this study is defined as a variable used to evaluate a
condition or phenomenon (i.e. Population living on less than $1.25 per day to express extreme
poverty). Whereas indicators are variables, data provide measurements of the values of these
variables (i.e. Proportion of population living in extreme poverty over time, in multiple
locations). An indicator framework should act to organize these individual variables in a logical,
coherent manner for use (i.e. to guide data collection and/or communicate information).
There are several classifications of indicators and indicator frameworks (Table 6.1 and
Table 6.2). Performance indicators measuring in the agency-mode (i.e. in a monitoring or control
framework) are viewed as the most instrumental toward policy making in support of framework
targets, actions considered fundamental toward producing positive SDG results (Gudmundsson,
2003; UN ESCAP, 2015; UNISDR, 2008). Applying the class descriptors to SDG indicators and
outputs observed for this study, the SDG framework can only reach conceptual or utilization information classifications.
Table 6.1. Classification of indicators (Gudmundsson, 2003).
Classification

Indicator Description

Descriptive

basic indicator type; can be number, grade, times series, ratios, etc.

Performance

indicators compare descriptive variable to some standard, target value or
benchmark; used to monitor performance

Aggregate
Indices

series of indicators are weighted or otherwise merged into a few numb ers;
message provided often disputed and instrumental function in practice unclear

System

indicators measure states, flows, and changes in human or natural systems,
using appropriate descriptive or performance indicators

Agency

indicators focus on the activities of an agent (organization, government, etc.)
and assigns a responsibility to it (e.g. measuring in terms of ‘input to’, ‘output
from’ or ‘outcome of’ the agent’s activities)
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Table 6.2. Classification of indicator frameworks (Gudmundsson, 2003).
Classification

Framework Description

Type(s)

Conceptual

framework establishes
certain logic to selection of
indicators and contains
supporting technical
definitions, metrics &
linkages; serves to justify
each indicator as intelligible
signal distinguishing it from
total flow of information;
prescribes a specific
worldview with associated
categories, system
boundaries & ‘blind spots’
frameworks defined with
regard toward presence of
mechanisms to ensure info
from indicators is used (in
other words, presence of
accountability mechanisms)
… ( * Three Types)

N/A

Utilization

Information: Most unspecified in terms of use.
Indicators provided to broad audience which
may or may not use info as seen fit. Framework
typically employs descriptive indicators not
defined in agency mode. Accountability
mechanisms not specified other than implicit
plea to take info into account.
Monitoring: provides regular reporting on
progress of policies or programs to enable
feedback. May include performance indicators in
addition to descriptive ones. Policy makers,
administrators & stakeholders are main users.
Notions of accountability may appear, i.e. as
normative impetus to change course of action if
indicator suggests policy failure.
Control: aims to regulate policy making directly,
in terms of where and how to act. Provides
stronger links to policy making than monitoring
framework, and measures results strictly on
basis of performance indicators compared to a
standard, target or benchmark. Accountability is
key concern, regulative mechanisms of
accountability present. Top policy executives &
control/audit bodies are among users.

Additionally, the majority of indicators fall under the classification of descriptive. The
remainder mostly qualify as system indicators, however, with regard toward the UN report,
frequent aggregate data prevent designation as performance indicators. Similarly, absence of
regular reporting prevents the framework from exceeding a classification of utilization –
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information to a monitoring classification. A low number of specified performance outputs to
national agencies, and absence of national accountability via framework design (and absence of
data) puts the SDG framework far from the control classification. Its current format lacks clearly
defined indicators for sustainable development expansion targets, rendering the expansion
somewhat cumbersome without purpose, and outputs reported thus far make it little more than a
conceptual framework.
The conceptual classification asserts that such frameworks “prescribe a specific
worldview with associated categories, system boundaries and ‘blind spots,’” critiques applied
toward the SDG framework directly, as well as the choice to use a numeric measuring
framework to assess sustainable development progresses (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013; Saith,
2006; Saith, 2007). Applying frameworks of measurement causes exclusion of “immeasurable”
phenomena, often consisting of complex issues (i.e. advancing human rights) central to triple
bottom line sustainability. Framework application, particularly at a larger scale, is also known to
cause the “knowledge effect” whereby variables selected as indicators end up defining or
redefining the concept as a whole (i.e. “development” as poverty eradication in only Third World
settings via North-South aid).
These general criticisms apply along with direct critique of the SDGs as a framework
based in a First World worldview hindered by “blind spots.” The intended duel-function
framework, regardless of whether the attempt is considered successful, further compounds
criticisms toward First World frameworks. By setting out to create both a management and a
measurement tool, authors of the SDSN report positioned (or perhaps better put, confirmed)
themselves as architects in addition to analysts. This is a significant amount of control over
design and content which was presented to the OWG as guiding drafts. And, presence of repeat
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“analysts” on the task (i.e. Sachs and SDSN researchers) is reflected in the redundancy of style
and targets between the MDGs and SDGs, as well as supporting justification of targets.
Repetition in lieu of reform is a repeat practice, with carryover from unfulfilled UN
resolutions to newer resolutions spanning decades. When, ultimately, key targets are (again) not
met, focus is placed on the actors (donors, stakeholders) – never the script (the framework). The
act of assigning accountability, meaning and importance begins with the decision to measure
phenomena (Fukuda-Parr & Yamin, 2013; Gasparatos, 2010; Levy, 2015). Shaping concepts and
outcomes is the “Analyst’s” activity and role. The next act is choosing the measures, and to
whom and where they will be applied. If the analyst does not see a problem, it will not be
measured nor guided toward improvement. This is partly why nation-states such as the United
States conduct “Business As Usual” despite official inclusion of First World countries toward
2015–2030 SDG reporting – Even though the indicators are now being applied, the indicators many reminiscent of the MDGs, do not apply.
Table 6.3 from the SDSN “BAU” presentation to the OWG demonstrates the “blind
spots” - what analysts such as the SDSN researchers see and do not see from a First World
perspective, and how that view can shape decades’ worth of global policy. This additional table
in the 2013 SDSN report when considered with the Third World focus of the 2000–2015 MDGs,
partly explains why substantial climate change frameworks (and related results) have not
materialized. Just as blind spots can miss sighting real problems, hyper-focus upon one area can
cause lack of attention toward an issue absent from that one locale (Table 6.3).
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Table 6.3. “BAU” contributions to environmental degradation by region (SDSN, 2013).
Latin
North America &
America Caribbean Europe

GHG
Emissions

Middle
East &
N. Africa

SubSaharan
Africa

South &
Central
Asia

S.E. Asia
& Pacific

East
Asia

H

M

H

M

M

M

H

(Virtual Water)

H

M

H

H

M

M

M

Water & Air
Pollution by

M

M

M

H

H

H

Water Use

Agrochemicals

6.2 Stakeholders
Had more credence been paid to stakeholder concerns entered into SDSN’s own public
consultation on SDG indicators, this oversight may have been highlighted by multiple comments
questioning whether environment should be considered “at odds” with development, expressed
as economic expansion in the draft as well as through much of the resulting final framework.
Stakeholder input toward the SDGs wasn’t only restricted by rejections or conditions of NGO
consultative status, meaningful input was also largely ignored by analysts and planners. In
addition to low attention paid toward critiques published during the “open call” Post-2015
Agenda, underutilized stakeholder entries submitted during the SDSN public consultation serve
as another critical example. Public comments requested more focus on balanced economy rather
than measures of poverty, and provided practical, meaningful indicators, including indicators to
addresses shortcomings of SDG 7 which were not applied.
One noticeable change that did come to pass was omission of an indicator concerning
gender equality and reproductive rights. At least 50 participants took particular issue with
wording of the indicator. Rather than expressing the target as clearly pursuant to family planning
options and bodily autonomy, the entry read, “rapid voluntary reduction of fertility” which many
respondents argued was restrictive and implied a form of forced population control rather than
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reproductive freedoms. Stakeholders emailing or commenting on the consultation online had
been forewarned about this particular indicator, as approximately half of the entries calling for
removal consisted of a form letter which rather apparently circulated among NGOs, in particular
those focused on human rights. While the indicator in question was questionable and may have
been removed during independent reevaluation, the form letter submissions show that
stakeholders possessed knowledge pathways and united to create a very apparent call for action.
These types of connections may become critically important in communities closely
affected by climate change hazards and other vulnerabilities. There is vast potential at present to
create knowledge pathways similar to those which began to emerge in response to social media
sharing of the SDG stakeholder survey. While geographically close, in-person stakeholder
groups and group participation offer several benefits, social media groups offer exchange of
information over long ranges and between a diverse range of participants. Further, as poor
governance and potential hazards associated with poor performance toward global goals is a very
real concern that emerges from this work, the reality that certain restraints on movements and
interpersonal activities may arise (i.e. the 2020 COVID-19 global pandemic) distinguishes online
surveying and use of social media as – not only tools of interest worthy of further investigation,
but also as instruments to disseminate and collect data toward vital assessment, communication,
and enhancement of risk preparedness and awareness in changing global and local conditions.
6.3 Final Takeaways and Future Implications of Research
Meaningful progress, particularly on the part of more advanced nations, is unlikely to be
achieved toward global goals concerned with sustainable development, risk reduction, and
climate change action. New approaches toward construction of frameworks that promote truly
inclusive design of targets and when possible contextually appropriate indicators is a potential
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next step toward addressing multiple global crises. However, this is a path that should be scaled
down further to national provinces or even towns. One SDG that was not discussed as much as
merited was SDG 11 – Sustainable Cities and Communities which had only 20 percent target
coverage in the UN report. It is a mostly new SDG added as part of the sustainable development
angle and related framework expansion. This is a goal that arguably cannot be adequately
measured regularly or accurately from a national level, this is especially true of larger countries
such as the United States. A scaled down, bottom-up approach may be the only option available
to stakeholders should vulnerability producing conditions (i.e. poor governance, income
inequality, climate change exacerbating policies) continue. In a sense, the unreliable, ODAdependent MDG and SDG framework structures provide a valuable lesson that promises of
assistance or assurances of safe conditions should not be depended upon.
One savvy stakeholder who participated in the SDSN consultation managed to foresee
and summarize these likely outcomes of the SDG framework, “Nations will ignore sections of
these goals which are not in their economic interest. Many of these objectives are expensive to
implement and can be mutually exclusive without adequate investment of money and technology
(SDSN, 2014).” That same respondent adds, “Goals need to be realistic in terms of applicability
to market-oriented national interests.” An entry a little further down asks, “How do you factor in
economics vs environmental impact?” Quite a few more reference the need to address lack of
meaningful measures toward human rights, as previously mentioned. And still more added quite
valuable analytical outlooks on the framework, its contents, as well as the overall challenges of
climate change, sustainability, and risk reduction (Table 6.4).
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In their 1999 paper, “Flood protection and management: quo vadimus?” Kundzewicz &
Takeuchi suggest an approach to disaster preparedness that can be generally described as “safefail” rather than “fail-safe.” They pose:
[S]afety is an illusion, a change of paradigm is needed: it is necessary to live with
awareness of the possibility of floods. No matter how high a design flood is, there is a
possibility of having floods greater than the design flood that will cause losses. Should
one design dikes to withstand a 100-year flood or perhaps a 200-year flood? The latter
solution would give a better protection, being far more costly. Yet, it may still turn out to
be insufficient if a 500-year or a 1000-year flood arrives …There is no single universal
remedy against floods and site-specific local efforts are necessary. It is essential to
undertake damage mitigation measures together with physical control measures for flood
management in an integrated approach, using a mixture of structural and non-structural
means. A more disaster conscious society needs to be built with better preparedness and
safe-fail (safe in failure) rather than, unrealistic, fail-safe (safe from failure) design of
flood defences (Kundzewicz & Takeuchi, 1999, pgs. 417 & 428).
While the authors focus most of the paper on flooding in Japan, the “safe in failure” approach is
well-suited for flood vulnerable locations such as the site of the hurricane stakeholder survey,
New Orleans, LA. Annual surveys to assess capacity can be performed via social media
distribution to assess “safe-fail” capacities leading up to and at the start of the Atlantic hurricane
season. Regular Facebook polls and polls following significant events can work to continue
assessment through the season, and to keep community members engaged in preparedness
strengthening. These assessments can be used to create social media posts containing
preparedness information, news articles, even popular memes to address weaknesses identified
during evaluation of respondent data. Following up with reader questions and comments acts to
both assess and inform. This data can be applied toward designing online and in-person
stakeholder activities to guide and fortify hazards preparedness capacity.
Given the large potential for growing inequality, climate impacts, civil unrest, and abuse
of government among other possible conditions implied by lack of commitment and
accomplishment toward clearly vital ends, a stakeholder-centric, “safe-fail” approach in the
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absence of true global progresses will diminish harm to human populations with high or
increasing hazards exposure.
Table 6.4. Further comments from the SDSN 2014 Public Consultation (SDSN, 2014).
Select Comments, SDSN 2014 Public Consultation (post-release of initial 100 indicators)
Given the massive rebound effects in de-coupling economic growth from resource use
and the great inequality in resource use the goal to achieve development within planetary
boundaries cannot be reached by moving each country up in income levels. Taking the
absolute limits for resource use serious that the concept of Planetary Boundaries implies
suggests stronger language in the sense that “each country aspires to secure prosperity
and wellbeing with no more than its fair share in resource use with respect to planetary
boundaries and incorporate them…” This would also support goal 09 and target 09a on
addressing the drivers of ecosystem degradation, sending a strong signal for sufficiency
considerations, the currently unmentioned core principle of sustainable development
(along with efficiency and consistency).
It may be helpful if the physical and scientific rather than conventional and legislative or
economic reasons for sustainable development goals are emphasized along with a
charismatic (rather than pedantic or academic) call for governments, corporates,
businesses, professionals, academics, civil society and religions to collaborate towards a
technological and life style change required to generate a sustainable civilization.
At some point, it has to be recognized that the poverty of 'poor' countries is almost
entirely a creation of western intervention, a direct result of 'foreign investment for the
sake of economic growth', which has been the popular euphemism for wealthy western
businesses owning and controlling all of the resources and dictating the actions of
governments, backed up by US and sometimes even UN soldiers. The 'debts' those
countries owe to western powers are essentially fraudulent, the western powers owe
those countries for the resources we have stolen, not the other way around, and those
multinational companies that benefit from this arrangement should not be allowed to
continue having input into solving the problems they themselves have created, because
they have every incentive to continue making those problems worse.
While the Goals and Targets are vital, by what means (besides ODA, official development
assistance) are they to be advanced? Evidently the Goals are ends, in relation to which
the Targets are constituent ends; but what will be the means? An Indicator is des cribed in
the draft as a management tool, the utility of which evidently presupposes the existence
of a reasonably functional, dedicated managerial apparatus. It seems this must be
governmental to a significant extent, even if partnered in some way with nongovernmental structures. At the same time, appropriate motivation to attain the intended
objectives is evidently needed in leaders, staff and the public—to “mobilize action”, a
stated expectation. Are the apparatus and motivation likely to exist, and if not, are they
likely to be generated and directed effectively, within the 15-year framework? As a
preliminary step, are the Goals and Targets to be incorporated into existing or new
national law, and is this reasonably likely to occur expeditiously? If so, are the resulting
laws likely to have a significant enforcement rate? Does the organizational structure
needed for this to occur exist, both nationally and down the line regionally and locally?
147

(table cont’d)
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals are one of the most important agenda for
humanity for which we have already invested lots of human hours and cos ts to advance
the cause. Regretfully, however, I have many points of concerns on the outcome and
impact of this program at large because the motto of sustainable development is, in
reality, an intellectual copout for citizens of United Nations. Considering our failure in
meeting the goals of the 1992 UN Convention on biodiversity and indefinite global
resolution to the mitigation of climate change I do not see how all of us could trust what
UN’s continued program expansion for sustainable development without direct attack on
the doubling impacts of 7.2+ billions of our cohorts in the world community as if today’s
environment and socio-economic demands were at the level of 1990s. Where is your
proposed determination and care for sustainable global biodiversity, whereas biodiversity
is continually destroyed and worsening global biodiversity that is the foundation of our lifesupport system. Without continued emphasis on biodiversity under the threat of rapid
increase in human population and sustainable development throughout the world we
must be prepared to deal with the ultimate outcome of our abusive destruction of the
planetary life-support system – this reality should be reflected on every projects and
programs the United Nations continues to develop for the sustainability of humanity and
human species.
The post-2015 goals process is a historic opportunity for the world to move towards a
bold new vision of the future, which has socio-economic equity, ecological sustainability,
and genuine prosperity for all as its central pillars. The two reports under comment here,
started with this promise. Both reports have a number of positive elements, including a
focus on the need to eradicate extreme poverty, reach basic entitlements to all, integrate
the multiple objectives of development, environment, and equity (including gender),
enhance both jobs and livelihoods, phase out fossil fuel subsidies, and achieve
sustainable production and consumption. The comments below do not take away from
appreciation for this progressive orientation. However, actually achieving these objectives
requires a robust and deep diagnosis of the problems we face today, including their
structural basis; and then a bold set of actions that are able to tackle the roots of these
problems. Unfortunately neither report provides an assessment of why, for instance,
Agenda 21 was not implemented, why Rio+20 could not come out with as concrete and
bold an outcome as Rio did 20 years before it, why nation-states have failed to come up
with a coherent response to the climate crisis starting at us, and so on. The systemic and
structural roots of continuing poverty, destitution, hunger, and malnutrition, and everincreasing inequities, are not dealt with. Given the above failure of diagnosis, it is not
surprising that the reports do not go the distance and direction needed to achieve the
objectives they set themselves. The SD Solutions report goes beyond the High-Level
Panel report on some counts (mentioned below), but both contain fundamental
weaknesses and gaps that will render them unable to achieve, beyond some marginal
improvements, the goals of sustainability, equity, and meaningful prosperity.
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APPENDIX A. GLOBAL INDICATOR FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND TARGETS OF THE 2030 AGENDA
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Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish where she served low-income families in areas hit hardest by
Katrina. The remarkably slow recovery experienced by her clientele, particularly when compared
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